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Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN




[1 Human rights have not figured prominently on the agenda of the
nine-member Association for Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) since its
inception in 1967.' Rather, the pursuit of regional security and cooperative
measures for promoting trade and economic development have been
paramount ASEAN objectives. By" insisting on a strict separation between
human rights policy and trade issues,2 ASEAN has marginalized human
rights and has consistently opposed the use by foreign states or
international organizations of economic or other forms of pressure to
induce change in human rights practices. ASEAN member states display
an antipathy towards critical scrutiny of their human rights records-for
example, in reports from the United States Department of State or
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch. ASEAN's general response has been that this
*Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore; LLM (Harvard);
Barrister (GI); BA (Oxon.) (Hons). The writer is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the University
of Cambridge researching minority rights questions in relation to international law and
domestic governance. This Article is a revised and updated version of a paper presented at
the "Linking the Domestic and the International: Human Rights into the 21st Century"
conference, held at the University of Toronto on October 2-4,1998 in celebration of the Tenth
Anniversary of their International Human Rights Program.
1. As of March 1999, the current ASEAN Member States include Brunei, Burma
(Myanmar), Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. The
decision was taken at the Sixth ASEAN Summit to admit Cambodia as the tenth member of
ASEAN sometime in 1999, thus fulfilling the founder's vision of "ASEAN-10" whereby all
states in the region of Southeast Asia were united through membership in ASEAN.
2. In his opening address to the Twenty-Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, for example,
the Prime Minister of Malaysia noted that "when the issue of human rights is linked to trade,
investment and finance, ASEAN cannot but view it as added conditionalities and
protectionism by other means." Joint Communiqu6 of the Twenty Fourth ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting, July 19-20,1991,917 (visited May 27,1999)
<http://www.aseansec.org/politics/pramm24.htm>. All ASEAN joint communiqu6s are
available at the home page of the ASEAN Secretariat at <http://www.aseansec.org>.
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constitutes foreign intervention in domestic matters, which undermines
state sovereignty and violates -the sacred principle of nonintervention in
internal affairs. Within the context of ASEAN itself, an emphasis on
harmony, compromise and consensus in ordering interstate relations helps
to preserve a fraternal silence with respect to the human rights violations of
member states. ASEAN policy (or lack thereof) towards human rights has
been one of reticence and nonengagement.
H2 A sea change in ASEAN policy has, however, been discernible in
the last decade of this century. Although a regional or subregional human
rights regime such as those found in Europe, the Americas, and Africa
remains conspicuous by its absence in Southeast Asia, there is a new, clear
willingness on the part of ASEAN states to engage in human rights
discourse, albeit on their own terms. The 1993 World Conference on
Human Rights placed the spotlight on human rights as a matter of
international concern. ASEAN states did not disavow the universal
character of the idea of human rights nor the noble cause of promoting
human dignity it espoused. They did, however, insist that the application
and mode of implementing human rights fall within the realm of national
competence, subject to particular economic, social, and cultural realities.
[3 Spokesmen from some ASEAN states, particularly Singapore and
Malaysia, buoyed atop a wave of impressive economic development and
growth rates, have challenged the universalist pretensions of human rights
law. Under the relativistic banner of "Asian values," they champion an
alternative model of domestic governance and development. This was in
part a defensive response to the proclamation of a New World Order by
United States President George Bush in the aftermath of the Cold War. The
United States appeared to be declaring, in hegemonic fashion, the triumph
of Western values, such as democracy, human rights, and market.
economics. The ASEAN response was also, in part, presented as a bulwark
against the undesirable social problems rife in permissive Western
societies, which, marked by excessive individualism and contentiousness,
are viewed as products of excessive freedom unchecked by a strong sense
of civic responsibility.3 By contrast, ASEAN spokesmen characterize
societies based on "Asian values" as disciplined, group-oriented rather than
atomized, and valuing duty to the community over the assertion of rights.
These societies are further said to feature consensus-seeking and a
deferential respect for public officials and institutions in the interests of
public harmony. Critics contend that such arguments smack of an apology
for misuse of power by authoritarian governments. The "Asian values"
school has mounted a counter-offensive, critiquing human rights as a
Western, ethnocentric imposition, hypocritically championed by Western
states whose own human rights records are remiss not only in terms of
their former colonial practices but also their contemporary "home" states of
3. See Shared Values White Paper, Cmd. 1 of 1991, Jan. 2,1991 (presented to Parliament by
Command of the President of the Republic of Singapore) (noting that "traditional Asian ideas
of morality, duty and society which have sustained and guided us in the past are giving way
to a more Westemised, individualistic and self-centred outlook on life.").
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I4 The glaring disparity between theory and practice is nowhere more
apparent than in the field of human rights. Southeast Asia, not unlike any
other part of the world, is not devoid of human rights violations, which do
not escape notice abroad. The media, Internet, and NGOs have, for
example, focused particular attention on the extra-judicial killings,
disappearances, and tortures by the Indonesian military in East Timor,
Acheh, and Irian Jaya, where separatist movements exist. Given the
widespread terror campaign undertaken against Chinese minorities, the
human rights situation in Indonesia was also closely scrutinized in the
aftermath of the May 1998 riots. The repressive policies of the military
junta in Burma (Myanmar),5 the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC), against Mon and Karen minorities-including forced labor and
forcible relocation-has also assured Burma a place in the media spotlight.
SLORC's continued ruthless suppression of the political opposition,
headed by the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner and leader of the National
League of Democracy (NLD), Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, attracts continuing
international attention. Finally, critics of Singapore and Malaysia highlight
the governments' strict media control, libel and censorship laws, and
illiberal preventive detention statutes, while Thailand struggles with
problems of child labor and prostitution.
5 Clearly, the disagreement by ASEAN states over the content and the
manner of implementation of human rights norms, and the lack of
enforcement machinery pose formidable obstacles to the advancement of
human rights in this region. The ASEAN stance has served to highlight the
difficulties of ensuring international accountability for governments'
treatment of individuals and groups, while also taking the realities of
cultural diversity seriously.
[6 This Article offers a critical review of the attitudes that ASEAN and
its individual member states have displayed toward the substantive
content and enforcement of human rights. It seeks to identify the obstacles
to the development of human rights protection in Southeast Asia, and it
suggests what the author considers to be the best strategies for constructing
4. In commenting upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights before the 53rd
Session of the U.N. General Assembly, the Permanent Representative of Singapore noted that
"[i]t is shocking to realize today that much of the Declaration was drafted then by major
colonial powers who saw no contradiction between colonial rule and human rights. Double
standards were present in 1948. They continue to remain in 1998." Ambassador Kishore
Mahbubani, Statement on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 Dec 98, Dec. 10,1998,
J 5 (visited May 27,1999) <http://www.gov.sg/mfa/NewYork>.
5. When the military junta known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) took power in Burma in 1988, it announced in June 1990 that the official English
name of the country was "Myanmar" and that of the capital was changed from Rangoon to
Yangon. The country is addressed as Myanmar before the United Nations and ASEAN.
Demonstrations against the takeover were brutally suppressed and SLORC refused to
recognize the results of the elections they held in May 1990, which was overwhelmingly won
by the opposition National League for Democracy, lead by Aung San Suu Kyi. The opposition
continues to reject the term "Myanmar" in protest against the illegitimacy of the present
regime. For the purposes of this article, "Burma" is used in preference over "Myanmar."
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the most effective and realistic approach to promoting human rights in that
context. It argues that despite the general shunting aside of human rights
issues to the periphery of the ASEAN agenda, there is cause for cautious
optimism with respect to the prospects for promoting human rights in
Southeast Asia in conjunction with ASEAN. This assessment is based on a
consideration of the developments that have taken place on three levels:
national, international, and subregional.
f7 In the national context, certain ASEAN states have made human
rights a part of their national agendas. Both the Philippines and Indonesia
have recently set up national human rights commissions, while the 1997
Thai constitution requires the establishment of such a commission by
October 1999. A law to regulate the Thai human rights commission is
currently in the process of being drafted.6 Both Indonesia and Thailand
have, furthermore, announced national plans of action on human rights.7
Meanwhile, the Thai government has for the first time committed itself to
the promotion and protection of democratic values and human rights in
international fora, as Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh declared in
his 1997 foreign policy statement before parliament.8
8 At the international level, individual ASEAN member states have
displayed a greater openness to acceding to human rights conventions and
have participated vigorously in human rights debates within United
Nations fora. This may be seen as an unequivocal acceptance that human
rights are a matter of legitimate international concern; .how this concern
should be expressed, however, is still open to question.
19 At the subregional level, ASEAN states have departed from
previous practice by discussing the issue of human rights in formal
meetings, albeit stressing that human rights are contingent upon the
distinct economic and cultural conditions of the region. The seed of
promise for advancing human rights within the institutional framework of
ASEAN was planted in the 1993 Joint Communiqud issued at the Twenty-
Sixth Annual Ministerial Meetings (AMM), held a month after the Vienna
Human Rights Conference. In it, the ASEAN foreign ministers expressly
affirmed the Vienna Declaration 9 and agreed that "ASEAN should
coordinate a common approach on human rights and actively participate
and contribute to the application, promotion and protection of human
6. See THAI CoNsr., reprinted in Sampong Sucharitkul, Kingdom of Thailand, in 18
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 49-50 (Gisbert Flan ed., 1998). The drafting
process is currently underway. For a review of some of the difficulties involved in the process,
see Challenges Mounted on Human Rights Bill: Changes by Council of State Defy Charter, BANGKOK
POST, Mar. 4,1999.
7. These are available through the web pages of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry,
<http://www.deplu.go.id>, and Thai Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mfa.go.th>,
respectively.
8. See e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Human Rights in Thailand (visited May
27,1999) <http://www.mfa.go.th/hr/>.
9. Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, signed June 25,1993, U.N. GAOR, World
Conf. on Hum. Rts., 48th Sess., 22nd plen mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993), reprinted in
32 I.L.M. 1664-87 (1993).
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rights.'' They also stated that basic human rights violations could not be
tolerated under any pretext and demanded that all governments should
uphold humane standards and respect human dignity. Significantly, there
was agreement that, in support of the Vienna Declaration, "ASEAN should
consider the establishment of an appropriate regional mechanism on
human rights." ASEAN parliamentarians reiterated this call for a regional
human rights mechanism in October 1993,11 but government enthusiasm
for the project later- diminished. No concrete government proposal was
made, nor was the issue featured in subsequent annual meetings of the
foreign ministers. World attention was focused on human rights again in
1998, by the five-year implementation review of the Vienna Declaration
and Program of Action 2 and the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). In the 1998 Joint Communiqud,
ASEAN ministers recalled their 1993 decision to consider establishing an
appropriate regional human rights mechanism. 3  Further, they
acknowledged the efforts and dialogue conducted with a nongovernment
initiative-the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights
Mechanism-beginning in 1996."4 It remains uncertain whether this
initiative will be consigned to the realm of rhetoric or translated into action.
10 In the author's opinion, attention and effort should be directed
toward establishing such a subregional human rights regime, rather than
an Asian regime. Indeed, given Asia's geographical breadth, lack of shared
historical past (even from the colonial era), and its varied political
ideologies, legal systems, cultural-religious traditions, and levels of
economic development, 5 "Asia" is not a coherent unit.16 It would be a
10. Text is available at <http://www.aseansec.org/politics/pramm26.htm>.
11. See ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization Declaration on Human Rights, art. 21,
reprinted in 3 ASIAN Y.B. INT'L L 500 (1993) [hereinafter AIPO Declaration] ("It is likewise the
task and responsibility of member states to establish an appropriate regional mechanism on
human rights.").
12. See Interim Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Five-
Year Review of the Implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 54e
Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/104 (1998). Paragraph 5 notes that among the ASEAN
countries, Brunei Darussalam and Vietnam have sent their views concerning the review
process to the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. Id. 5.
13. See Joint Communiqu6 of the Thirty-First ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, July 1998
(visited May 27,1999) <http://www.aseansec.org/politics/pramm31.htm>.
14. The Secretariat of the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism is
located at 3/F Human Rights Center, School of Law, Ateneo de Manila University, 130 HV de
]a Costa SJ Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City, Metro Manila 3116, Philippines. Its email
address is <ahrc@acc.aiti.admu.edu.ph>.
15. See Hiroko Yamane, Asia and Human Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
HuMAN RIGHT 651 (Karl Vasek & Philip Alston eds., 1982).
16. The idea of "Asia" itself is European in origin. See Onuma Yasuaki, In Quest of
Intercivilizational Human Rights: Universal vs. Relative Human Rights Viewed from an Asian
Perspective, CENTER FOR ASIAN PACIFIC AFFAIRS 1 (Occasional Paper No. 2, March 1996).
Yasuaki writes: "The very notion of Asia is not Asian, but of European origin. There is no
single Asia, there are many Asias. It is commonplace to talk about the diversity of Asia and to
divide Asia into four regions: East, Southeast, South and West (Near East and Middle East, to
adopt a more Eurocentric terminology). However, even in such subregions there remains
enormous diversity." Id. at 1-2.
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Herculean task to find consensus on human rights norms in this context.
Transnational regimes must be founded upon shared values," since
international institutions embody their creators' willingness to adopt a
cooperative approach toward common concerns. ASEAN states largely
lack such a common value system.8 Their post-colonial governments range
from Islamic absolute monarchies to military juntas to secular presidential
and parliamentary forms of democracy. Given, moreover, that East Asia
lacks a political infrastructure akin to the Council of Europe, the
Organization of American States, or the Organization of African Unity,
associating a regional or subregional human rights system with ASEAN is
more realistic. This would take advantage of the existing political
infrastructure and, more importantly, the established practice of working
together. What binds ASEAN states is a shared pragmatism and
consensual ethos in interstate relations, as well as a staunch adherence to
the cardinal principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of member
states, enshrined in Article 2(c) of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia. 9 Although ASEAN has historically treated
human rights as a matter of domestic jurisdiction and state sovereignty, the
possibility of establishing a subregional protective human rights
mechanism represents a significant foothold and change in thinking that
should be exploited. 20
[11 The task of protecting human rights in the ASEAN context is
twofold. On the one hand, an ASEAN Charter of Human Rights should be
formulated with the widespread consultation and participation of state and
non-state actors; its standards should be compatible with international
17. The European, American and African human rights regimes operate on the
assumptions that their member-states share common values. The preamble to the 1950
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms refers
to the like-mindedness and common heritage of political traditions shared by the
governments of European countries while that of the 1969 American Convention on Human
Rights reaffirms the intention of the American states "to consolidate in this hemisphere, within
the framework of democratic institutions, a system of personal liberty and social justice based
on respect for the essential rights of man". In similar fashion, the preamble to the 1981 African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights affirms "the values of African civilization which
should inspire and characterize" the conceptualisation of human and peoples' rights.
18. See e.g., Yash Ghai, Asian Perspectives on Human Rights, 23 HONG KONG L.J. 342 (1993);
ASEAN IDEN=rrY, DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURE (R.P. Anand & Purificacion V. Quisumbing
eds., 1981).
19. signed Feb. 24,1976, available at <http: //vww.aseansec.org/summit/amiY76.htm>.
For a collection of ASEAN documents and related materials, see ASEAN DOCUMENTS SERIES,
1967-1988 (3rd ed., 1988) and R. NAGI, ASEAN: 20 YEARs, A COMPREHENSIVE
DOCUMENTATION 134 (1989).
20. Invoking "sovereignty" as a protective shield against a state's treatment of individuals
within its territorial boundaries is inconsonant with U.N. practice: human rights matters fall
outside the insulation of the domestic jurisdiction clause in Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.
See generally Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty," 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31
(1995/96); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International
Law, 84 AM. J. INT'LL. 866 (1990); Rudolf Bernhardt, Domestic Jurisdiction of States and
International Human Rights Organs, 7 HUM. RTS. L. J. 205 (1986); Jurgen Habermas, Human
Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and Republican Versions, 7 RATIO JRis 1 (1994);
Seyom Brown, Human Rights vs. State Rights, in INTrERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A CHANGING
GLOBAL SYSTEM: TOWARD A THEORY OF THE WORLD POLTY 94-106 (1996).
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norms. On the other, a subregional protective mechanism vested with
monitoring powers, allowing individuals to report alleged human rights
abuses to an independent forum, is needed within ASEAN. These
subregional efforts must be complimented by human rights promotion
through domestic procedures and active participation in the United
Nations human rights regime at the global level. Such collective fostering
of a human rights culture forms the substratum of any effort to advance
human rights.
f12 This Article advocates a three-tier national/regional/international
approach to advancing human rights protection. Such an approach
envisages the cooperative efforts of NGOs and the international
community in engaging ASEAN states and encouraging them, both
individually and as ASEAN policymakers, to improve their human rights
commitments as an integral facet of good governance. Their incentive to do
so would be the domestic and international rewards of a good human
rights record.
[13 Part I of this Article lays the groundwork for a contextualized
response to human rights issues by providing an overview of the genesis
and evolution of ASEAN in its thirty-two years of existence. Part II
examines the reasons for the so-called "Asian values" school's theoretical
counterchallenge to the universality of human rights, and the form that this
argument has assumed. It goes on to discuss the scope of ASEAN states'
engagement in the United Nations human rights regime to date. Finally, it
suggests some factors-centered on developmentalism and individual
duties-that might influence the construction of an ASEAN Charter of
Human Rights, and highlights how they may be obstacles to the promotion
of human rights. Part Ill deals with the attitude ASEAN states have
exhibited towards the implementation of human rights among other
member-states. It considers how the ASEAN preference for consensus,
nonconfrontation, and adherence to the principle of nonintervention in
internal affairs shapes the response of ASEAN states to human rights
abusers iri their midst, as well as to external critics. To assess whether the
general commitment to nonintervention has weakened, it examines recent
developments where certain ASEAN states have adopted differing stances
towards human rights issues. Lastly, it discusses how ASEAN
programmatic goals, characterized as matters of "functional cooperation,"
are related to human rights, and urges that this linkage be made explicit.
Part IV considers the developing institutions, processes, and initiatives that
have been undertaken to construct a human rights regime. It focuses on
national human rights commissions within ASEAN and the initiative,
pursued by a private group of concerned individuals-the Working Group
for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism-to promote a subregional
human rights system by engaging the ASEAN Secretariat. Some
observations are offered on the form such a mechanism might take. Lastly,
Part V evaluates the traumatic effects of economic crises and socio-political
upheavals in some ASEAN member states, and the impact that this might
have on the push toward democratic reform and human rights protection
1999]
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in the region.
I. ASEAN: AN AMBIVALENCE TOWARDS HUMAN RIGHTS?
A. The Formation and Evolution of ASEAN
14 ASEAN, formed in August 1967 by five noncommunist Southeast
Asian states of Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Singapore, was born "out of fear rather than idealistic convictions about
regionalism.'2' The withdrawal of colonial powers from the region had
created a power vacuum and a common fear about the spread of
communism, which was already entrenched in Vietnam and the People's
Republic of China. ASEAN was designed to present a united front against
communism, an orientation that drew the support of the United States,
then engaged in a war to prevent South Vietnam from falling into the
hands of the North Vietnamese communists.
f15 ASEAN heralded a new era in a region that had previously been
destabilized by the clash of national interests and the ensuing conflicts.
Malaysia and the Philippines, for example, had disputed the possession of
Sabah, while Indonesia pursued an aggressive policy of confrontation with
the Federation of Malaysia from 1963 to 1965.2 After these disputes were
resolved and diplomatic ties normalized, ASEAN came into being. The
initial unifying bond among its member states was their common
vulnerability to, and shared antipathy toward, Vietnam. ASEAN was not
designed to be a military alliance, although the founding members
subscribed to the idea of finding strength in numbers and sought to reduce
their collective dependence on foreign powers. In addition to providing a
forum for the peaceful resolution of intraregional disputes, ASEAN
allowed its member states to escape their historical experience of colonial
exploitation and Western nations' imperialistic maneuverings by
safeguarding political and economic stability from external interference.
This was to preserve the national identities of ASEAN states in accordance
with their peoples' aspirations.'
21. See S. Rajaratnam, ASEAN: The Way Ahead, in THE ASEAN READER xxiii, xxvi (K.S.
Sandhu & Sharon Siddique eds., 1992). On ASEAN generally, see ASEAN SECRETARIAT,
ASEAN AT THIRTY (1998) (full text may be'downloaded from
<http://www.aseansec.org/general/asean3Op.htm>); DEREK McDOUGALL, THE
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE NEW ASIA PACIFIC 199 (1997); CAESAR EsPIRrru, LAW AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASEAN (1986).
22. For a discussion of Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia, which arose out of a
territorial dispute stemming from Sabah and Sarawak's colonial legacy and resulted in the
severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries, see generally DEWI FORTUNA
ANWAR, INDONESIA IN ASEAN: FOREIGN POLICY AND REGIONALISM 17-57 (1994).
23. See The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), signed Aug. 8,1967, preamble
(establishing ASEAN). The ASEAN founding documents are available at
<http://www.aseansec.org>. See also the appendix of documents in ASEAN SECRErARIAT,
ASEAN: AN OVERVIEW (1994).
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f16 In order to improve the welfare of the people of ASEAN,
immediate priority was given to pursuing regional cooperation in the field
of economics and development. Principle TII of the Declaration of ASEAN
Concord declared that a primary concern of ASEAN states was the
"elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy" through intensive
cooperation in "economic and social development, with particular
emphasis on the promotion of social justice and on the improvement of the
living standards."2 4 Economic growth was regarded as a way to promote
national resilience. ASEAN governments believed that poverty and
economic discontent could motivate internal communist insurgencies and
that the best way of countering this was through economic development in
close association with the West. This not only required internal political
stability to build donor and investor confidence, but would also buttress
stability.
[17 National resilience would naturally strengthen the sinews of
regional resilience. In 1976, it was established, as a matter of principle, that
ASEAN states adopt a common stance in international fora on matters
affecting the region.2 Further, a "strong ASEAN community" and sense of
regional identity was to actively be sought in accordance with the
fundamental principles of self-determination, sovereign equality, and
noninterference in the internal affairs of nations. These principles, along
with abstention from the threat or use of force and the pacific settlement of
disputes, were inspired by the United Nations Charter. It is significant,
however, that little reference is made in these documents to the preeminent
U.N. goal of promoting respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms.' Awakening a "rights consciousness" in ASEAN peoples was to
be avoided as it might provoke claims against their governments. That,
ASEAN leaders felt, would impede the exercise of broad government
powers required to achieve development goals. Civil liberties, for example,
were subject to the overriding state-determined objective of public order,
as manifested by the use of draconian preventive detention laws in
Singapore and Malaysia (a British colonial bequest) to control subversive
elements trying to infiltrate trade unions or other organs of civil society.
118 ASEAN emerged as a political community and won the
recognition and respect of the international community as a cohesive
regional body when it took a principled stand, particularly before the
24. Declaration of ASEAN Concord, signed Feb. 24,1976, preamble (visited May 1999)
<http://www.aseansec.org/summit/concord.htm> (enunciated eight primary principles and
objectives to be adopted in the pursuit of political stability).
25. Id. at section A (Political), principle 7 (adopting, as a framework for ASEAN
cooperation, a program of action that includes the "strengthening of political solidarity, by
promoting the harmonization of views, coordinating positions and, where possible and
desirable, taking common action.").
26. See e.g. Kuala Lumpur Declaration for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN), signed Nov. 27,1971, preamble, reprinted in 1967-1988 AsEA, DOCIJM rsN SERIES
34 (referring to the U.N.'s aims and objectives, including respect for sovereignty, abstention
from use of force, and noninterference.).
1999]
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United Nations, against the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979.27
This setting aside of economic matters in order to reach a comprehensive
political settlement to the Cambodian issue was a deviation from the
original plan to focus exclusively on economic matters. The situation in
Indochina and the resulting refugee problem were constantly on the
ASEAN agenda after the late 1970s. The invasion was characterized as a
breach of Cambodia's sovereignty and of the Cambodian people's right to
self-determination. Within the United Nations, ASEAN urged the
recognition of the government in exile under Prince Sihanouk and
condemned the illegitimacy of the Vietnamese puppet regime. ASEAN also
stood united in opposition to Vietnam's Grand Design, announced in
January 1980 with Soviet backing, to liberate all of Southeast Asia, after
having "liberated" Cambodia. ASEAN's collective resolution was a vital
factor in thwarting the realization of Vietnam's expansionist plan. At the
same time, the Cambodian conflict served as a principal agent in forging a
sense of ASEAN solidarity and common purpose.
[19 The dissipation of Cold War mentalities and alliances over the last
decade, the muting of ideological distinctions, and the signing of the
Cambodian Paris Peace Accords in 1991 paved the way for an enlarged
ASEAN membership. The latter, in particular, opened the door to
rapprochement with the Indochinese states. While Brunei had been
admitted as a member of ASEAN in 1984, the post-Cold War shift in the
ASEAN focus from ideology to economics led to the admission of the
socialist state of Vietnam in 1997, followed by Laos and, more
controversially, Burma in 1998. With the admission of Cambodia on 30
April 1999, ASEAN enters the twenty-first century as "ASEAN 10," a
subregional body encompassing all Southeast Asian states, and forming a
Southeast Asian community through common membership in ASEAN.
That ASEAN is already identified with the Southeast Asian regional order
is a testament to its success.2
20 During the Cold War, the United States perceived Southeast Asia
as a focus of its containment policy against a worldwide communist threat.
The end of the Cold War ushered the world away from a bipolar to a more
fragmented power structure, with the United States as the sole remaining
superpower. Since Southeast Asia was no longer a primary focus of U.S.
political attention, it lost its previous status as chief cornerstone of the
regional security order. Without the uniting bond of anti-Communism,
ASEAN had to redefine its political goals and orientation. Noting the
"profound international political and economic changes" of the post-Cold
War era, the ASEAN governments stated in the 1992 Singapore
27. Chan Heng Chee, The Interests and Role of ASEAN in the Indochina Conflict, in
INDOCHINA AND PROBLEMS OF SEcuR1TY AND STABILITY IN SOUTHEASr ASIA 184 (Khien
Theeravit and MacAlister Brown ed., 1981).
28. For an account of the prior "failed" regional associations in Southeast Asia, see
generally Norman D. Palmer, SEATO, ASA, Maphilindo and ASPAC, in THE ASEAN READER
27,27-29 (Sandhu et al. eds., 1994).
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Declaration,2 issued at the Fourth ASEAN Summit, that they would "move
towards a higher plane of political and economic cooperation to secure
regional peace and prosperity." The sphere of intra-ASEAN cooperation
was extended to include matters like environmental protection and
sustainable development, the control of HIV, and measures against drug
trafficking. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was launched in July 1993
to serve as a multilateral consultative forum, designed to promote
preventive diplomacy and build confidence among Asia-Pacific states.'
Trade, economic growth, liberalization, and regional security remained
priorities. Certain ASEAN states have become showcases for economic
development, displaying impressive double-digit growth rates up to 1997,
before the present economic crisis. ASEAN plans to establish an ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2008.
B. ASEAN Ambivalence towards Human Rights
f21 The promotion and protection of human rights has, at best, been
dealt with in cursory fashion within ASEAN. This is not to say that ASEAN
has been unconcerned with human rights issues; rather, it has avoided the
human rights terminology. ASEAN has consistently shown a commitment
to alleviating poverty by means of a "basic needs" strategy. Such an
approach focuses on producing personal consumption items, on
community services, and on productive and remunerative employment, all
as an integral part of a country's development efforts. There has also been
concern for increasing the participation of women and children in the
political, economic, social, and cultural development of their countries."
These concerns, in large measure, overlap with socio-economic rights.
22 There is no official, clear, or comprehensive ASEAN "position" on
human rights, and divergences exist among individual ASEAN countries.3
ASEAN ambivalence toward human rights has been manifested in practice
by the attitude it has displayed and the causes it has selectively
championed within the ASEAN region. This selectivity demonstrates the
general politicized nature of human rights in international relations, in
29. Singapore Declaration, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 498 (1992)
30. The ARF is the first regional multilateral forum for government level consultations on
Asia-Pacific security issues. Its inaugural meeting was held in July 1994. Its members include
Australia, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
Russia, Singapore, Thailand, United States, Vietnam. See generally SIMONJ. HAY, INsIT-TE OF
SouTHEAsr ASIAN STuDiEs, ASEAN's REGIONAL SEcuR1TY DIALOGUE PRocEss: FROM
EXPECrATION TO REALITY? (1997); Michael Antolik, The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of
Constructive Engagement, 16 COrrEM. S.E. ASIA 117,117-136 (1994).
31. See, e.g., Joint Communiqu6 of the Nineteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meetings, June 23-
28,1986, 151 ('Advancement of Women") (visited May 27,1999)
<http: / /www.aseansec.org/politics/pramml9.htm>.
32. For example, Carolina G. Hernandez cites the Singapore-Philippines diplomatic row
over Singapore's hanging of a Filipino maid for double murder in March 1995. See CAROLINA
G. HERNANDEZ, ASEAN PERSPECIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRAcY IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2 (1995).
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both individual countries and regional groupings. ASEAN has supported
the Palestinian, Bosnian, Afghan, and Cambodian peoples' right to self-
determination, and the former's right to its own homeland.3 The Soviet
violation of Afghan sovereignty was deplored by ASEAN in 1980 on the
basis that "the sovereignty and integrity of a nation must always be
respected.3' Subsequently, ASEAN called for foreign troop withdrawal
and affirmed the right of the Afghans to freely determine their own
destiny. These actions reflect a concern for the "external" aspect of the right
to self-determination-the right to self-government free from foreign
interference. ASEAN, through its practice, has also affirmed the "internal"
aspect of the right to self-determination-that is, the right to a democratic,
representative, and authentic government, chosen freely, without
intimidation, by actors internal to the state. In the words of Article 21(3) of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the basis of government
authority rests on "the will of the people" expressed in "periodic and
genuine elections on the basis of "universal and equal suffrage." Such a
policy has, for example, been manifest in ASEAN's insistence on the right
of Cambodians to choose their own government through United Nations-
supervised free elections. The idea that domestic government should not
rest merely on effective control of the state's territory and population, but
that it should conform to certain fundamental international principles, is
further reflected in ASEAN's attitude towards South Africa. While
downplaying racial discrimination and other violations of civil and
political rights on home turf, ASEAN has consistently condemned
apartheid in South Africa and Namibia3M In so doing, it took a clear
normative stance against racism and racist governments. ASEAN even
,went so far as to approve the use of international pressure to induce a
change in South Africa's internal government structure through the
dismantling of apartheid and the installation of majority rule. ASEAN
noted the efficacy of economic and non-economic sanctions against South
Africa and called for their "wider, tighter and more intensified application,"
33. See ASEAN Declaration on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Nov. 28,1973 (visited Apr. 21,
1999) <http://www.aseansec.org/politics/staic73>; Joint Communiqud of the Thirty-First
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, July 24-25,1998, 17-19 (visited May 27,1999)
<http: //www.aseansec.org/politics/pramm3l.htm>; Joint Communiqud of the Twenty-Sixth
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, July 23-24,1998, 14 (visited May 27,1999)
http://www.aseansec.org/politics/pramm26.htm>. The Middle East issue has been regularly
discussed in ASEAN since the 1970s. See, e.g. Joint Communiqu6 of the Tenth ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting, July 5-8,1977, 21 (visited May 27,1999)
<http://www.aseansec.org/politics/prammlO.htm>.
34. See Joint Communiqud of the Thirteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, June 25-26,1980,
10 (visited May 27,1999) <http:/ /www.aseansec.org/politics/pramrn13.htm>.
35. See Joint Communiqud of the Eighteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting,'July 9,1985,i
67 (visited May 27,1999) <http://www.aseansec.org/politics/pramm18.htm>. ASEAN
foreign ministers condemned the installation in Namibia of a racist interim government by the
white minority Pretoria regime in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978.
ASEAN called for the international community to 'bring relentless pressure to bear upon
South Africa and to continue to support the just struggle of thi Namibian people under the
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while urging the release of all African nationalists, including Nelson
Mandela.3 ASEAN has also collectively expressed concern for the
genocidal horrors in Bosnia-Herzegovina 7
23 Yet human rights violations in ASEAN's own backyard are
selectively ignored. While the Cambodian human rights issue has been a
regular fixture on the ASEAN agenda since the Vietnamese invasion,-s the
Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975 has barely been touched.39 At
present, one ASEAN country illegally occupies an island in breach of its
people's right of self-determination as affirmed by United Nations
resolutions; in another, the military junta refuses to surrender power to the
people's democratically elected representatives. This theme will be
developed more fully below in the discussion of ASEAN and its policy of
nonintervention in internal affairs.
II. A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE: THE ASIAN VALUES SCHOOL & THE CONTENT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The Counter-Challenge of the Asian Values School
24 In the post Cold War era, the demise of the Communist threat
altered the foreign policy of Western states in their dealings with ASEAN
nations. Western foreign policy was previously confined to economic and
strategic matters, largely ignoring the human rights abuses of the West's
authoritarian anti-Communist Asian allies. This has changed. A new
crusade to promote human rights and democracy has been launched.4°
36. See Joint Communiqud of the Twenty-Second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, July 3-4,
1989, '1[ 79-80 (visited May 27,1999) <http://www.aseansec.org/politics/pramm22.htm>.
37. See, e.g., Joint Communiqud of the Twenty-Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, July 21-
22,1992,![ 11 (visited May 27,1999) <http://www.aseansec.org/politics/pramm25.htm>;
Joint Communiqud of the Thirty-First ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, July 24-25,1998,9 119
(visited April 21,1999) <http://www.aseansec.org/politics/pramm31.htm>. In the latter
meeting, ASEAN emphasized the importance of promoting human rights and freedom of
movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
38. See, e.g., Joint Communiqud of the Twenty-Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, July
19-20,1991, '121 (visited May 27,1999) <http://www.aseansec.org/politics/pramm24.htm>.
39. The East Timor situation in briefly discussed in paragraph 23 of the Joint
Communiqu6 of the Ninth ASEAN Ministerial meeting, June 24-25,1976 (visited May 27,
1999) <http://www.aseansec.org/politics/pramm9.htm>. The ministers, however, merely
note with appreciation the explanation given by the Foreign Minister on the question of East
Timor and called upon the U.N. to take cognizance of the Indonesian minister's assurances
that his government and the provisional East Timorese government would cooperate with the
United Nations. They affirm that "the future of East Timor remains, in the final analysis, in the
hands of the people of East Timor." Obviously, ASEAN implicitly accepted the validity of the
contested referendum held to determine the future of East Timor, whose alleged result was
the expressed choice to integrate with Indonesia. On the East Timor problem, see generally
CONsTANcIO PINTO & MATrHEW JARDINE, EAST TtMOR's UNFINISHED STRUGGLE: INSIDE THE
TmORESE RESISTANCE (1997); BILVEER SINGH, EAST TIMOR, INDONESIA AND THE WORLD: MYrHS
AND REALITms (1995).
40. See generally Amitav Acharya, Human Rights and Regional Order: ASEAN and Human
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Certain Asian quarters in government circles perceived this shift as a self-
congratulatory trumpeting of the superior values of Western liberal
democracy: a hegemonic attempt to universalize Western values.'
[25 ASEAN countries have reacted defensively to charges of human
rights abuses, pointing out that no state is guiltless in this respect. The
West's selective criticism is denounced as hypocritical, witnessed by its
own omissions, such as the failure to prevent human rights violations in
Bosnia.42 After United States Vice President Albert Gore delivered an
implicit critique of Malaysian democracy at the APEC meeting held in
November 1998 in Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian foreign minister's riposte
was that "Malaysians do not take kindly to sanctimonious sermonising
from any foreign quarter, especially the U.S., a country which is known to
have committed gross violations of human rights."' Similar mud-slinging
was apparent in Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir's response to
Canada's interest in the state of human rights in Malaysia: "Canada once
belonged to Red Indians. I don't see them represented in APEC."" Since
human rights touch upon ethical issues, ASEAN states resent being
hectored on their human rights performances by the West in tones of moral
self-righteousness. Notwithstanding, such rhetorical thrust and parry at the
interstate level does little to alleviate human suffering. Clearly, a posture of
humility on all sides, stemming from introspective self-criticism, would
facilitate the actual solution of human rights problems.
[26 Since the early 1990s, filled with a new found self-confidence
stemming from the management of successful economies, ASEAN states
have mounted a positive counter-critique against their western detractors.
Taking hold of the reins of human rights discourse, rather than simply
employing defensive rebuttals, ASEAN countries have, without
disavowing the entire corpus of human rights norms, expressed
dissatisfaction with the status quo. The ASEAN position rests on three
distinguishable bases: a cultural argument, an "economics-first" argument,
and a contextual "asian values" argument.
27 First, most ASEAN states did not participate in the formulation of
Rights Management in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia, in INrERNATIoNAL RELATIONS IN THE ASIA
PACIFIC 167 (James T.H. Tang ed., 1995).
41. See, e.g., Bilahari Kim Hee P.S. Kausikan, An East Asian Approach to Human Rights, 2
BUFF. J. IN'L. L 263 (1995-96) (considering the universality of human rights and cultural
identity in East Asian context.)
42. Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Abdullah Badawi in his statement at the 1993
Vienna Conference stated that "nowhere is the double-standard approach to human rights
more glaring than in the West's evasion of its responsibilities through its inaction in the face of
the massive and gravest violations of human rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Surely, their
apathetic and meek response to genocide, ethnic cleansing and rape, in the heart of Europe,
makes a total mockery of their preaching and posturing on the promotion and protection of
human rights in the far comers of the world." Statement reproduced in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 234-38 (James T.H. Tang ed., 1995).
43. Malaysians are Enraged, STRAITS TIMES INTERACTIVE, Nov. 18,1998 (visited Apr. 21,
1999) http:/ /straitstimes.asial.com.sg/pages/wrld3.1118.html.
44. APEC Conference: Rafidah and Albright Trade Shots Over Trial, STRAITS TIMES
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these norms. Insofar as ASEAN states have affirmed the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights by adopting the Vienna Declaration of 1993,
ratified human rights treaties of their own accord, and endorsed
international legal norms like self-determination, and free elections, and
the prohibition against racial discrimination in policy statements such as
those in reference to Cambodia, South Africa, Afghanistan and Palestine,
this objection cannot be maintained. Second, "Asian values" school
proponents argue that since human rights norms embody "alien values"
they are inappropriate in specific cultural contexts where other cultural
values hold sway. This argument is often simplistically framed in terms of
a "universalism versus cultural relativism" dichotomy which questions the
applicability of norms. This opens up the question of how to identify "core"
global norms. Lastly, a third, non-culture-specific argument asserts that the
application of certain norms is contingent on a certain level of economic
development. Prior to attaining that undefined threshold, individual rights
must be subordinated to state-defined development goals, in the interest of
the community. This concerns the prioritization of different categories of
rights, namely, the debate about the nature of the relationship between
democracy (civil and political rights) and development (socio-economic
rights). It follows from this assertion that rights are not "natural" or
"inherent" as in the Western natural law tradition, but that they are
privileges to be progressively implemented, given or rescinded by the
state. The shift from "right" to "privilege," the move to making a claim
contingent rather than inherent, detracts from the concept of rights as an
instrument of empowerment and a tool for ensuring the accountability of
those in public office, whose power is based, in the democratic conception,
on trust rather than will or divine fiat. Rights confer upon the right-holder
(the individual, in the case of human rights) the power to initiate a claim
against the duty-bearer (the state) for alleged violations of human rights,
before a judicial or political forum. The last two "Asian values" school
arguments are discussed more fully below.
i. The Cultural Argument
28 The cultural strain of the "Asian values" school operates along two
tracks. On the one hand, "culture" is invoked defensively and negatively as
a shield against the neo-imperialistic imposition of "alien" Western liberal
values. The acceptance of cultural diversity is presented as a facet of
respect for the sovereign equality of states. On the other, "Asian values" are
invoked offensively and positively as a distinctive approach to human
development and state-community-individual relations that is superior to
the individualistic, rights-oriented Western liberal democracies, typified by
moral decay, social dysfunction, and disrespect for public authority.
129 Empirically, the practice of ASEAN states in affirming certain
human rights declarations and ratifying certain treaties indicate their
acceptance of human rights law. However, it is clear that cultural values do
differ and this affects the application of these norms. Clearly, invoking the
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fact of pluralism in a multicultural world is insufficient in itself to fend off
human rights scrutiny. The human rights project is ultimately about a
normative ordering of state-individual relations and the role of the
international community, which includes both state and nonstate actors. It
is not culturally neutral. Human rights norms will clash with racist or
sexist cultures. In the event of a clash between "human rights" and
"culture" in a horizontal, state-centric world, the question is which should
prevail and who should be the adjudicator: the state, the international
community, the big powers, the transnational NGO community, the
domestic community? Whose agenda prevails?
30 An even more basic question, however, is whose voice is amplified
by the definition of these terms? The articulators of the "Asian values"
school are by and large government officials or diplomats seeking to justify
the operation of the regimes they represent. The presentation of "Asian"
and "Western" cultural values as identifiable, distinct entities obscures the
existence of divergent views within a region or within a single state itself.
The state does not always speak with an all-inclusive "voice." Indeed,
human rights is the language of the oppressed and marginalized. The more
authentically representative a government is, the greater the authority of its
.,voice."
31 It is also important to recognize that "human rights" and "culture"
are not always in opposition. Attention should be directed to searching for
resources within cultures and traditions that reflect the values inherent in
human rights ideology.4 This would affirm the universal reach of human
rights. Second, the assertion that "Asian" and "Western" cultural values are
static, monolithic entities calls into question the very nature of culture.4
This "essentialization" of cultural values ignores the fact that cultures are
not static but in flux, given the influences of international capitalism,
globalism, industrialization and the emergence of a global culture of
human rights within modem states. One might point out that the
emergence of human rights is a response to the advent of the modem state
and its monopoly on public power. With the disappearance of traditional
group or community structures and the atomizing effects of modem,
urban, industrial life, human rights appears in the gap to mitigate the
imbalance of power in state-individual relations. Furthermore, even with
respec to "core" or even immutable religious-cultural values, a high view
of the human person that respects his/her moral autonomy and moral
responsibility must accept that individuals are not defined exclusively by
45. Scholarship demonstrating that religious or "non-Western" ideologies also reflect a
"high view" of the individual has been undertaken to foster the legitimacy of human rights
norms both through internal discourse within the state and through cross-cultural dialogue.
See generally ABDULLAHI AN-NAIM, HUMAN RIGMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPEcTIvES: A
QUEST FOR CONSENSUS (1992).
46. "Culture" may be understood to encompass "all issues of human thinking, feeling and
behavior in a given geographic areaLl... the religion, philosophy and mentalities, the social,
administrative, public and legal institutions, clothes, nutrition, architecture, demographical
behaviour, 'arts', loving, hating, war, peace..." WOLFGANG SCHMALE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CULTURAL DivERsrrY 11 (1993).
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their cultures and traditions. Human rights seek to vindicate human
dignity in part by policing the boundaries of individual autonomy. By
protecting the freedoms, for example, of conscience and association,
human rights ideology deems it a '"good"' to enable the individual to "opt
out" or reaffirm the cultural values of the community into which he or she
is born. Such a choice is essential to human self-development.
f32 In the absence of an international legislature, states will continue to
be the international lawmaking instruments, though nonstate actors play
an important role in influencing policy. At the international level, NGOs
and treaty-based human rights bodies shape policy by consulting with
state officials. At the domestic level, through information dissemination
and human rights education to the general public, citizens can shape the
way their governments behave in international fora, though this presumes
a functioning democracy and constitutional government. Apart from any a
priori postulates grounding human rights norms, the legitimacy of a norm
is partially, if not mainly, derived from widespread popular support,
which is itself a function of politics and the "culture wars" waged within
that arena.
133 The second way in which "Asian values" proponents claim a
distinctive approach to human development and state-individual-
community relations is to attack Western culture while defending their
own.47 The moral decay of individualistic, rights-oriented Western liberal
democracies (European and American)4 as manifest in widespread
dysfunctional families, disrespect for public authority and the breakdown
in social order is highlighted to claim the superiority of "Asian values."
9
Indeed, the economic success in certain East Asian countries that
industrialized before they democratized (for example, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Malaysia) has been attributed to "Asian values," which
engender discipline and respect for public authority. The legitimacy of
47. Many trees have been sacrificed to feed the paper war over the "Asian Values" debate.
For a sampling of views in this respect, see Daniel A. Bell, The East Asian Challenge to Human
Rights: Reflections on an East West Dialogue, 18 HUM. Ris. Q. 641 (1996); Peter R. Moody, Jr.,
Asian values, 50 J. INrr'L AFF. 166 (1996); Kishore Mahbubani, The United States: Go East, Young
Man, 17 WASH. Q. 5 (1994); Bilahari Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, 92 FOREIGN POL'Y 24
(1993); Fareed Zakaria, Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew, 73 FOREIGN AFF.
109 (1994); Kim Dae Jung, Is Culture Destiny: The Myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic Values,
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 189; William A Callahan, Rescripting East/West Relations,
Rethinking Asian Democracy, 8 PAc. REv. 1 (1996); Eric Jones, Asia's Fate: A Response to the
Singapore School, 35 NAT'L INTEREST 18 (1994); Francis Fukuyama, Asia's Soft-Authoritarian
Alternative, NEw PERsP. Q. 60 (1992).
48. For a powerful critique of contemporary American liberalism, see ROBERT BORK,
SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LmERAUSM AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1997). For
an Asian indictment of the West's moral degeneration, see MAHATIR MOHAMED, Western
Modernism v. Eastern Thought, in THE VOICE OF ASIA: Two LEADERS DIscuss THE COMIG
CENTURY 71, 80-81 (Mahatir Mohamed & Shintaro Ishihara eds., 1995).
49. Hugh Cortazzi, Misnomer: "Asian Values" May Not Be So Particularly Asian After All,
STRArrs TLIMES, Oct. 14, 1997, at 36.
50. Doubts are cast on the proposition that Asians respect government authority more
than Westerners, given the popular movements against autocratic governments in the
Philippines (1986), Burma (1988), Thailand (1992), and, lately, Indonesia (1998).
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"soft authoritarianism" rested on the provision of economic goodies to
citizens. The present economic crises in Asia deprive governments of this
base of legitimacy, forcing them to rest their claims to legitimacy on a
democratic, representative basis.5 '
34 There is certainly truth in the proposition that excessive
individualism unrestrained by a sense of civic or moral responsibility is
anarchical. Recognizing this problem, which is fueled to a large extent by a
capitalistic, consumer-oriented industrial society, is one thing. Prescribing
a cultural antidote in the form of "Asian values" is a bit disingenuous.
When one gets down to identifying what "Asian values" are, the list
includes a respect for hard work, the family, and public authority, an
emphasis on social harmony and thrift.' These values are not exclusively
"Asian," bearing resonance with a kind of Protestant work ethic, sans the
Western stress on individualism. The point is that identifying the values
that buttress social cohesion, a just order, and economic development
should be a matter of assessing a proposition on its intrinsic merits, rather
than on the dubious basis of cultural superiority.
[35 Next, a distinction should be drawn between contested human
rights norms and those norms upon which all agree, such as the right to
free speech. The controversy surrounding the latter category is one with
respect to the scope of application. The right of free speech, which
underpins a democratic society, is, for example, formally guaranteed in the
Singapore and Malaysian Political Constitutions, the United States Bill of
Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The controversy
is in the degree of liberty permitted, and in what are the permissible
grounds for derogation. This can have extensive ramifications in the
practical realm, as illustrated by the following quote from Islamic scholar
Shad Faruqi:
Admittedly, the rugged individualism, un-inhibitedness and
licentiousness of what is still 'the wild, wild West' is contrary to
Asian tradition. Our attitudes to nation, religion and culture, race,
family and community are reverential. We draw a line between
liberty and license. We do not deem it a matter of constitutional
principle that there should be a right to desecrate our national flag,
to blaspheme our religions and to walk freely into shops to buy
murderous weapons. We view a free-wheeling sexual lifestyle,
drug taking and alcohol addiction with revulsion. With the bulk of
51. In fact, it has been noted that some of the present economic woes in East Asia look like
"... Asian values gone wrong. The attachment to the family becomes nepotism. The
importance of personal relationship rather than formal legality becomes cronyism. Consensus
becomes wheel-greasing and corrupt politics. Conservatism and respect for authority becomes
rigidity and an inability to innovate. Much vaunted educational achievements become rote-
learning and a refusal to question those in authority." Asian Values Revisited: What Would
Confucius Say Now?, ECONoMIST, 25 July 1998, at 23.
52. See Tommy T.B. Koh, The 10 Values that Undergird East Asian Strength and Success, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Dec. 11, 1993. These include the importance of the family, education, high
savings, home ownership and hard work and clean living.
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us, pornography is not part of free speech, abortion on demand is
not part of personal liberty and homosexuality is not part of
freedom of choice. We acknowledge that rights and responsibilities
must go hand-in-hand and that freedom is not an end in itself.5
[36 It is an eternally impossible task to determine the line between
legitimate cultural differences and those that should be subject to
international standards. This is the difficulty already alluded to in the clash
of ideologies in a multicultural world. Certain disputes are unlikely to bear
legal, much less moral, resolution in this lifetime. Advocates on opposing
sides both adopt the self-righteous mantle of crusaders who see their way
as that of enlightenment, whether arguing from the epistemology of faith
or "reason." It is essential to note, however, that this is not a West versus
the Rest debate.51 Advocates on both sides straddle interstate lines and
wage their campaigns in both the domestic and international fields of
politics and persuasion.
[37 When governments invoke their versions of "culture" to support
their respective approaches to governance or their perceptions of society,
they present problems of cultural authenticity. In Singapore, for example,
the government in 1990 issued the Shared Values White Paper, which
contained five key values underpinning a national ideology that
"Singaporeans of all races and faiths can subscribe to and live by.'' The
values presented have a notable communitarian bias insofar as there is a
heavy emphasis on social order and harmony. As former Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew has noted:
Whether in periods of golden prosperity or in the depths of
disorder, Asia has never valued the individual over society. The
society has always been more important than the individual. I
think that is what has saved Asia from greater misery?6
' [38 The Prime Minister referred to Confucian values to legitimate
government policy, but the government's heralding of Confucian values
53. Shad Saleem Faruqi, What are Human Rights? Some Explanations on Different Conceptions
and Perspectives, in HUMAN RIGHTs AND THE MEDIA 7,17 (Robert Haas ed., 1996).
54. In his speech at the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights, the Indonesian Foreign
Minister Ali Alatas noted that the debate on human rights was not an East-West or North-
South dash but rather, "the lingering echo of an earlier clash between two Western traditions,
between the principle of individual liberty which, for example, Thomas Jefferson passionately
espoused and the principle of a strong, lawful authority which Alexander Hamilton just as
passionately advocated." Text reproduced in Appendix I, Statements by Representatives of
Asian Governments at the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ASIA-PAcIFIC REGION 228,229 (James Tang ed., 1995).
55. Shared Values White Paper, supra note 3, at 9 1. These five values include: (1) Nation
before community and society above self; (2) Family as the basic unit of society; (3) Regard
and community support for the individual; (4) Consensus instead of contention; (5) Racial and
religious harmony. Id. at 9152.
56. Sandra Burton, Society vs. The Individual, TIME, June 14,1993, at 20,21.
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has been accompanied by contradictory non-Confucian practices. 7 The
selective adoption of some Confucian values and casting aside of others
raises questions about the desirability of a flawed ideology.8 Intellectual
honesty demands that tfhe validity and legitimacy of ideas be tested on
their intrinsic merits rather than their cultural pedigree. Furthermore, state
definitions of local culture can effectively drown dissenting voices resident
within the state through the conflation of the interests of the state with
those of the community. In Southeast Asia, as in all parts of the world,
there is an ongoing debate as to which traditions merit preservation and
which should be discarded. To develop a civic society, states must find the
right balance between traditional and contemporary values. In finding this
golden mean, the values of a community must be ascertained through an
inclusive, participatory process, not imposed by government fiat.
57. For example, the passage of the Maintenance of Parents Act, Chapter 167B (1996),
which legally compels children to maintain their parents seems contrary to the Confucian
ethic of filial piety. Christopher Tremewan has argued that, while the significance of
philosophical traditions must not be denied, neither must they be divorced from historical
and political realities. He writes that Asia's pre-industrial societies did place duties to the
community above individual rights, but that:
this observation does not license a leap in logic to the claim that modem
East Asian societies are consequently not suited to the observance of
human rights or liberal democracy because of residual Confucianism.
This ignores the historical discrediting of Confucianism, the emergence of
revolutionary left-wing politics and the development in South Korea,
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore of the most un-Confucian practices
associated with rapid industrial growth such as corporate conglomerates
with 12-hour working days for executives, the breaking up of community
through massive urbanization, the necessity of parliamentarianism for
legitimacy, government by military elites and the militarization of
politics.
Christopher Tremewan, Human Rights in Asia, 6 PAC. REV. 17,27 (1993).
58. For example, in the Singapore context, the Confucian tradition has been lauded as a
valuable source from whence to derive a national ideology. In the Shared Values White Paper,
however, certain sexist Confucian traits were excised as being unsuitable in the context of a
modem society. Paragraph 44 provides:
Traditional Confucian family relationships are strictly hierarchical. Sons
owe an absolute duty of filial piety and unquestioning obedience to
fathers. Males take precedence over females, brothers over sisters, and the
first born over younger sons. But in Singapore, the parent-child
relationship is more one of respect rather than absolute subordination.
Sons and daughters are increasingly treated equally. The relationship
between older and younger siblings is less authoritarian. In all these
respects Singaporean practices must continue, without eroding the
cohesion and loyalty within the family unit.
Shared Values White Paper, supra note 3, at 44. See also Tu Wei Ming, A Confucian
Perspective on Human Rights, in WUi TEH YAO MEMORIAL LECrURES 3 (1995); Daniel A Bell,
Democracy in Confucian Societies: The Challenge of Justification, in TOwARDS ILLIBERAL
DEMOcRAcY IN PAcmc ASiA 17 (Daniel A. Bell et al. eds., 1995). Amartya Sen challenges the
view that Confucius was an authoritarian in Human Rights and Asian Values, NEW REPUBLIC,
July, 14-21,1997 (visited May 27,1999) <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad /intrel/sen.htm>.
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ii. The Economics First Argument
39 The position that human rights must be contingent on other goals
where linked with community interests is often expressed with the"economics first" argument. This asserts that the entire spectrum of human
rights can only be enjoyed after a certain level of socio-economic
development is reached. Since human dignity is denied by abject poverty,
according to this view, the inalienable right to development must be
guaranteed first.9 This argument further holds that, for the attainment of
economic development, civil and political rights must be subject to social
order; they may be suspended or severely curtailed in the name of
development until the people are supplied with basic food, housing and
jobs. This argument is premised on the view that certain civil and political
rights, which buttress "democracy" in the Western liberal view, impede
economic growth. Developing countries must, therefore, sideline those
rights to which, perhaps not coincidentally, ASEAN countries seem to bear
an antipathy.
40 Conversely, critics have argued that certain civil and political
rights actually promote economic development. For example, the right to
free speech is needed so that citizens can criticize misconceived economic
policies, denounce government corruption, or call for the equitable
distribution of the benefits of economic development and social justice.
While the relationship between civil and political rights and development
is indeterminate and merits closer examination, the economics first
argument does draw attention to a valid point: that government priorities
differ depending on the stage of a country's economic development.
[41 Both Western and ASEAN countries tend to treat categories of
rights unequally. ASEAN countries claim that the West is inordinately
preoccupied with civil and political rights, evident from frequent attacks
on ASEAN libel laws, media restrictions, censorship and preventive
detention laws. Malaysia has elicited international concern in invoking the
latter to detain former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and to aid
investigations that eventually led to his being charged in September 1998
with ten counts of corruption and sodomy. This also undercut Ibrahim's
budding nationwide reform movemento which was a threat to the national
59. For readings related to the "economics first" argument, see Robert A. Dahl, Democracy
and Human Rights under Different Conditions of Development, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PERSPECnVE:
A GLOBAL ASSESSMENr 235 (Asbjorn Eide & Bernt Hagtvet eds., 1992); Jack Donnelly, Human
Rights and Development: Complementary or Competing Concerns, in HUMAN RIGHTS AN\D THIRD
WORLD DEvELOPMENT 27 (George W. Shepherd, Jr. & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1985); John
O'Manique, Human Rights and Development, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 78 (1992); Russel Lawrence Barsh,
The ROD as a Human Right: Results of the Global Consultation, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 322 (1991); Jack
Donnelly, Repression and Development: The Political Contingency of Human Rights Trade-offs, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL VIEWS 305 (David P. Forsythe ed., 1989);
Pieter van Dijk, The Right to Development and Human Rights: A Matter of Equality and Priority, 14
ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 221 (1984); Michael C. Davis, The Price of Rights: Constitutionalism and the
East Asian Economic Development, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 303 (1998).
60. Brendan Pereira, Reformasi or 'Reform-mati'?, STRAITS TIMES INrrERACnIVE, Sept. 27,1998
(visited May 9,1999) <httv://straitstimes.asial.com/anwar/anvar20 0927.html>.
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security interests of the country as defined by the current powerholders.
[42 The problem with the "economics first" argument is that since
government elites are the actors who declare when the threshold of
sufficient economic development has been achieved (so as to justify a more
robust enjoyment of civil and political liberties), there is no one to hold
them accountable in two respects. First, no one will actually compel them
to declare when the threshold has been reached. Second, if no clear criteria
are put forward to define the threshold, it remains a matter of state
prerogative. The fear then is that civil and political rights will be
suppressed in the name of the nebulous goal of economic development.
iii. The Asian Values School: A Conclusion
43 Essentially, the "Asian values" school advocates a contextual
approach towards human rights which, while universally valid in the
world of theory and ideas, are qualified in their practical application by
culture and contingency. Since the supporters of this school hold, or are
closely connected to, government power, framing human rights in this
fashion can allow government elites greater control over the terms of the
discourse. Government elites may invoke their definition of local culture to
decide for themselves which human rights are to be applicable, even if
their version of culture is nothing more than an amalgam of traits
selectively cobbled together from a past cultural tradition to justify current,
perhaps authoritarian, political practices and institutions.6' They can cite
the need for development to postpone indefinitely the protection of civil
and political rights. This reserves to government elites a broad discretion in
controlling the domestic implementation of human rights. Both the
development argument and the cultural relativist argument are variants of
the theme that external scrutiny of how states treat individuals violates
national sovereignty.
iv. Summing Up
44 Since human rights involve fundamental issues of ethics and
justice, one might reasonably expect to find as many views on what
61. For example, the Confucian notion of hierarchical relationships, the wulun, which
relates to the ordering of relationships between father-son, husband-wife, and older brother-
younger brother, has been translated into the Singapore political context. Here, the citizen is
cast as the child who is to relate to government leaders, who adopt the role of the pater
familias, in a deferential fashion rather than in a relationship between equals. This is well
illustrated by a statement by a government minister, B.G. George Yeo, who, in setting the
boundaries of political debate, noted: "Remember your place in society before you engage in
political debate.., debate cannot degenerate into a free-for-all where no distinction is made
between the senior and junior party .... You must make distinctions-what is high, what is
low, what is above, what is below-and then within this, we can have a debate, we can have a
discussion .... Debate Yes, But Do Not Take Those in Authority as 'Equals,' STRArrs TMs, Feb.
20,1995, at 11, reproduced in KEVIN Y.L. TAN & LI-ANN T-no, CoNSTrrUTIoNAL LAW IN
MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE 25 (1997).
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constitutes human rights as there are value systems. While ASEAN states
have quite rightly asserted that human rights are molded by Western
liberal values,2 this does not bar their application in non-Western contexts,
nor does it mean that the Western incarnation of human rights must be
accepted as sacred writ. To ignore pluralist conceptions of what it means to
be a human being, and what constitutes human development and
fulfillment, would be imperialistic. But it would be equally dogmatic, and
ultimately deleterious to the human condition, to fal into the abyss of
relativism which, taken to its logical conclusion, validates all views and
practices except the view that any one practice is wrong, immoral or
invalid. In the author's view, the fiction that human rights are culturally
neutral should receive its quietus est. Human rights embody a political
ideology. The project of human rights must, however, be recognized as a
continuing, open-ended experiment in elucidating the principles of good
governance to serve the goal of vindicating human dignity.6 The
normative content of "human dignity" is not entirely self-evident; it cannot
be exhaustively defined. But neither is it obscure. We know it when we see
it. Ultimately, we either intuit or deduce from some a priori postulate what
human dignity is and from this, consider how best to fashion rights to
secure it. This will not be free from ideological bias and dispute. In a
relativistic universe, one must look to areas of agreement to discern which
core or fundamental rights are universally accepted. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which was affirmed by 171 countries at the
1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights, and constitutional bills of rights
are good starting places. Even though human rights originated in Western
liberal thinking and values, some human rights values are also found in
non-Western ideologies." Explicit links should be drawn as this would, as
a matter of strategy, aid peoples in non-Western countries in developing
their sense of "ownership' of human rights at the grassroots level, as a sort
of common heritage of mankind rather than an alien object.
[45 This is not to ignore the fact that clashes between traditional and
cultural values and those espoused by human rights ideology are
inevitable. There will always be gray areas of debate over such topics as
reproductive rights or whether international law requires the abolition of
the death penalty. These are not settled matters of law; they remain fodder
for political dispute. The lack of resolution over contentious issues should
62. See Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'LL. 512,589 (1996)
(arguing that current human rights law requires the reconstruction of states to fit the values of
governance derived from western liberalism).
63. See generally Oscar Schacter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 17 HuM. RTS. Q. 509
(1995).
64. As Aung San Suu Kyi noted: "If ideas and beliefs are to be denied validity outside the
geographical and cultural bounds of their origin, Buddhism would be confined to north India,
Christianity to a narrow tract in the Middle East and Islam to Arabia." AUNG SAN Suu Kyi,
FREEDOM FROM FEAR AND OTHER wRrr IGs 175 (1991). For an analysis of how the values of
democracy are linked to the ethical norms of Buddhism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam,
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not, however, detract from defending human rights against what are
unequivocally considered to be illegitimate exercises of government power,
such as genocidal policies, extrajudicial killing, and torture.
46 The focus should not be on the origin of the idea of human rights;
this is a red herring. Rather, a focus on the teleology or raison d'etre of
human rights will be far more useful for demonstrating the validity and
necessity of human rights. Theoretically, the idea of human rights affirms a
"high" view of the human being, whether stemming from natural law
thinking such as the Judeo-Christian doctrine of personality,6 or
secularized variants such as the Kantian ideal that man should be treated
as the end, rather than the means to another end.6 In practical terms, this
means that the purpose of the state is to facilitate human fulfillment and
development. The best approach is a holistic one, which seeks to promote
the physical, psychological and pneumatic (spiritual) well-being of man.
This entails postulating that fundamental ethical rights inhere in
individuals, and charging the state with securing these rights. Rather than
asserting that huinan rights scrutiny impinges upon a state's sovereignty,
human rights advocates should attempt to dissociate "sovereignty" from
absolute, arbitrary power.67 Sovereignty should be associated with the
legitimate exercise of power, and the preserving and safeguarding of
fundamental rights. This comports with the assertion that the state exists to
serve the people, and not vice versa. Indeed, states formally subscribe to
this principle insofar as they support the principle of democratic legitimacy
and a consent-based form of government that genuinely represents the
interests of its people. Within ASEAN, the principle of free and fair
elections and the right of a people to choose their own government has
received formal support. This is evidenced by the ASEAN reaction when
Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978 and installed the puppet Heng Samrin
regime during the years of the Cambodian crisis. ASEAN consistently
deplored the Vietnamese armed intervention against the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cambodia and reaffirmed the right
of the Cambodian people to determine their own future free from foreign
interference, pursuant to their right of self-determination.'
[47 Human rights law was developed in the second half of the
65. This asserts "the individual as the final value, [placing] the emphasis upon the
transcendent importance of each man's soul." CARL J. FRIEDRICH, LIMrTED GOVERNMErr: A
COMPARIsON, 12-13 (1974).. 66. See Fernando Teson, The Kantian Theory ofInternational Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 53,54
(1992) ("A liberal theory commits itself... to the premise that the primary normative unit is
the individual, not the state. The end of states and governments is to benefit, serve and protect
their component human beings.").
67. See e.g., Geoffrey Butler, Sovereignty and the League of Nations 1920-21 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L.
35 (discussing the manner in which sovereignty should be understood in relation to the
functions of the League of Nations). See also W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human rights
in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INrr'L L. 866 (1990).
68. See e.g., Joint Communiqu6 of the Twelfth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, June 28-30,
1979, 13-18 (visited May 27,1999) <http://www.aseansec.or-/politics/pramm12.htm>
(dealing with the situation in Indochina when the Pol Pot regime was driven out by
Vietnamese forces in 1978).
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twentieth century as a reaction against totalitarian and fascist regimes-to
curtail state power and to afford vulnerable individuals some protection
against maltreatment by their governments. States are positioned both to
protect, and to abuse, human rights. To prevent abuse, it is imperative to
subject states to some form of external accountability. This could be done
through the monitoring or quasi-judicial powers of a regional or
international human rights body. ASEAN states should also be encouraged
to participate in the United Nations human rights regime by acceding to
the existing corpus of human rights treaties, as well as by working towards
establishing a subregional mechanism for human rights.
B. Engagement with the United Nations Human Rights Regime
48 Beyond examining the contours of the theoretical joust between
the "Asian values" school and "Western" conceptions of human rights, it is
also important to look at the practice of ASEAN states in relation to the
United Nations human rights regimes, to see whether this sheds any light
on their views of human rights.
[49 Given that human rights have developed into a major issue in
international relations in the latter half of the twentieth century,
nonengagement in the human rights discourse creates the suspicion that
one has something to hide. To demonstrate their willingness to be counted
as responsible members of the international community, ASEAN countries
are readily participating in international dialogues. In statements made at
the 1993 Vienna Conference, the ASEAN foreign ministers affirmed their
commitment to the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR), but stressed a particularist approach based on
contextual exigencies.6
[50 At Vienna, the Singapore Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng
accepted that a "core" group of universal rights existed-for example, the
right to life, prohibition against torture, and other nonderogable rights
found in the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).?
Nonetheless, he maintained that international consensus on what
constituted "core" rights was fragile, and that "the hard core of rights that
are truly universal is perhaps smaller than we sometimes like to pretend."'
69. The statements made at the 1993 Vienna Conference of Human Rights by the foreign
ministers of Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand are reproduced in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE AsIA-
PACIFIC REGION 213 (James Tang ed., 1995).
70. Article 4 provides that even in times of public emergency, no derogation is permitted
in regard to certain rights, including the right to life, prohibition against torture and slavery,
prohibition against imprisonment on the ground of failing to perform a contractual obligation,
prohibition against retrospective crimes, the right to recognition every where as a person
before the law, and freedom of religion and conscience. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16,1966, entered into force Mar. 23,1976, art. 4,999 U.N.T.S. 171,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N.Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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He advocated a pragmatic, clinical approach to strike a realistic balance
between "the ideal of universality and the reality of diversity.' '7 As things
stand, the scope of the "core" remains contestable-for example, whether
the right to development is an inalienable right, as maintained by many
developing countries. Hence, outside the core-in the equivocal words of
the 1993 Inter-Governmental Bangkok Declaration:
[H]uman rights must be considered in the context of a dynamic
and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in
mind the significance of national and regional particularities and
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.
[51 The Vienna Declaration qualified this stance. While noting the
significance of national and regional particularities, it stressed that "it is the
duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems,
to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms." 74
[52 The Vienna Declaration, a product of political compromise and
consensus, was adopted by 171 states. It affirmed the United Nations
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the basis for
U.N. human rights standard-setting. Malaysia has recently sent out
conflicting signals by calling for a review of the Universal Declaration '
claiming that it is outdated and unrepresentative of the larger global
community of 180 states today, having been drafted by superpowers when
only about forty states existed.7 Western observers from the European
72. Id..
73. Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human
Rights, adopted April 7,1993, 8, A/CONF.157/ASRM/8-A/CONF.157/PC/59.
74. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted June 25,1993, f5, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/23 (1993).
75. In response, Datuk Param Cumaraswamy, a Malaysian lawyer and U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers has pointed out that the U.N.
Charter and the UDHR are the sources of a large number of codified human rights, which
were adopted with the participation and consent of many U.N. Member States. For example,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
the Convention against Torture, and the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women have all been ratified by over 100 States. This is "further
testimony of universal acceptance of the 1948 Declaration." In his opinion, "any review of the
source of these codifications would have a far-reaching and destabilising effect on
international human rights law and could very well threaten world peace." Datuk Pararn
Cumaraswamy, The Universal Dedaration of Human Rights: Is It Universal?, 18 HuM. RTs. L.J.
476,477 (1997).
76. The point has been made that many Third World states did not participate in the
drafting of the UDHR, throwing into question its universal applicability. In an interview with
Time, former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, has stated:
The UDHR was written up by the victorious powers at the end of World
War II, which meant the U.S. and the British primarily, as well as the
French, the Russians and the Chinese. The Russians did not believe a
single word of what they signed in the declaration. The Chinese were in
such a mess they had to pretend they were espousing the inalienable
rights and liberties of man to get American aid to fight the communists,
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Union and the United States, fearing a dilution of standards, were put into
a combative mood when the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohamad proposed the idea at the 1997 ASEAN Post Ministerial
Conference.'7
53 China, the Philippines, and Indonesia supported the Malaysian
proposal. The Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas expressed surprise
that a "review" would be considered a "dilution,"' which illustrates the
mutual suspicion of Asian and Western states in debating human rights
standards. He stated that Asian nations sought to confer "equal
weightage"7' to political, social, and economic rights rather than purporting
to articulate a distinct Asian set of rights. 8
54 One way of determining which rights have received the widest
state support and might fall within the catalogue of "core" rights is to see
which treaties are most widely ratified. Of course one would have to
who were threatening them in 1945. So the victors settled the UDHR and
every nation that joined the U.N. was presumed to have subscribed to it.
However, once you started applying human rights conditions for aid, that
was different. People started looking at the declaration seriously. Now a
serious alternative formulation is being worked out in Asia.
Sandra Burton, Society vs. The Individual, TIME, June 14,1993, at 20,21. Thailand was among
the countries voting in favor of the UDHR at the time of its drafting, while the ASEAN
countries at Vienna all implicitly affirmed the UDHR by adopting the Vienna Declaration and
Program of Action.
77. Prime Minister Mahatir was endorsing an earlier statement made by Economic
Adviser Tun Daim Zainuddin to the effect that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
was outdated, having been drafted fifty years ago by superpowers who did not understand
the needs of developing countries. Daim noted that:
Reform does not mean that the present declaration is fundamentally
flawed from the very beginning. What it means is that the passage of time
and the emergence of new situations and issues necessitate the
formulation of a new declaration or a major overhaul of the present
declaration to make it relevant for present times and to make it acceptable
to all nations and peoples.
Zubaldah Abu Bakar, Call For Review of UN Charter on Human Rights, NEW SUNDAY TIMES, July
27,1997, at 3. Prime Minister Mahatir said that a review of the Declaration did not necessarily
connote dilution of its standards:
It is not a question of diluting it as there are very unsympathetic views
towards human rights problems in developed countries. These countries
would rather see people starve than allow for a stable government. They
would rather have their government chasing demonstrators in the
streets .... But to us, the welfare of our people is important .... In a
country like ours where stability is important to provide a good life to our
people, we consider the good life of people as the right of the people.
Zuhrin Azam Ahmad, PM: Review Not Meant to Dilute, STAR, July 31, 1997, at 2. Malaysia has
considered submitting a proposal to the U.N. to review the definition of human rights. See PM
Agrees with Daim on Human Rights Review, STAR, July 28,1997, at 3. ASEAN and China have
supported this call for a review.
78. ASEAN Bid Faces West Opposition, INDIAN ExPREss, July 30,1997 (visited April 21,1999)
<http://wvwv.epressindia.com/ie/daily/19970730/21150133.html>.
79. Alatas Backs Review of UN Rights Charter, STRAnrs TIMES, Sept. 11, 1997, at 24.
80. Alatas stated "everybody knows that human rights does [sic] not only consist of
individual, political or civil rights. It now has grown in perception in the world and people
are now much more aware that economic rights, cultural rights and social rights are just as
important." ASEAN Bid Faces West Opposition, supra note 78.
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temper any conclusions by noting the many reservations to the treaties and
their compatibility with the treaty object and purpose under Article 19(c) of
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.8'
f55 The Vienna Program of Action encouraged ratifications of U.N.
human rights treaties, particularly of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, for which universal ratification was sought by 1995. Setting a time
limit for a specific treaty seems to have worked well. Since Vienna, ASEAN
countries that had not previously been party to any human rights treaties
have displayed a significant change in practice. Singapore in 1995, for
example, acceded to the CEDAW,2 the Child Convention, and the
Genocide Convention." Undoubtedly, this type of move not only displays
a degree of good will on the part of states that seek to advance human
rights as part of their foreign policy. It also has a twin legitimating effect.
Domestically, it signals to the citizenry that its government is not out of
step with international mores (insofar as they are reflected by human
rights) or that it is in fact "liberalizing" and answering the call to
accountability. Internationally, it illustrates a commitment to the
international rule of law and a desire to further engage the United Nations
regime as a responsible and active participant. Should an ASEAN country
seek, for example, a seat on the Security Council, a demonstrated
commitment to human rights (one of the fundamental objectives of the
U.N. Charter) would stand it in good stead. It is, however, to be noted that,
in the case of Singapore at least, the obligations accepted were confined
mainly to reporting obligations. No fundamental change in domestic policy
was contemplated, as accession was effected on the basis that domestic
laws were already compatible with the international obligations
undertaken.8'
56 The major human rights treaties ratified or acceded to by ASEAN
states and Cambodia, the member in waiting, are listed in Appendix 1.8' All
ASEAN states are currently parties to the Child Convention and CEDAW,
save Brunei in the latter instance. The Bangkok IGO Declaration
encouraged the ratification of both the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).8 To date, only Cambodia, Philippines
81. 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
82. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
adopted Dec. 18,1979, entered into force Sep. 3, 1981, G.A. Res. 280, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33
(1980).
83. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 28,1989, entered into force Sept. 2,
1990, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989).
84. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec.
9,1948, entered into force Jan. 12,1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
85. See No Changes Neededfor Women's Convention, STRAITS IMFs, Jan. 19,1996, at 29.
86. See infra page 85-86. This was compiled as of October 1998 with reference to the table
of ratifications found at United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Multilateral Treaties
Deposited with the Secretary General: Human Rights Treaties (last modified May 4,1999)
<http: / /www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/frontboo/toc4.htm>.
87. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966,
entered into force 3 Jan. 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR. 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 48,
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and Vietnam have ratified both, and only the Philippines has signed the
optional protocol to the ICCPR.
[57 Extensive reservations have, however, limited the scope of states
parties' international obligations. Malaysia subjected Articles 5(a) and 7(b)
of CEDAW to the Syariah law on testamentary dispositions of property,
and exempted its application from the appointment of public offices like
that of Syariah, court judges, Muftis and Imams. Similarly, Singapore
reserved Articles 2 and 16 of CEDAW insofar as they conflicted with
personal and religious law. These reservations were challenged for
incompatibility with treaty purpose since general references to national or
religious law without specifying when this might apply to exclude or
modify treaty obligations do not clearly define to other state parties the
extent to which the reserving state has accepted treaty obligations.8
Further, invoking internal law does not excuse the nonperformance of
international responsibilities. These extensive reservations,9 framed in
terms of non-acceptance of obligations beyond constitutional limits,
effectively truncate the domestic impact of the treaty. This casts doubts
about the degree of genuine commitment to these human rights
instruments. Governments should be encouraged, particularly by the
related U.N. human rights bodies, to withdraw their reservations or, at
least, to formulate their reservations more restrictively.
C. Factors likely to influence the shaping of an ASEAN Charter of
Human Rights: Duties, Development, and Discretion
[58 An ASEAN Charter of Human Rights is likely to be an alternative
formulation with a different emphasis, reflecting ASEAN realities and
primary concerns for economic development and socio-political order.
Drafting may be guided by the language of the Bangkok IGO Declaration,
the Kuala Lumpur AIPO Declaration of Human Rights (the only sub-
regional human rights document that bears government affiliation),9' and
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967).
88. For an analysis of the impact of Singapore's accession to CEDAW, see Li-ann Thio, The
Impact of Internationalisation on Domestic Governance: Gender Egalitarianism and the
Transformative Potential of CEDAW, 1 SINGAPORE J. INtL & COMP. L. 278 (1997).
89. See, for example, Finland's objections to Malaysia's reservations to CEDAW. 1249
U.N.T.S. 13; United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Elimination of All Violence
Against Women (last modified May 4,1999)
<http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part boo/iv boo/iv 8.html>.
90. In the context of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, see the reservations made
by Malaysian, Brunei, Indonesia and Singapore, Myarmar, and Thailand, which were
challenged by many countries, including Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal and Sweden. United Nations Treaty Series, Convention on the Rights of the
Child (last modified May 4,1999)
<http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part boo/iv boo/iv 11.html>.
91. Approved by the Second Plenary Session of the 14th General Assembly of the ASEAN
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constitutional bills of rights9
59 Reaffirmation of some commitment to the U.N. Charter, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and Vienna Declaration is likely, although-
following the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights-prominence
will be accorded regional cultures and values in conceptualizing human
rights in order to take account of "national and regional particularities. 03
As has been noted, however, "the definition of what constitutes cultural
norms is not uniform between or within ASEAN societies. Singapore's
invocation of Confucian values is not shared by Islamic Malaysia, Catholic
Philippines or Buddhist Thailand.' ' Interestingly, the AIPO Declaration
contains a theocratic basis for understanding what it means to be human.9
The Preamble declares that "the peoples of ASEAN recognize that all
human beings are created by the Almighty, and possess fundamental
rights which are universal, indivisible and inalienable." The influence of
Article 1 of the UDHR is further evident in the statement that human
beings are born free and equal in dignity, being endowed with reasoning
and conscience. This is more secular in orientation. The constitutional
preambles of ASEAN countries reveal diverse subscriptions to varied
religious and ideological beliefs, including commitments to Islam,9
Buddhism7 Marxist-Leninism,9 liberal democracy and pluralism.9 Since
92. Notably, the Cambodian Constitution, with its extensive guarantees of human rights
and explicit references to international law, states in Ch. III, Art. 31: "The Kingdom of
Cambodia shall recognize and respect human rights as stipulated in the United Nations
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the covenants and conventions related to
human rights, women's and children's rights." CAMBODIAN CONsr., reprinted in Albert P.
Blaustein, Cambodia, in 3 CoNsnrrmONs OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 8 (Albert P.
Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flanz eds.,1994). Text of Cambodian Constitution available at
<http: //www.constitution.org/cons/cambodia.htm#chapterll >.
93. See supra note 73.
94. Amitav Acharya, Human Rights and Regional Order: ASEAN and Human Rights
Management in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN THE ASIA-PAcIFIC REGION 167,172 (James T.H. Tang ed., 1995).
95. On the relationship between human rights and religion, see Ann Elizabeth Meyer,
Universal versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct?, 15 MICH.
J. INr'L L. 307 (1994); see also Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim, Islam, Islamic Law and the Dilemma of
Cultural Legitimacy for Universal Human Rights 31; Jack Donnelly, Traditional Values and
Universal Human Rights: Caste in India 55; and Kenneth K. Inada, A Buddhist Response to the
Nature of Human Rights, all in ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Claude E. Welch. Jr. &
Virginia A. Leary eds., 1986).
96. Article 3 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia states that "Islam is the religion of the
Federation; but other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the
Federation." Constitution of Malaysia, Human Services Research Council (visited May 27,
1999) http: //star.hsrc.ac.za/constitutions/mall.htm.
97. Chapter II, Section 9 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand provides: "The
King is a Buddhist and Upholder of religions." See THAI CoNsr., supra note 6, at 4. Text of the
constitution is available at <http://www.nectec.or.th:80/pub/info/thai-law/constitution-
2538.txt>.
98. The constitutional preamble of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam refers to Marxism-
Leninism, Ho Chi Minh thought, and the period of transition to socialism. Chapter I, Article 2
states: "The SRV State is of the people, by the people and for the people. All state power
belongs to the people based on the worker-peasant-intellectual alliance." Phuong-Khanh
Nguyen, The Socialist Republic of Vietnam Constitution 1989-1992, in 20 CONSTroNs OF THE
CouNrRIES OF THE WORLD 4 (Albert Blaustein & Gilbert Flanz eds., 1992). Text of the
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there is no united ASEAN vision of human rights, most ASEAN members
will want to ensure sufficient space for self-definition within their
respective national contexts. In the interests of being inclusive and
multicultural, it is submitted that both a theocratic and secular reference to
the inherent dignity of human beings should be maintained. This would
avoid an anthropocentric or excessively secularist orientation that may well
be interpreted as an anti-religious bias or an epistemological triumph by
default of Reason over Revelation.
i. Duty
f60 That rights operate within the framework of community and
obligation is a truism. Lately, presumably to counter what is perceived as
excessive stress on individual rights, ASEAN state elites have been among
those suggesting, within the context of the human rights debates, that an
increased focus should be placed on duties. A lingering fear is that if state
elites arrogate to themselves the task of defining what constitute duties to
the community, this could be done in a self-serving manner to prop up
authoritarian regimes. "Duty" has been misused as a demand to support
the Fuhrer, the Volk or the Party, to serve statist values. It is also unclear
how such duties can be enforced.
f61 An ASEAN Charter is likely to elaborate a group-oriented vision of
society incorporating the critique of social irresponsibility ' N to counter the
influence of excessive Western "individualism" and its attendant social ills.
Like the African Charter,0 ' an ASEAN charter would place significant
emphasis on individual duties in relation to the state. The AIPO
Declaration, a muddy document that incoherently lumps together
discussions of state and citizens' rights declares uncontroversially:
[T]he peoples of ASEAN accept that human rights have two
mutually balancing aspects; those with respect to rights and
freedom of the individuals and those which stipulate obligations of
the individuals to society and State.
constitution is available at <http://www.batin.com.vn/vninfo/vni.htm>.
99. Chapter IV, Article 51 of the 1993 Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia adopts
the policy of liberal democracy and pluralism, while Article 56 adopts the market economy
system. See CAMBODIAN CoNST., supra note 92, at 13. Text of the constitution is available at
<http://www.constitution.org/cons/cambodia.htm#ChapterIV>.
100. For an explanation of such critiques, see Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility,
43 DUKE L.J. 989 (1994); DAVID SELBOURNE, THE PRINCIPLE OF DUTY: AN ESSAY ON THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVIC ORDER (1994).
101. For a description of the duties established in the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, see U. Oji Umozurike, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES'
RIGHTS 63 (1997); Makau wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: an
Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 339 (1995); Etienne-Richard Mbaya, The
Compatibility of Regional Human Rights Systems with International Standards, in HUMAN RIGHTS
IN PERSPECTIVE: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT 66 (Asbjem Eide & Bert Hagtvet eds., 1991).
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62 Undue emphasis on individual obligations might further weaken
the position of the vulnerable individual against the state, because breaches
of individual duties may be easily confused with the denial of individual
rights. For example, Article 1 of the AIPO Declaration stresses the
responsibility of all human beings "to participate in their total
development, taking in account the need for full respect of their human
rights as well as their duties to the community." In the first instance, if this
is an assertion that individuals are obliged to give a certain degree of
support to community goals as loyal citizens, it suggests nothing
controversial. "Development" in this context must be understood as
encompassing a holistic project for vindicating human dignity,
safeguarding both civil and political and socio-economic rights. It does not
suggest that the citizen must follow the "community goals" enunciated by
his government leaders blindly and uncritically. To avoid this deleterious
interpretation, it should constantly be stressed that development must
serve the individual, not vice-versa, and, as a responsible citizen, an
individual must be empowered to call his government to account in the
implementation of policies and programs.
[63 Interestingly, under Article 12, Part II of the AIPO Declaration,
("Basic Rights and Duties of Citizens and States"), the civil and political
right of free expression is qualified by reference to the inherent duties and
responsibilities" it carries."u The qualification of "free expression" with a
reference to duty implies the broad understanding in Anglo-American
constitutional jurisprudence that there are limits to an individual's rights.
To adapt Lord Acton's famed dictum, "liberties corrupt and absolute liberty
corrupts absolutely." Libel law, for example, punishes the irresponsible use
of free speech that harms personal reputation. There is a trade-off between
free speech and personal reputation; both factors must be balanced. The
stress on "duty" might unduly detract from individual rights where it is
utilized as a factor in the balancing process, usually in a judicial forum,
against the exercise of a liberty. This is particularly dangerous within a
context with a pre-existing-communitarian bias that presumptively allows
102. This is unlikely to mean the duty to speak against public policy or maladministration
but more likely, to speak in a manner that does not impair the socio-political status quo or
threaten stability. In Singapore for example, an alternative model of responsible journalism
has been advocated by the government, whereby a balance is to be struck between the press
as adversarial watchdogs and as government mouthpieces. The overriding guideline is that
reporting must be done in a manner that forges harmony and consensus, creating and
sustaining a climate conducive to Singapore's progress. See Li-ann Thio, Human Rights and the
Media in Singapore, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MEDIA 69, 72-75 (Robert Haas ed., 1996).
Different approaches to journalism in several Southeast and East Asian nations are discussed
in MURRAY MASTERTON, ASIAN VALUES I JOURNALISM (1996). An indication of what might
constitute irresponsible free expression may be found in topics that are subject to censorship.
For example, the Internet Code guidelines drawn up by Singapore Broadcasting Authority
(http://www.sba.gov.sg) lists specific taboos: pornography (displays of nudity to titillate,
forced sex, homosexuality, sex with children, animals, corpses as opposed to content with an
intrinsic medical, scientific, artistic or educational value); incest; bestiality; necrophilia;
excessive violence; and materials inciting racial and religious hatred. See Revised Internet Code
Makes Taboo Areas Clear, STRArS TIMES, Oct. 23, 1997, at 3.
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community interests to "trump" individual rights.0
64 The constitutions of many ASEAN states contain chapters
detailing citizens' duties." Not all duties are framed in terms of obligations
owed to the state-for example, duties to respect the Cbnstitution, to
receive education and training, to protect national arts and culture, and to
conserve natural resources and the environment. Some duties are
addressed primarily to private parties. Article 47(1) of the 1993 Cambodian
constitution states that "Parents shall have the duty to take care of and
educate their children to become good citizens" while article 47(2) declares
that "Children shall have the duty to take good care of their elderly mother
and father according to Khmer traditions." In some cases, the state is
enjoined to "serve and protect the people,"' 5 "respect the role of the
independent people's organizations,"'' protect children's rights,'07 and
protect the interests of racial and religious minorities."' The AIPO
Declaration also asserts, in Article 16, "the right and duty of each Member
State to formulate appropriate and sustainable national development
policies." This right to development, which is statist in nature, may be
asserted by a state in political fora against other states to protest any
interference with its economic policies, and may be asserted as a defense
against the suspension of civil and political rights. To prevent the right to
development from degenerating into a justification for repressive state
policy, it must be remembered that the people must be considered the
foundation upon which to develop this nebulous "right."'10 Individual well-
being and the equitable distribution of benefits must be central to
development strategies.
65 This trend toward emphasizing duties in human rights documents
is embodied by the draft Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities
(DHR) proposed by the Interaction Council in September 1997, to
complement the UDHR."0 Its supporters include former Prime Ministers of
103. For an analysis of the Singapore Court of Appeal's approach towards fundamental
liberties, see Li-ann Thio, An "i"for an "I": Singapore's Communitarian Approach Towards
Constitutional Adjudication, 27 HONG KONG L.J. 163 (1997).
104. Chapter IV of the Thai Constitution lists the "Duties of the Thai People" in sections
66-70. Supra note 6, at 14-15. Chapter III of the Laos Constitution covers the "Fundamental
Rights and Obligations of Citizens" in Articles 21-38. Joseph Zasloff, Lao People's Democratic
Republic, in 10 CONsnTrImONs OF THE COUNrRMS OF THE WORLD 63 (Albert Blaustein &
Gisbert Flanz eds., 1992). Chapter V of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Constitution states
the "Citizens Fundamental Rights and Duties." Supra note 98, at 13. Chapter M of the
Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia lists "The Rights and Obligations of Khmer
Citizens." Supra note 92, at 8.
105. PHILLUPNE CONsr., art. II, §4, reprinted in Gisbert Flanz, Phillipine Supplement, in 15
CONsTu (,NS OF THE COUNuES OF THE WORLD 2 (Albert Blaustein & Gisbert Flanz eds.,
1986).
106. PHmLuPINE CONSr., art. XMI, §15, reprinted in id., at 56.
107. CAMBODIAN CONsr., supra note 92, art 48, at 11.
108. SINGAPOREAN CONsr., art. 152, reprinted in Kevin Tan, Republic of Singapore, in 16
Constitutions of the Countries of the World 106 (Gisbert Flanz ed., 1995).
109. For a discussion of the putative quality of this "right" and what its content might be,
see Roland Rich, The Right of Development: A Right of Peoples?, in THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES 39
(James Crawford ed., 1988).
110. This is available af <http://-www.asiawide.or.ip/iac/declaral/ EngDecll.htmn>. See
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Thailand and Singapore, and the Indonesian Foreign Minister. The Council
Chairman, former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, has said that
the UDHR was influenced by Western ideas of freedom and individuality
stemming from the eighteenth century European Enlightenment, while the
DHR has an Eastern genesis, since "in the East, the notions of responsibility
and community have prevailed.""' Composed of twenty-nine elder
statesmen, the Council sought to draft a set of universal ethical standards
balancing freedom with the responsibility that allows it to grow. The
Declaration shuns exclusive insistence on rights, which, purportedly,
generate conflict and division. The enumerated obligations-for example,
to speak truthfully, to behave honestly and fairly, and to develop one's
talents-speak primarily to persons. Religious leaders and the media are
additionally singled out as having special responsibilities to avoid acts of
prejudice and hatred and to report accurately, eschewing sensationalism.
Reference is also made to conjugal and filial responsibilities, and duties to
preserve the environment for unborn generations. Only Article 6 seems to
be directly aimed at governments, exhorting their nonparticipation in, and
intolerance of terrorism, genocide, and the use of women, children and
other civilians as instruments of war.
66 Given the asymmetries of power between the state and
individuals, an undue emphasis on individual and non-state group duties
is likely to further render the individual vulnerable to misuses of state
power. Implicit in human rights are the duties of government, either to
refrain from restricting rights or to undertake positive steps to protect
them. The Draft declaration reflects a desire to make explicit the
obligations individuals owe to their community. But this should not be
done at the cost of diverting. attention from the duties states owe to their
individuals. A charter of state duties towards citizens might substantially
replicate the provisions of human rights documents. If the concept of duty
is going to take a more prominent place in human rights discourse,
however, human rights advocates should ensure that the duties of all
parties involved are set forth, including state duties. Further, it should be
stressed that individual duties are contingent upon the state's responsible
discharge of its role to protect and promote the human rights of
individuals, the primary subject of international human rights law.
also Pang Gek Choo, New Charter on Human Obligations Drawn Up, STRAITs TIMES, Sept. 2,1997,
at 1; Asad Latif, New Declaration Codifies Obligations, STRArrS T Fs, Sept. 6,1997, at 52. For a
critique of this Declaration as undermining human rights, see ANESrY INRNATIONAL,
MUDDYLNG THE WATERS: THE DRAFr "UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN REsPONSIBILTIES"
(1998).
111. Report on the Conclusions and Recommendations by a High-level Expert Group
Meeting, Vienna, Austria (April. 20-22,1997) chaired by Helmut Schmidt, available at
<http://wwiv.asiawide.or.jp/iac/declaral/EngDecll.htm>; see also Asad Latif, Declaration of
Responsibilities Balances That of Rights, STMArrs TIMES, Sept. 5,1997, at 66.
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ii. Discretion and Derogation
[67 Rights and liberties are likely to be crafted with broad derogation
clauses, evidencing a bias towards states. '12 States also maintain large
measures of discretion insofar as they can limit the scope of human fights,
balancing individual rights against requirements of public order, morality,
and welfare. This technique is employed in the AIPO Declaration, which
some view as a regional attempt to articulate an Asian model of human
rights. Part II deals with "Fundamental Human Rights," guaranteeing the
right to life, freedom of conscience and religion, right to property, liberty,
and security of person, and the right to have violations of these rights
redressed. These rights are expressly qualified by the phrase "in accordance
with law." National legislation may contain a communitarian bias and the
judicial interpretation of derogation clauses may be liberal to reinforce a
communitarian philosophy that subjects individual rights to the interests of
the collective. This may effectively denude them of any worth."3 The
Singapore chapter of the deregistered Jehovah's Witnesses, for example,
claimed that their constitutional rights to religious freedom had been
impugned by an administrative ban on all their publications. The
publications were considered prejudicial to the public, welfare since their
pacifist tenets contradicted the national policy of compulsory military
service. The High Court dismissed the claim, giving great leeway to
"national security" interests:
The sovereignty, integrity and unity of Singapore are undoubtedly
the paramount mandate of the Constitution and anything,
including religious beliefs and practices, which tend to run counter
to these objectives, must be restrained" 4
112. See generally Adamantia Pollis, Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism, 18
HuM. Rms. Q. 316 (1996).
113. In the Singapore context, see Li-ann Thio, supra note 103. See also H.P. Lee,
Constitutional Values in Turbulent Asia, 23 MONASH U. L. REv. 375 (1997). In the constitutional
history of Singapore, there has only been one case before the Court of Appeals where the state
sought to justify a preventive detention order in the interests of national security. The Court of
Appeal found the order to be invalid on account on a technicality; the wrong officer had
signed it. See Chng Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs, [1989] 1 MLJ 69. This decision asserted
that the exercise of ministerial discretion in issuing detention orders was objective in nature
and subject to judicial review. Chng overturned the decision of Lee Mau Seng v. Minister of
Home Affairs [197112 MUJ 137, which had held that the exercise of such jurisdiction under the
Internal Security Act was subjective and immune from review on substantive grounds. The
government showed its displeasure with the decision in Chng by legislatively overruling it
within a month. The amendment stated effectively that the law was "frozen" to the state of
affairs that had existed on the date that the Lee Mau Seng judgment was delivered, effectively
reinstating the subjective test of restricting judicial review to grounds of procedural
compliance. For a discussion of Chng and its subsequent legislative overruling, see Li-ann
Thio, Trends in Constitutional Interpretation: Oppugning Ong, Awakening Arumugam, 1997
SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD. 240,241-46.
114. See Chan Hiang Leng Colin & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR 662. Fora
detailed critique of this judgment, see Li-ann Thio, The Secular Trumps.the Sacred: Constitutional
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68 The differing approaches of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) and the Singapore Court of Appeal (SCA) toward the scope of free
speech to criticize politicians usefully illustrates how the judicial
interpretation of a right determines how robustly it is enjoyed.
Adjudicating between individual and community rights is not a value-
neutral exercise; it is greatly affected by whether a judge believes
individuals exist primarily in "splendid isolation" or primarily as social
units. The communitarian bias in ASEAN countries tends to favor state-
defined collective interests over individual interests.
69 In considering a claim that an opposition parliamentarian had
made libelous statements disparaging then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew
during election rallies, moreover, the SCA accorded paramount importance
to protecting politicians' reputations. Citing two pre-Charter Canadian
cases,"5 the SCA rejected the American "public figure" exception, which
maintains a broader scope of acceptable criticism against public figures,
because of their voluntary acceptance of public scrutiny. The SCA feared
that privileging such critical political speech would "deter 'sensitive and
honourable men from seeking public positions of trust and responsibility,
and leave them open to others who have no respect for their reputation.0 16
A dearth of worthy public officials would be contrary to the collective
public interest. The judicial affirmation of this statement echoes the official
executive stance in the Shared Values White Paper that government leaders
are Confucian junzi, or honorable men, to whom society should defer.
These "honorable men" demand that a superior-subordinate posture be
adopted in the realm of political debate and yet expect to enjoy the same
protection as private individuals in relation to libel law, without being
subject to a wider scope of public criticism. This stance seems to entirely
ignore the "chilling" effect exerted on free speech, and the collective
democratic interest in hearing criticism about the community's elected
representatives. In the latest run of libel cases arising out of the 1997
general elections, damages have reached a record high of $3.63 million for
defamatory words uttered during political rallies."7 This strongly deters
critical political speech, which is the lifeblood of a democratic regime.
70 By conttast, in Lingens v. Austria,"8 the European court took a far
more balanced approach by not focusing exclusively on a single interest. In
Issues Arising out of Colin Chan v PP, 16 SINGAPORE L. REv. 26 (1995). This essay will be
published as a chapter in INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE AsA-PAcIFIc
(Garry Rodan ed., forthcoming, 1999).
115. Campbell v. Spottiswoode (1863) 32 LJ QB 185 and Tucker v. Douglas [195012 DLR
827.
116. Jeyeratnam Joshua Ben v. Lee Kuan Yew 11992] 2 SLR 310, 333H (quoting GATLEY ON
LIBEL AND SLANDER (Philip Lewis, ed., 8th ed., 1981)). Jeyaretnam had spoken at a political
rally in the hustings for the 1988 General Elections in Singapore where he made insinuations
that the poison used in the suicide of Minister Teh Cheng Wan was somehow linked to the
Prime Minister.
117. Tang Liang Hong v. Lee Kuan Yew [199811 SLR 97.
118. (1986) 8 ECHR 407 (involving a journalist who had written an article where the
words "basest opportunism" and "immoral" were used in relation to the Federal Chancellor of
Austria, who was accused of protecting former Nazi members for political reasons).
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addition to public reputation, the court considered the public's right in a
democratic society to receive information critical of its government leaders,
as well as the electioneering context of the case, and the speaker's right to
speak. The vindication of democratic values was the governing principle.
These contrasting approaches show that similar paper commitments to
rights may diverge substantially in their practical application, depending
on the ideological values of the adjudicators.
iii. Development
71 ASEAN countries stress the right to development, which was
elevated to the status of a "universal and inalienable" right in the Bangkok
IGO Declaration. Article 1 of the 1986 Declaration on the Right to
Development states that "every human person and all peoples are entitled
to participate in and contribute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural and
political development, in which all human rights and fundamental
freedoms can be fully realised.""' This suggests a holistic approach to both
civil and political rights and social, economic, and cultural rights. The
nebulous quality of the right, however, makes it difficult to monitor.
72 ASEAN statesmen have cited the exuberanhe of democracy as an
inhibitor of economic growth, lauding the discipline engendered by "Asian
values" as the basis of their economic success. Given the present Asian
economic crisis, the "democracy versus development" debate remains
topical. A wave of popular discontent in Indonesia culminated in the May
1998 riots and unseated a long-term authoritarian ruler. This has revived
assertions that economic development cannot progress unchecked without
some attention being paid to political liberalisation. It also undergirds the
belief that democratic governments can better handle crises than
authoritarian ones, and that free markets and political liberalism are
mutually reinforcingo Political and economic reconstruction needs
popular endorsement to be effective. The legitimacy of the current
President B.J. Habibie's administration is still being challenged, as
manifested in street demonstrations, such as the deadly Black Friday clash
of November 13, 1998.1' Economic reform cannot be carried out when
there are riots in the street as this certainly dampens investor confidence.
Democratic elections whereby people actively participate in choosing their
representatives are a crucial source of legitimacy. Democracy, while not a
panacea for economic woes, is an important stabilizing force that buttresses
rather than impedes economic development.
119. adopted Dec. 4,1986, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186
(1986).
120. Steve Lohr, Business, Asian Style: A Revaluing of Values; Some Say Market Collapse Shows
Democracy is Key to Growth, After All, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,1998, at B9; Fareed Zakaria, Will Asia
Turn Against the West?, N.Y. TIMES, July 10,1998, at A15.
121. Habibie Honeymoon Over After Riots, STRAIIS TIMES INTERACTIVE, Nov. 18,1998 (visited
May 9,1999) <http://straitstimes.asial.com/pages/sea6 1118.html>.
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iv. An ASEAN Charter on Human Rights?
73 Since ASEAN governments engaged in the human rights
discourse favor the statist themes of individual duties and collective rights,
some human rights advocates fear that a regional ASEAN Charter on
Human Rights will undermine international standards and further weaken
the position of individuals.
174 Rather than lobby for an ASEAN Charter, some feel that a wiser
strategy would be to encourage ASEAN states to ratify more human rights
treaties and participate more actively within the UN human rights regime.
175 A more optimistic approach would seek to draft a regional charter
based on a genuine commitment to the indivisibility of civil and political
rights and socio-economic rights, both of which are aspects of humane
development. Both categories of rights reflect legitimate aspects of human
dignity and are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Studies should be
undertaken to show how these categories of rights complement and
reinforce one another. Clear indicators or goals should be set out, so that
the progress of development can be monitored and a government's
performance can be subject to the censure or praise of an informed public
opinion.
[76 The problem of not having an authoritative (as opposed to a loud)
voice is one endemic to a decentralised international legal system.
Minimally, a regional charter should affirm the international bill of rights-
the UDHR and both 1966 International Covenants-to enhance the
possibility of compatibility with international standards. A regional body
has to uphold international standards lest a particularistic approach lead to
"the kind of arbitrary, political interpretation of actions that leads to human
rights violations in the first place."tm Political culture in this respect may be
determinative, but it cannot be definitive where it conflicts with
international standards.
III. "ACCEPTABLE" MODES OF IMPLEMENTATION: CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT
AND DESTRUCTIVE ADVERSARIALISM
A. Anti-Conditionalities: De-linking Human Rights and Development
I77 As discussed above, ASEAN countries view the implementation of
human rights as primarily a matter of national competence, rather than one
subject to international supervision. Consonant with the "ASEAN way,"
which eschews confrontation, and with an eye at not marring the image of
unity projected by ASEAN to the world, any concern ASEAN states might
have about the human rights violations of one of their members is
122. Sidney Jones, Regional Institutions for Protecting Human Rights in Asia, 50 AuSrRALIAN
J. INT'L AFF. 269, 272 (1996).
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addressed through discreet diplomatic channels. In addition, any such
concern is articulated in terms of avoiding human rights terminology. This
conveys the unfortunate impression of nonengagement with the outside
world.
78 ASEAN asserts that, in promoting human rights, the international
community should adopt a "positive, balanced and non-confrontational"
posture, following the call to international cooperation in Articles 55 and 56
of the United Nations Charter." The Bangkok IGO Declaration advocates
promoting human rights by "cooperation and consensus, and not through
confrontation and the imposition of incompatible values."
[79 In spite of their support of economic sanctions against South
Africa, ASEAN states have generally opposed such external measures. The
Bangkok IGO Declaration stresses the "universality, objectivity and non-
selectivity" of human rights and the importance of avoiding double
standards in implementing human rights. Further, tying economic aid to
human rights performance could constitute a form of economic neo-
imperialism, insofar as developing countries in desperate need of foreign
assistance will then be subject to the terms of aid as dictated by foreign
states. Such terms may be nothing more than thinly veiled protectionist
measures designed to impede the economic competitiveness of developing
countries. Hence, ASEAN jointly presses for delinking human rights from
economic development issues, for example, through rejecting the inclusion
of a social clause in international trade agreements as a new form of
protectionism.
B. ASEAN Admissions Policy
180 The ideological animosity that had divided Southeast Asian
countries and made the founding vision of an ASEAN composed of all ten
Southeast Asian countries illusory ended with the Cold War. The 1991
Cambodian Paris Peace Accord brought a limited, uneasy peace to a
country torn by decades-long civil strife, paving the way for the
rapprochement of Vietnam and Laos with individual ASEAN countries. This
made the dream of a regionwide institution more concrete. The stances
adopted in regard to the applications of Burma and Cambodia for ASEAN
membership appear prima facie contradictory, insofar as no demands were
made to the Burmese military junta, SLORC, as a condition for entry.
Conversely, Cambodian admission to ASEAN has been delayed and made
contingent upon the establishment of a democratic government established
under United Nations-supervised free and fair elections.
[81 In applying to join ASEAN, Burma departing from its self-imposed
isolationist policy. Its application immediately stirred opposition from
123. See Irawan Abidin, Human Rights: The Indonesian View, INDONESIAN OBsERVER, Sept.
11, 1997, available at the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia web-site
at <http://www.deplu.go.id/view/humanrights/paper/indeonsianview.htm>. See generally
Christine Cerna, East Asian Approaches to Human Rights, 2 BUFF J. INrr'L L. 201 (1995-96).
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Western states that felt that ASEAN membership would confer a degree of
legitimacy upon what the West considered an illegitimate, repressive
regime. In seeking to dissuade ASEAN from admitting Burma, Western
states argued that ASEAN's association with an international pariah would
only tarnish the ASEAN image, and that ASEAN admission would only
fortify the junta leaders' belief that they could get away with abusive and
authoritarian practices. The western view was that only through a regime
of harsh sanctions could SLORC, now euphemistically renamed the State
Peace and Development Council (SPDC), be motivated to make changes
toward a democratic, and presumably human rights-respecting,
government. ASEAN begged to differ on the effectiveness of sanctions to
induce such change, noting that this would only work if Burma were
plugged into the world economy. The ASEAN predilection for harmony
and consensus yielded the softer approach of "constructive engagement."
This assumed that problems are best solved by inclusion rather than
exclusion. Once Burma was admitted, it could gently be nudged along the
path of change through moral suasion. In November 1996, the ASEAN
Heads of Government agreed to simultaneously admit Cambodia, Laos,
and Burma into ASEAN.
[82 Burna's eventual admission into ASEAN in 1997, however, was
not plain sailing. ASEAN leaders held differing views as to whether Burma
should democratize before being awarded the prize of membership, with
Thailand and the Philippines at times suggesting they should. Malaysia
was disgruntled by Burma's treatment of the Muslim Rohingyas minority
groups, while Thailand suffered the brunt of Burma's status as the chief
refugee exporting country in the region. A general discomfit existed,
moreover, over the military junta's repression of democratic forces,
including the house arrest of the head of the National League for
Democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi, who had won a victory in democratic
elections in 1990.12 The prevailing consensual view, however, was that it
would be easier to influence the military regime once it was an ASEAN
member.12 Burma, together with Laos,12 was thus admitted to ASEAN in
July 1997 without any requirement of democratization. For admitting
Burma, and for ignoring the contrary plea of Aung San Suu Kyi-the
leader of the party that won ninety percent of the vote in the 1990
elections-ASEAN has been criticized as "rejecting democrats in favor of
124. Proposals were made to the effect that a genuine tripartite dialogue between the
junta, the ethnic minorities and the National League of Democracy, perhaps mediated by an
ASEAN member serve as a condition for entry. See Asean Values for Myanmar, ASlAWEEK,
Nov. 22,1996, at 184.
125. ASEAN to admit Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, in July, STRArrs TIMES, June 1,1997, at 1.
126. The list of agreements to which Laos had to accede include those for contributing to
an ASEAN Food Security Reserve and Fund for ASEAN, as well as various other agreements
relating to tariffs, customs, economic cooperation, investment, and dispute settlement. See
Declaration on the Admission of the Lao People's Democratic Republic into the Association of
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despots.""
f83 Since the promotion of human rights and democracy is not an
express ASEAN goal, it is not surprising that ASEAN admission policies
exclude human rights policy as a condition for membership. This may be
contrasted with the European approach in the wake of the Yugoslav and
Soviet implosions in the early 1990s.'2 States wanting to join the European
Union had to satisfy certain normative conditions including a commitment
to a form of governance that respects democracy, the rule of law, and
international human rights standards. A prospective ASEAN member had
only to satisfy the following non-human rights related criteria: accession to
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and all other ASEAN treaties,
declarations, and agreements. It also had to agree to join the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA), which takes effect in 2003, and to have the capacity to
participate in all other economic arrangements.
184 ASEAN's decision to delay Cambodia's admission stemmed from
dramatic changes in the political situation. Just sixteen days before
Cambodia was scheduled to enter ASEAN, together with Laos and Burma,
Second Prime Minister Hun Sen staged a military coup to seize power by
force. Certainly, the accommodating approach ASEAN had displayed
toward the Burmese junta, which is widely viewed by the international
community as illegitimately ruling by force of arms, did not serve to deter
Hun Sen.'2 The immediate statements issued by ASEAN' governments
were varied, with Indonesia and Vietnam leading a six-strong faction
championing Hun Sen's case and opposing delayed entry, leaving
Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines, inspired by the principle of the
peaceful transfer of power, troubled enough to rethink the whole issue."3
85 On July 10, 1997, ASEAN issued the following statement:
In the light of unfortunate circumstances which have resulted from
the use of force, the wisest course of action is to delay the
admission of Cambodia into ASEAN until a later date.3
127. Shame on Southeast Asia, JERUsALEM POsr, June 1,1997, at 6.
128. For a description of this approach, see Declaration on the Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, 31 I.L.M. 1485 (1992);
Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions arising from the
Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1488,1494-1526 (1992); Roland Rich, Recognition of States:
The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 4 EUR. J. L\t'L L. 36 (1993).
129. While the United Nations recognizes the government of Myanmar, it remains
insistent on calling upon the SPDC to establish a meaningful democracy in accordance with
the popular will expressed in the 1990 democratic elections, and to engage upon talks with the
political opposition in the interests of national reconciliation. United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, para. 4(b), 54 Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/1998/23 (1998).
130. It was reported that Singapore, in addition to urging restraint and calling for a
ceasefire stated that it "disapproves of the change of government through violent means and
calls on all parties to adhere to the constitutional processes in place in Cambodia." Singapore
Disapproves of Government Change, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, July 11, 1997.
131. Joint Statement, The Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, Kuala Lumpur, 10
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[86 At first, in its characteristic nonantagonistic manner, ASEAN
refused to adopt a stance concerning the legality of Hun Sen's government
as this would cross the line into internal Cambodian affairs and be
"tantamount to making an assessment of his position. '1 Ranariddh had
urged ASEAN to delay Cambodia's entry, cautioning against a 'business
first, democracy next approach" and calling for stronger economic and
political pressure from the international community.ln Hun Sen
characterized the Cambodian problem as purely domestic, arguing that it
should pose no impediment to the scheduled admission. It was clear that
ASEAN membership would bolster Hun Sen's legitimacy and open the
door to foreign aid. ASEAN manifestly did not want to take sides, and
assigned envoys to work with both parties. The delay, however, was
effectively a censure of Hun Sen. To maintain its credibility as an
organization, ASEAN felt that it could not condone the use of force for
unconstitutional purposes.M  This would contradict the ASEAN
fundamental principle of renouncing the threat or use of force.'3 It
continued to recognize Ranariddh as co-premier-along with Hun Sen-of
the coalition government set up after the 1993 elections. Clearly, ASEAN
could not remain indifferent to these potentially destabilizing
developments, nor could this indifference extend to accepting a new
member that used force to solve domestic political disputes, flouting the
ASEAN tradition of peaceful consensus-seeking approaches to problems.
Cambodian entry was thus made contingent upon the formation of an
effective government, with ASEAN urging the conduct of free and fair
elections and the return of political normalcy to Cambodia.
[87 The ASEAN Foreign Ministers had decided to indefinitely delay
Cambodia's admission until a government was formed, otherwise
Cambodia would be unable to discharge its rights and obligations as an
ASEAN member. Even after the stalemate following the July 1998 elections
ended, in November, when Hun Sen and Ranariddh arrived at a deal to
form a coalition government in November, ASEAN showed a distinct
wariness, still harboring serious reservations about the political stability of
the country. ASEAN stated that a functioning government was necessary
before admission into ASEAN could be recommended." Cambodia did not
gain full membership at the ASEAN summit in December because key
aspects of the coalition pact, which included the formation of a Senate, had
July 1997 (visited May 9,1999) <http://www.aseansec.org/news/pre cam.htm>.
132. ASEAN Feels 'Let Down,' S. CHINA MORMNING POST, July 11, 1997 (quoting Malaysian
Foreign Minister Abdulla Badawi).
133. See Ranariddh wants stronger pressure put on Hun Sen, STRAITs TIMEs, July 22,1997, at 1.
134. See e.g., ASEAN and the Question of Cambodia, STRArrs TMEs, Sept. 10,1997, at 43;
Waiting for Normalcy, Bus. TWEs, July 11, 1997, at 5.
135. See e.g., Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, signed Feb. 24,1976, art.
2(e) (providing that, in their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall be
guided by the fundamental principle of renunciation of the threat or use of force). Text may be
found at <http://www.asean.or.id/politics/pol agr2.htm> and
<http: //www.aseansec.org/summit/amity76.htm>.
136. See Hun Sen and Ranariddh Agree to Coalition, STRArrS TIMES, Nov. 14,1998; Cambodia's
ASEAN Entry Unlikely in Dec, STRAs.TiMEs, Nov. 18,1998.
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yet to be implemented. 137 Consensus as to Cambodia's admission was
finally reached in March 1999 after Cambodian legislators effected
extensive constitutional changes necessary to form the Senate. On April 30,
1999, Cambodia was admitted to ASEAN.
f88 Judging by the Cambodian experience, it would appear that the
minimum criterion for ASEAN admission is the presence of a stable
internal order, maintained without resort to force. If this is so, ASEAN's
credibility seems to be called into question, insofar as it has adopted an
inconsistent position, rendering ambiguous the admissions criteria.
ASEAN seemed to apply a double standard in calling for the return of a
democratically elected government in Cambodia, but not for one in
Burma.'- Although the Burmese military junta maintains its position by
force and was democratically repudiated by the Burmese people in the
1990 elections, there was no delay in Burma's 1997 admission. Burma's
admission was characterized as an internal ASEAN affair, with Malaysia
noting that the political systems of countries did not factor into the United
Nations admissions process.39 Yet ASEAN appeared to intervene in the
domestic affairs of Cambodia by requiring the observance of constitutional
processes and political legitimacy as a condition of membership.
Ostensibly this did not constitute meddling in Cambodia's domestic
politics insofar as the role played by the ASEAN Troika-the Philippines,
Thailand, and Indonesia-to help restore political stability came in
immediate response to a request by a Cambodian elected official for help.
The Burmese junta, by contrast, never asked ASEAN to mediate its conflict
with the country's political opposition.
89 The fact is, however, that ASEAN was more comfortable not
intervening in Burma because the dispute there was not perceived as a
threat to regional stability; SLORC had the country under its effective,
brutal control. This was not the case in Cambodia, where the bitter political
rivalry, built on a strife-ridden history, threatened to explode into fighting
sufficient to threaten regional stability. It would thus appear that ASEAN is
prepared to take a more interventionist stance when a conflict between
actors in one state is sufficiently grave to threaten the stability of the state
and the region. ASEAN seems content to ignore the grossest human rights
violations committed by a state like Burma-where extra-judicial killings,
torture, and forced labor are widespread-so long as there is a strong
government with which it can deal. ASEAN is not, after all, a club of
democratic nations; some of its longstanding members have autocratic
governments. To deny Burma membership because of its notorious human
137. See Singapore View: No Rush for Cambodia to Join ASEAN, STRAITS TIMES, Dec. 13,1998,
at 13.
138. See e.g., ASEAN Reeks of Double Standards, NATiON (Bangkok), July 13,1997 (visited
May 27,1999) <http://www.singapore-window.org/O713naed.htm>.
139. See ASEAN Won't Let US Influence its Decision to Admit Myanmar, STRArrs TIMES, Apr.
28,1997, at 14. The head of the largest US investor in Burma, Unocal Corp., pointed out that
economic sanctions hurt people, not regimes, justifying his company's investment on the
belief that the fastest route to an open society was through the open market. See US Oil Giant
Defends its Role in Myanmar, STRArrS TIMES, April 23,1997, at 15.
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rights violations, would have forced some pots to call the kettle black.
C. Constructive Engagement vs. Imposition of Sanctions
90 Burma's' 4" admission into ASEAN displeased the European Union
(EU) and the United States. EU members4 ' and the United States often
address human rights violations by attempting to induce authoritarian
regimes to liberalize through such measures as unilateral or multilateral
economic sanctions or pressuring multi-national corporations to withdraw
their investments. After the Dili Massacre carried out by Indonesian forces
in East Timor in November 1991, Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands
suspended bilateral aid to Indonesia.'4 This approach is not confined to
Western states. Taiwan, the sixth biggest investor in Indonesia in 1997,
suspended rice aid to Indonesia in the wake of the violent attacks on the
ethnic Chinese minority there in 1998.'" Prior to Burma's entry into
ASEAN, in October 1996, the European Union imposed a visa ban on the
SLORC military rulers.'" All military cooperation and military equipment
sales to Burma were banned. Further, all nonhumanitarian or development
assistance had been suspended since 1988 after SLORC seized power,
crushing nationwide pro-democracy protests and killing and jailing
thousands. The European Union expanded its existing visa ban on Burma
government officials in October 1998.'" The United States and Canada
were among those countries that unilaterally imposed sanctions on Burma,
condemning its systematic human rights violations, including the freedom
of expression. The United States banned all new investments in Burma in
April 1997,1 while in August 1997, Canada removed Burma's eligibility
under the General Preferential Tariff and placed it on the Area Controls
List, which requires all exports from Canada to Burma to have an export
140. See generally MYANMAR AND THE WIDER SouTHEAsrT AsIA (Rohana Mahmood & Hans-
Joachim Esderts eds., 1991). A useful internet source for the latest updates on the Burma
situation is the Burma Project website at <http://wwv.soros.org/burma> ("The Latest News
on Burma").
141. One of the explicit foreign policy objectives of the European Union is "to develop and
consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms." Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty), art. J, 1(2), signed Feb. 7,1992,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992). See generally Li-ann Thio, Human Rights and Asian Values: At
the Periphery of ASEAN-EU Relations?, 5 J. EUR. STUD. 27 (1997).
142. See Amitav Acharya, Human Rights and Regional Order: ASEAN and Human Rights
Management in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNAnoNAL
RELAnONS IN THE ASIA-PAcIc REGIoN 167,167-68 (James T.H. Tang ed., 1995).
143. Taiwan halts rice aid for Indonesia, STRArIs TIMEs, Aug. 21,1998, at 1.
144. EU Bans all High Level Government Contacts: SLORC feels chill, NATIoN, Nov. 12,1996.
145. See Michael Lelyveld, Burma Project, EU Expands Sanctions Against Burma, J. OF
CoMMERcE, Oct. 28,1998 (visited April 23,1999)
<http://www.soros.org/burma/bn102898.html>.
146. See Clinton Says Yes to Sanctions forMyanmar, STRAITS TIMES, Apr. 23,1997, at 2. See
also the White House press release and letter to Congress concerning the Notification of




Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 2 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol2/iss1/1
1999] Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries 45
permit.4 ' The opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi supports the Western
economic sanctions against Burma.'48
[91 The traditional ASEAN way avoids confrontation, preferring quiet
diplomacy. "Constructive engagement,' 49 as an alternative method of
human rights management, seeks not to embarrass the object of
engagement through isolation or condemnation. Change is induced
through peer pressure. Its proponents argue that isolating Burma will be
ineffective, given Burma's self-reliant ethos and recent emergence from
self-imposed isolation, a manifest indication of its non-receptivity to
international pressure. In this view, more effective results can be attained
through gentle suasion and the wielding of "economic carrots" that can
economically benefit all Burmese. Promoting Burma's economic
development through foreign trade and investment and through its
integration into the world economy will eventually lead to peaceful,
political liberalization, it is argued. Singapore, for example, has responded
enthusiastically to foreign investment solicitations from Burma in recent
years, and is now one of the largest sources of foreign investment in
Burma. Indeed, Singapore has property development and manufacturing
projects in Burma worth an estimated $1.5 billion and actively promotes
bilateral economic cooperation between the two countries.'- ° Powerful
economic interest groups in the West also support this stance.5' ASEAN is
of the opinion that economic sanctions violate its policy of nonintervention
in the internal affairs of a state.15
92 Opponents of "constructive engagement" argue that the policy is
morally repugnant; it serves merely as "a prop of the military regime for
147. See Press Release, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada,
Aug. 8,1998, No. 186, Axworthy Condemns Burma on 10th Anniversary of Military
Crackdown (visited May 27,1999) <http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca /english/news/press releases/98 press/98 186e.htm>.
148. In November 1996, National League of Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyii issued
a video-taped appeal to the European Union calling for economic sanctions against Myanmar.
See Burma Faces New Worldwide Criticism Over Suu Kyii Attack, AsiA AGE, Nov. 11, 1996.
149. For a description of this policy, see Amitav Acharya supra note 142, at 175-78.
150. See e.g., Singapore to Promote Economic Cooperation with Burma, XhHUA, Feb. 18, 1999
(visited May 27,1999) <http://www.singapore-window.org/sw99/90218xin.htm>. The
imposition of U.S. sanctions against Burma was criticized in a Straits Times editorial on April
25,1997, at 60. In the editors' view, which is closely associated with the views of the Singapore
government, sanctions would be ineffective in bringing about an acceptable form of
government in Singapore because it would have a minor impact in dollar terms; foreign
investment would continue to pour in from Asia and Europe. Interestingly, it stated that the
U.S. motive of restoring Burma to rights and to end the suppression of free choice and
political dissent there was one shared by ASEAN. ASEAN chose to work toward transition
through investment and offering ASEAN membership though the editorial stressed ASEAN
membership carried not merely benefits but obligations, and that it behooved SLORC to show
a sincerity towards political reform.
151. USA Engage!, for example, is a coalition of American businesses, agricultural groups
and trade associations that opposes unilateral economic sanctions. Their website is at
<http://www.usaengage.org/>.
152. See Asean to Continue Dialogue with Myanmar Despite US Sanctions, STRArrs TIMEs, Apr.
25,1997, at 37.
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short term economic gains. ' o It is hard to predict the effects of private
pressure and it is uncertain whether engagement will elicit change or
embolden resistance to change. In a video smuggled out of the country,
Aung San Suu Kyi highlighted the danger that admitting Burma in ASEAN
might make the regime "even more obdurate and repressive than ever,"
seeing that there was no real opposition to its ways. Tm
93 "Constructive engagement" also feeds the interests of those
ASEAN states that wish to shield their human rights policy from
international scrutiny. Were ASEAN states to comment on the repressive
measures taken by the renamed State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC), this might threaten their own interests; their own domestic policies
might become fair game for the embarrassing scrutiny of international
criticism. Membership in ASEAN is supposed to enhance legitimacy, rather
than provide a forum for the exposure of illegitimate policy.
I94 After Burma's admission into ASEAN, Amnesty International
argued that the ASEAN claim that "constructive engagement" with SLORC
would improve human rights in Burma would now be put to the test.
55
There does not seem to be any improvement in Burma's human rights
record after it gained ASEAN membership.56 To the contrary, after Burma's
admission as an official ASEAN observer in July 1996, human rights
violations intensified. In September 1996, SLORC detained 500 democracy
activists and barricading the home of Aung San Suu Kyi. 7
95 What's more, the issue of human rights in Burma has not been put
on any formal ASEAN agenda. It is likely that ASEAN will maintain an
official blind eye with respect to Burma's human rights, given Burma's
insistence that it will not tolerate criticisms from its regional partners.5 8
When Malaysia's foreign minister suggested that SPDC open talks with
Aung San Suu Kyi, he was simply rebuffed; SPDC indicated that it saw no
point in commencing dialogue with her"59 The Burmese government has
remained resolute in refusing to start such a dialogue, despite repeated
pleas. 60 Under pressure, the Burmese junta has made c~rtain concessions
153. KANBAWZA WIN, CONSTRUCIVE ENGAGEMENT IN THE BURMESE CONr i (1995).
154. See Shame on Southeast Asia, JERUSALEM Posr, June 1,1997.
155. Amnesty International, News Release, Myanmar A New Human Rights Problem for
ASEAN, July 22,1997 (visited May 27,1999)
<http://www.amnesty.it/news/1997/31602297.htn>.
156. See, e.g., Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, United States Department
of State, Burma Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, Feb. 26,1999 (visited May 27,
1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/human rights/1998 hrp report/burma.html>.
157. Southeast Asia's Black Eye: How ASEAN should handle a wayward neighbour, ASIAWEEK,
Oct 25,1996, at 20.
158. See Rangoon won't brook criticism over its policies, BANGKOK Posr, July 16,1998 (visited
June 1999) <http://www.soros.org/burma/bn7/698.html>
159. See Testfor ASEAN, S. CHINA MORNING Posr, July 5,1997.
160. Japan also called for the Burmese government to start a dialogue with Suu Kyi but
this was ignored. See Activists Freed, But Pressure on Myanmar Continues, STRArrs TiMES, Aug.
16,1998, at 21. In a Reuters interview conducted by Rajan Moses on February 28,1999, a
Burmese government spokesperson argued that tacit Western support for the opposition
National League for Democracy hindered the introduction of democracy. The spokesman
insisted that Suu Kyi must drop all talk of convening a Parliament in order to start the process
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with respect to foreign nationals. In August 1998, SPDC detained eighteen
foreign activists for allegedly inciting unrest by handing out pamphlets
recalling the bloody military crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators
in August 1988, and sentenced them to five years of hard labor. This
provoked international outrage and even some disquiet from ASEAN
members. 61 Among the foreign activists detained were six Americans and
nationals from ASEAN countries like Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and
the Philippines. Demonstrating a readiness to speak out against the SPDC,
but only where the interests of a state's own nationals are affected, the
Philippines called for the release of the two detained Filipinos.'6 All of the
activists were eventually freed, primarily due to pressure from states
protecting their nationals.
[96 Burma continued to be a source of embarrassment after joining
ASEAN, fueling discord between ASEAN and some of its dialogue
partners. Indeed, Burma has remained a central issue in ASEAN-EU
affairs.' s The European Union has decried the inefficacy of "constructive
engagement." A senior EU official pointed out that the human rights
situation had deteriorated since Burma's ASEAN membership: more
opposition politicians have been disappeared, and killings have increased.
He asked pointedly, "If ASEAN can intervene in Cambodia, why can't it
intervene in Myanmar?"'164
97 At the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference in July 1998, the
European Union expressed grave concern about the lack of democratic
progress in Burma. ASEAN-EU cooperative ventures had hit a rock
because of the EU's stand against repression in Burma. The European
Union's continuing refusal to accept Burma as a member of the European
Community-ASEAN Joint Committee has caused a rift with ASEAN,
which insists that it wants all of its foreign ministers present at EU talks.'65
I98 Although ASEAN has insisted that the European Union not
discriminate against any of its members, individual ASEAN ministers did
not feel compelled to publicly defend Burma for its harsh policies against
pro-democracy political opponents during the 1998 ASEAN Regional
Forum security talks.'6 The European Union continues to prevent Burma
from exploiting the full privileges of ASEAN membership by denying
Burma a seat at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 67 for government
of political reconciliation. See Estrada Pushes Junta for Reforms, NATION, Dec. 17,1999.
161. Shawn Crispin, Regime veers between tolerance and toughness, FAR E. EcoN. REv., Aug.
27,1998.
162. Free Activists, US tells Myanmar, STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 13,1998, at 27.
163. The EU had called for change in four aspects to improve human rights conditions: the
release of all political prisoners, the end of military rule, granting democratic political parties
access to political life and the promulgation of a democratic constitution. German Minister says
EU seeks Change on Four Fronts in Burma, NATION, Oct. 22,1997.
164. EU Seeks New Relationship with ASEAN, STRArIS TIMES, Sept. 29,1997, at 20.
165. See EU and ASEAN reconciliation talks breakdown, STRAUS TIMES, Jan. 24,1999, at 22;
ASEAN wants all its members at EU talks, STRAIS TEvS, Feb. 26,1999, at 21.
166. Myanmar's ASEAN Shield, STRAMIS TRMES, July 28,1998, at 53.
167. The inaugural Asia-Europe Meeting was held in March 1996 in Thailand and
provided a forum for European and Asian leaders to consolidate links and to discuss any
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leaders." Further, unlike other new ASEAN members (Laos and Vietnam),
Burma does not receive aid from the West. The tension precipitated by
Burma in EU-ASEAN relations has stilted dialogue between the two
groups, delaying the disbursement of much needed EU development
funding.
169
'99 An influential European-led pressure group, the International
Network of Political Leaders Promoting Democracy in Burma (PD Burma),
has put further pressure on Burma to democratize by calling on ASEAN to
put its own house in order and to push for talks between the Burmese
military junta and the opposition leader. This, it believes, will bring about
political stability and European investment in the region.70 The glare of
negative international publicity increased even further in August 1998
when the National League for Democracy raised the ante by calling for the
convening of a People's Parliament, and the military blocked attempts by
Aung San Suu Kyii to meet her supporters.'7 The EU Ministerial Council
supported Aung San Suu Kyii's convocation of the Committee
Representing Parliament (CRP) and the European Union urged the SPDC
to recognize, and hold genuine dialogues with, the CRP. Continuing
adverse public opinion in the United States has also caused corporations
like Ericcson to suspend all business ties with Burma as of September
1 9 9 8 .'
2 Anti-Burma grassroots movements in state governments and
campuses have already pressured major corporations like Pepsi, Liz
Claiborne, and Apple Computer to pull out of the country.
100 "Constructive engagement" is ultimately a limited tool to induce
changes in the dictatorial Burmese regime. It is obviously a method for the
patient, yet, in the interim, rampant human rights abuse continues in
Burma. Countries and corporations that invest in Burma are in complicity
with those human rights violations. Constructive engagement has been
attacked as merely allowing the SPDC to exploit Burma's resources and
divert its earnings to the military apparatus for oppressing the Burmese
people, rather than providing for their basic needs1 3 Promoting the
topic of mutual interest. The official ASEM home web page is at <http://asem.inter.net.th>.
168. European countries are determined not to let Burma attend ASEM until its human
rights record improves. British Foreign Minister Robin Cook has criticised the military regime
there as being repressive and irresponsible insofar as it profited from the drug trade. While
the Malaysian Prime Minister has stated that discrimination against Burma is discrimination
against ASEAN, other ASEAN leaders have been more circumspect in the matter, pointing
out that ASEM is not a meeting of regional blocs but rather, a forum for individual countries.
See ASEM Ban on Myanmar Will Provoke Strong ASEAN Reaction, STRArTs TImEs, Sept. 3,1997, at
23; see also Myanmar's Place at Asem Not Asean's Call, STRArrs TVMIES, Sept. 4,1997, at 24.
169. See ASEAN feeling weight of Burma, NATION, Feb. 16,1999 (visited May 9,1999)
<http://www.soros.org/burma/bn021699c.html>.
170. See ASEAN Must Put its Own House in Order, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 26,1998.
171. See Stephen Collinson, Myanmar Still Thorn in Side of ASEAN, TIMEs OF INDIA, Dec. 11,
1998 (visited May 9,1999) <http://www.timesofindia.com/111298/llwor4.htm>.
172. Ericsson, Press Releases, Ericsson Suspends Business Ties With Burma, Sept. 1,1998
(visited May 9,1999) <http:/ /www.ericsson.se/Eripress/19980901-0023.html>.
173. See Debbie Stothard, Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, "Constructive
engagement"-an alternative view (citing the briefing on human rights in Burma before the U.N.
Human Rights Commission on April 8,1997) (visited May 9,1999)
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welfare of the peoples in ASEAN is one of the founding objectives of
ASEAN. A repressive military regime that treats human rights with
contempt and cracks down on political dissent harms the welfare of its
people. Such policies cannot be the basis for long term stability. ASEAN
states are best positioned to influence Burma, but a more aggressive stance
is needed to produce results. This would necessitate a radical shift in
ASEAN policy, such as the placing of serious human rights abuses on
ASEAN's formal agenda. If ASEAN were able to contribute to restoring
democratic rule in Burma, this would enhance its prestige both
internationally and within the region. 4
D. The Principle of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs: Erosion of a
Bedrock ASEAN Principle?
i. Maintaining a Fraternal Silence and a Blind Eye
[101 Article 2(c) of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia enshrines the fundamental principle of nonintervention in
the internal affairs of another state. This prohibition is also set out in
Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter and the 1970 Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.'75 This section deals with the application of the principle of
nonintervention in the ASEAN context.
102 A matter is "internal," or falls within the domestic jurisdiction of a
state, if it is "not regulated by international law or if it is not capable of
regulation by international law."' 76 Human rights issues are clearly matters
of international concern, evident from the substantial corpus of human
rights law. Human rights concerns cannot be characterized as issues of
domestic governance where states have voluntarily assumed international
obligations in this regard. All United Nations members, which include all
of the ASEAN states, have a de minimis obligation to promote and protect
human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the United
Nations Charter. By acceding to specific human rights treaties, ASEAN
states accept the obligations contained therein. For a state's action to
constitute "intervention" there must be an element of compulsion, which
Lauterpacht defines as "a peremptory demand or an attempt at interference
<http://www.soros.org/burma/alteview.html>.
174. Local NGOs, such as the Burma Solidarity Group Malaysia, have called for a change
in ASEAN policy with regard to constructive engagement as being one that favors the military
junta and encourages it to discard the democratic process. See the Burma Solidarity Group's
February 14,1997 press statement issued in conjunction with some fifty NGOs throughout the
ASEAN region, ASEAN urged to ditch "constructive engagement" (visited May 9,1999)
<http://www.soros.org/burma/malaygrp.html>.
175. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV)
176. HERSCHLALrrERPACHT, INrERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHrs 175 (1950).
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accompanied by enforcement or threat of enforcement in case of non-
'compliance." Enforcement may entail "either direct measures of
compulsion or such indirect pressure as is associated with non-compliance
with a legal obligation or with a pronouncement of an international
authority having binding legal effect."'77 A Security Council resolution
imposing mandatory sanctions against a recalcitrant state certainly falls
within the orbit of "intervention." A specific recommendation to a State,
drawing its attention to the propriety of taking action to bring a course of
behavior in line with an international obligation, does not constitute
"intervention," since it lacks the element of dictatorial and peremptory
interference. The pressure of public opinion may induce changes in state
behavior but this change does not flow from a binding legal determination.
103 In practice, ASEAN states have "closed ranks" against
intervention and adopted a united stance against foreign states or
international organizations that have criticized the human rights record of
one of their members, particularly Burma. A clear "hands-off" policy was
adopted with respect to the Indonesian annexation of East Timor in 1975.
Only in 1976 was the issue discussed formally by ASEAN foreign
ministers; the rest was silence. ASEAN's blind eye toward intraregional
human rights abuses was also evident in regard to the human rights abuses
in the Philippines under the Marcos administration.
f104 This policy of ignoring human rights abuses in ASEAN member
states has, nevertheless, damaged ASEAN's relationships with its dialogue
partners and other regional and international bodies. The military abuses
committed in East Timor have elicited much international concern and
have been a perennial bugbear in ASEAN-EU relations. The European
Union wants to place the promotion of human rights and democracy on
the ASEAN-EU agenda while ASEAN wants to confine the agenda to
economic cooperation, trade, and investment issues.'7 ASEAN had
characterized the problem as a bilateral issue between Portugal and
Indonesia, while Portugal has asserted that such a viewpoint is too narrow
given the fact that the United Nations has never recognized the Indonesian
annexation and still considers Portugal to be the administering colonial
power."
[105 ASEAN cites the principle of nonintervention for its refusal to
comment on East Timorese claims to self-determination, but its fraternal
silence is motivated by a desire not to embarrass Indonesia, the largest
177. Id. at 168.
178. See ASEAN and EU Should Avoid Divisive Issues, Says Jayakumar, STRAn-s TiMEs, Feb.
11, 1997, at 6; EU Must Not Bow Down to Asean's 'Shut-up' Policy, NATIoN, Dec. 2,1997, at A4;
Talks on Burma permissible: No yielding on Timor, BANGKOK Posr, Feb. 12,1997, at 5.
179. With a "sea change" in Indonesian policy, some headway is currently being made in
resolving the East Timor issue. It has been decided as a matter of principle that the East
Timorese were to vote in a U.N. organized ballot about whether they wanted autonomy
within Indonesia, with the possibility that a refusal of this proposal could open the way to
independence. See Cameron Stewart & Don Greenles, Jakarta accepts E. Timor ballot, THE
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member of ASEAN. This seems to be an exercise in selectivity, given
ASEAN's role in brokering a peace in Cambodia and between the Muslim
Moros in Mindanao and the Philippines.
[106 The concern not to upset a fellow ASEAN member in the interests
of solidarity extends further than refusing to confront them directly.
ASEAN states have displayed a great reluctance to allow conferences on
contentious issues affecting other ASEAN states to be held on their soil.
This may be in line with Article 10 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
in Southeast Asia (1976), which provides that "[e]ach High Contracting
Party shall not in any manner or form participate in any activity which
shall constitute a threat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty
or territorial integrity of another High Contracting Party." In refusing to
allow the use of their country as a base for protesting against others, the
Filipino President banned forty prominent foreign delegates, including
South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu, from entering the country to
attend the first Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor (APCET I). This
conference was held in Manila in 1994 in the absence of the foreign
delegates.
107 Malaysia was similarly discomfited by plans to hold APCET II in
Kuala Lumpur in November 1996. Malaysian NGOs and the Asia Pacific
Coalition on East Timor,'80 who seek to change the ASEAN position from
that of silence to proactive conflict resolution, organized the conference.
The Malaysian government appealed to the conference organizers to cancel
it, to avoid harming bilateral relations with a fellow ASEAN member. The
cabinet decided at the eleventh hour not to permit the meeting and said
that foreign delegates would be deported. The local media was directed not
to cover the Conference, which was held but disrupted by a mob that
included youth members of Malaysia's governing National Front Coalition
(UMNO). Led by UMNO youth, the mob broke doors, overturned tables
and threatened delegates with violence if they did not leave the hotel
hosting the conference. The police eventually arrived, bussing the
delegates to the airport for deportation and arresting some mob members
who were later released. Indonesia was pleased with the deportations,
declaring that this "reflected the ASEAN members' commitment not to
interfere in the affairs of other countries and their highest solidarity."'81 By
failing to prevent the violent crackdown on this private meeting to
promote self-determination, Malaysia tainted its international reputation
for adherence to the rule of law. The Philippines also manifested this spirit
of ASEAN cooperation and solidarity when it informed the Malaysian
authorities of the movements of a Filipino who had convened APCET I; he
was detained by immigration officials and deported back to the
Philippines.'"
180. The press statements made in connection to the events surrounding APCET I can by
found at <http: / /www.geocities.com/Capitolhill/6133/5.htrnl>.
181. Melee Over a Meeting, ASIAWEEK, Nov. 22,1996, at 20-21.
182. See Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor II, Press Release, APCET I Convenor
detained by Malaysian Immigration (visited May 9,1999)
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108 The "ASEAN way" of avoiding public discussion of human rights
abuse appears to be a vehicle for silencing dissent from alternative, non-
state actors'8 like NGOs active in the East Timor cause. In general, NGOs
are suspiciously regarded as advocates of "Western" values, out to
undermine the legitimacy of ASEAN governments. Influential human
rights reports like those produced by Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch have great potential to embarrass, and to strain interstate
relations. Even local NGOs are sometimes considered too aggressive, akin
to opposition political parties in highlighting social problems.'m Malaysia
has threatened to unleash its draconian Internal Security Act (ISA) which
allows for preventive detention, if NGOs pose a threat to "national
security," which can be expansively defined. For example, NGOs planning
to hold a public tribunal to highlight the abuses of the Malaysian police
were dissuaded by a threat to invoke the ISA.' Clamping down on the
expression of critical political views is effected in the name of national
resilience and order.
ii. Testing the Waters: The Call for a More Flexible Posture
[109 Cracks in the faqade of ASEAN unity have appeared over how to
handle certain matters of common concern, such as the admission of
Cambodia and the management of the economic crisis. This is also
reflected in the strained bilateral relations between certain ASEAN
countries. Indonesia has made remarks that Singapore is not doing enough
to help Indonesia as a friend.' Singapore and Malaysia are occupied in a
heated railway land row. ASEAN countries also seem to be displaying
differing attitudes toward engaging Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma. For
example, Filipino Foreign Minister Domingo Siazon paid a private visit to
Aung San Suu Kyi at her Rangoon home in October 1997, becoming the
<www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/6133/press8.html>.
183. For a discussion of non-statist perspectives on human rights, see Dianne Otto,
Rethinking the "Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 1 (1997);
Sharon K. Hom, Commentary: Re-Positioning Human Rights Discourse on "Asian" Perspectives, 3
BUFF. J. INT'L L. 209 (1996). It is instructive to compare the statist 1993 Bangkok IGO
Declaration on Human Rights with the Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights, a
product of the 240 participants from 110 non-governmental NGOs from the Asia-Pacific
regiofi. The latter, the Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights, affirms the universality of
human rights and stresses that religious-cultural traditions do not pose an obstacle to
realizing international human rights norms. The text of both Bangkok Declarations is
reproduced in 1 ASIA-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS AND RESOURCES (Fernand de
Varennes ed., 1998) at pages 88 and 147, respectively.
184. See e.g., Jakarta to launch probe into non-govt bodies, STRAnTs TIMES, Sept. 10, 1997, at 25;
Relations between Malaysian government, NGOs hit rough patch, STRAITs TIMES, Jan. 17,1997, at
58.
185. See ISA Threat Forces NGOs to Shelve Tribunal on 'Police Abuses,' STRAITs TIMES, Dec.
22,1996, at 18.
186. The Singapore Prime Minister has stated that his government will restrain itself and
say little in response to the litany of criticisms leveled against Singapore by the Indonesian
president, to avoid being drawn into the latter's domestic politics. See S'pore Won't be Drawn
by Indonesia, STRAITS TMES, Mar. 5,1999.
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highest ranking Southeast Asian government official to have done so and
risking the displeasure of the Burmese authorities. The Filipino President
had requested official permission to visit her but when this was met with
silence, he did not pursue the matter.187 This was followed by a meeting of
the Malaysian foreign minister, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, and top
leaders of the National League of Democracy (NLD) in March 1998.
Singapore's Prime Minister made no attempt to visit her during his visit to
Burma that same month.18 Visits by high-level ASEAN government
officials to NLD members, whom the SPDC considers political dissidents,
and whom they want to continue to marginalize, may well be construed by
the SPDC as moral support for an opposition faction and, therefore,
interference with Burma's internal affairs.
110 Speculation that ASEAN would alter its longstanding
commitment to the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs was
fueled when Thailand proposed that the policy should be reexamined
during the thirty-first annual ministers' meeting in July 1998. Malaysian
Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim had already suggested that
ASEAN needed a more proactive response to manage the spill-over effects
of certain domestic socio-economic crises and political upheavals, such as
that in Cambodia, through "constructive intervention" to prevent the
escalation of problems.89 A Thai minister also criticized the inadequacy of a
"neutral" ASEAN stance.' 90 In a world of interdependent economies, no
neighbor should sit quietly by while another suffered from foreign
speculative attacks on the baht, for example.
f111 Recognizing that the world was becoming increasingly
interdependent and globalized, Thailand argued that a stronger new
approach was needed to handle the escalation of economic, environmental,
and political crises in the latter half of the 1990s. ASEAN member states
had to be able to criticize each other's policies more openly where these
had regional repercussions. Thailand suggested a policy of 'flexible
engagement":
T9
All the ASEAN members have the responsibility of upholding the
principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of one another.
187. See Siazon Met with Suu Kyi in Rangoon, BANGKOK POST, Oct. 23,1997 (visited May 9,
1999) <http://www.soros.org/burma/n2O2397.html>.
188. Goh Leaves Burma Without Meeting Suu Kyi, AssOcIATED PRESS, Mar. 25,1998 (visited
May 27,1999) <http: / /www.singapore-window.org/80325app.htm>.
189. See The Word is Constructive Intervention, STRArrS TIMEs, July 15,1997, at 19. In the
Cambodian context, this could involve extending direct assistance to firm up the electoral
process and strengthening civil society and the rule of law. While affirming the
nonintervention principle, he stressed that there were certain core humanitarian values by
which all should be bound. Datuk Anwar cited ASEAN's willingness to ensure free and fair
elections in Cambodia and its constructive engagement with Burma as indicators of a more
active stance in handling potential sources of regional conflict.
190. See Time for ASEAN to Play a More Active Role in Members' Affairs, STRArrs TIEs, July
25,1997, at 26.
191. See ASEAN's Diversity is Baggage, say Thais: Problems in Some Member Countries Become
Stumbling Blocks for the Group as a Whole, STRAITS TIMEs, Aug. 13,1998, at 28.
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But this commitment cannot and should not be absolute. It must be
subjected to reality tests and accordingly, it must be flexible. The
reality is that, as the region becomes more inter-dependent, the
dividing line between domestic affairs on the one hand and
external or trans-national issues on the other is less dear. Many
"domestic" affairs have obvious external or trans-national
dimensions, adversely affecting neighbors, the region and the
region's relations with others. In such cases, the affected countries
should be able to express their opinions and concerns in an open,
frank and constructive manner which is not, and should not be,
considered "interference" in fellow-members' domestic affairs.'9
12 This proposal provoked a great deal of debate within ASEAN.
Ultimately, only the Philippines supported the Thai suggestion. The other
ASEAN nations expressed public alarm at any attempt to change gears.
[113 Most of the ASEAN governments also feared that "flexible
engagement" might encourage foreign forces to step up their efforts to
influence change within ASEAN countries, through more intensive
criticism or even stepped up sanctions. Within- ASEAN, a more critical
interstate approach might precipitate a level of discord that could threaten
the cohesiveness of the grouping. The majority of ASEAN countries paid
little heed to the Thai argument that, far from promoting divisiveness
within ASEAN, the proposed policy reflected an enhanced degree of
political maturity within ASEAN; ASEAN regionalism and resilience
would be promoted in the long run if states took a more active interest in
each other. As far as human rights are concerned, franker discussion would
promote awareness about abuses and contribute to raising the standards of
human rights protection in the region. Flexible engagement would also
provide an early warning system by alerting the grouping to the domestic
problems of an ASEAN country that had transnational implications,
helping the formulation of informed solutions. Notably, Thailand was not
calling for abandonment of the principle of nonintervention in internal
affairs. Rather, Thailand was, calling for recognition that the division
between internal and international affairs is no longer so clear. Some
matters were no longer to be considered taboo, and the threshold was to be
determined by an "effects" test. ASEAN states should engage more
intensively with respect to matters with adverse effects on countries
outside the state where the problem originated.
[114 The nonintervention policy was, however, affirmed in the closing
statement issued by the Singapore Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar at the
end of the 1998 meeting.' The majority of ASEAN states were obviously
wary of any attempts to whittle away the "consensus" approach, which
provides a useful way of avoiding political questions with wider regional
192. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand's Non-Paper on the Flexible Engagement Approach,
Press Release No. 743/2541, [3(d), July 27,1998 (visited June 9,1999)
<http: //www.thaiembdc.org/pressctr/pr/pr743.htm>.
193. See Non-Intervention Policy Stays, STRArs TmS, July 26,1998, at 15.
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implications. Nevertheless, there was a growing acceptance of the need to
talk more openly about common problems in the form of "enhanced
interaction." According to Filipino Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon,
ASEAN had been in "enhanced interaction" mode in Burma, holding
extensive and comprehensive talks with the authorities over the process of
national reconciliation among other issues.'94 ASEAN continued to hope
that integrating Burma would induce the junta to introduce reforms and
political pluralism in the face of criticisms that the human rights situation
had deteriorated.
' 115 This semantic nitpicking over how to characterize suggested
modifications to the principle of nonintervention reveals some internal
fissures in ASEAN unity and a general, if mild, disaffection with a total
"hands off' policy. Thailand continued to push for change. In August 1998,
the Thai government urged ASEAN states to expedite political reform to
enable them to adjust to outside forces, in particular to comply with global
standards of business administration. In relation to managing social trends,
Thailand urged other ASEAN states to "open up" and take care of their
peoples' needs, including increasing demands for political participation,
respect for human rights and freedom of religion.
[116 The principle of nonintervention in internal affairs has also been
tested by recent events. Thailand and the Philippines, for example, both
criticized Malaysia for the ill-treatment of the sacked Deputy Prime
Minister Anwar Ibrahim in September 1998 while held in detention,
expressing fears that Anwar was being denied due process of law. Anwar
had been charged with corruption, gross indecency, and eleven counts of
sexual offenses. Punishment for these offenses range from up to twenty
years imprisonment, to caning, to fines. Anwar maintains that these are
trumped-up charges, part of a political conspiracy by Malaysian Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad to remove him from politics.
1 117 Prima facie, the removal of a government minister would be an
internal matter. Both President Habibie of Indonesia and President Estrada
of the Philippines, however, expressed open disapproval of Anwar's
alleged maltreatment. Habibie has both close personal ties to Anwar 95 and,
given concerns with human rights and democracy at home, an eye to
legitimizing his political position domestically. At the same time, Estrada
was the only ASEAN minister who openly supported United States Vice
President Albert Gore's speech lauding the nascent internal political reform
movement of the "brave people of Malaysia"'96 at the November APEC
194. See Siazon Calls for Open Dialogue in Myanmar, STRArrs TIMES, July 26,1998, at 15.
195. See Anwar's Links with Indonesia's Elite Are Too Close for Them to Brush his Case Aside,
says Habibie Advisor, STRAITS TIs, Oct. 4,1998.
196. Gore's speech was quoted in Malaysians Are Enraged, STRArrs TIMES INTERACriVE,
Nov. 18,1998 (visited May 9,1999) <http://straitstimes.asial.com/pages/wrld 11118.html>.
It continues: "Democracy confers a stamp of legitimacy that reforms must have in order to be
effective. And so, among nations suffering economic crises, we continue to hear calls for
democracy, calls for "reformasi". We hear them today-right here, right now-among the
brave people of Malaysia .... Citizens who gain democracy also gain the opportunity and the
obligation to root out corruption and cronyism." Id.
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meeting. President Estrada declared, "[a]s a president of a democratic
country, I go along with him,'097 opining that "human rights and due
process of law transcend national boundaries.'.9. Other ASEAN countries
like Singapore criticized the American stance, urging all sides to settle their
bilateral tiffs diplomatically and not to mix politics with economics. For
being "civil" and not commenting on Anwar's sacking, the Malaysia Prime
Minister called Singapore a "true friend."'99
H118 The point is that two ASEAN members "broke ranks," first, by
commenting on a politically sensitive matter in another ASEAN state and,
second, by framing Anwar's maltreatment in detention in terms of
previously eschewed "human rights" terminology, implying that it is a
matter of universal concern. Malaysian politicians criticized the
inexperience of the two "new kids on the block"' who failed to follow the
ASEAN practice of washing dirty linen in private, if at all.
[119 These maverick stances may well have been performances to
curry favor with the West, or displays of support for a personal friend,
rather than advocacy for human rights. Nevertheless, Malaysia formally
accused the Indonesian and Filipino heads of government of breaching
ASEAN's sacrosanct principle and interfering in internal Malaysian
affairs.20' Bilateral relations were further strained when Habibie and
Estrada appeared to hesitate over attending the November APEC
conference in Malaysia. This was taken as further criticism of the treatment
of Anwar.=
120 Trying to soothe troubled waters, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali
Alatas sought to clarify what constitutes intervention in another state's
internal affairs. He suggested that Habibie's comments were personal in
nature and did not constitute interference in Malaysian affairs.20 Estrada
197. See Focus on Apec Matters, urges Chok Tong, STRArrs TIMES INTERACnvE, Nov. 18,1998
(visited May 9,1999) <http://straitstimes.asial.com/pages/wrld7 1118.html>.
198. Keith B. Richburg & Paul Blustein, Gore's Remarks in Malaysia Stir Dispute, WASH.
Posr, Nov. 18,1998, at A35.
199. See Singapore a True Friend, says Nazri, STRAIS TIMES INTERACrvE, Nov. 14,1998
(visited May 9,1999) <http://web3.asial.com.sg/archive/st/6/pages/ma111 1114.html>.
200. See Habibie and Estrada Are Just the New Kids, Says Minister, STRAITs TIMEs, Oct. 20,
1998, at 20.
201. See Statements by Habibie, Estrada, Breach ASEAN Policy, STRAnS TIMES, Oct. 21, 1998,
at 1.
202. President Estrada has expressly stated: "I syfnpathize with Anwar because I can say
he is not being given due process (being under preventive detention) and that's a human
rights violation .... He looks like a human rights victim. It is sad what is happening to our
friend." Estrada: Anwar's Rights Being Violated, STRAITS TIMES, Oct. 7,1998, at 22. President
Habibie, in expressing concern over 'bhow my friend, Anwar Ibrahim, has been treated," also
spoke the language of human rights: "You cannot just forget the Constitution or a man or a
woman in this society. Because of the human rights involved-and I think it is [sic]
universal-people should be given the chance to defend themselves. People should not be
tortured. There's a United Nations convention." Habibie Concerned About Anwar's Well-Being,
STRAnrs TIMES, Oct. 5,1998, at 25.
203. Foreign Minister Alatas noted that as long as the statements made did not voice
agreement or disagreement, or lecture another state, they should not be considered as
intervening in the affairs of another country, stating that a distinction had to be drawn
'between a personal opinion about the conditions of someone and intervention." Alatas: Comments
[Vol. 2
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and Habibie's criticisms can be understood as unofficial statements rather
than as intervention. Given their standing, however, their comments made
them appear to be taking sides in a domestic political dispute. Knowing
that the leader of another ASEAN country has expressed concern for
Anwar probably made it easier for Anwar's supporters to question the
Prime Minister's actions. At the very least, it may be said that certain
ASEAN leaders seem to be less inhibited about criticizing the policies of
their fellow member states, though they are careful to stress that, in so
doing, they are not intervening. Naturally, if either Estrada or Habibie do
something controversial at home, they will not be able to fall back so easily
on the ASEAN tradition of noninterference, should ASEAN states choose
to criticize their policies.
f121 Disagreement among ASEAN states over what constitutes
"internal affairs" has certainly strained bilateral relations and breached the
silence. Further, the Indonesian government may not even be able to act
"fraternally" as Malaysia did by preventing Malaysians from organizing an
East Timor conference in Kuala Lumpur. This is because the notion of
government accountability is taking root in an increasingly free and vocal
press. NGOs in the region are increasingly ready to air their opinions
independent of the government's foreign policy concerns. As Dr. Dewi
Fortuna Anwar, foreign policy adviser to the Indonesian president, stated,
"if NGOs in Indonesia organized a conference on Malaysia now, Jakarta
would "not be able to do anything about it." Dr. Dewi noted that "ASEAN
is in danger of being split between countries that regard democracy and
human rights as universal values whose promotion becomes a common
responsibility, and those that are still proponents of "Asian values.' ' 0
R122 While the principle of nonintervention may have taken a
battering during recent events, ASEAN has by no means been abandoned
it. ASEAN's action in helping to restore political stability in Cambodia was
grounded in consensus, since Cambodia for help. One may speculate that
ASEAN will now be more willing to intervene when a government is not in
control, and when internal political instability within an ASEAN state
threatens regional peace and security.
E. Promising Trends in ASEAN Practice: Expanding the Range of
Functional Co-operation - Women and Children First
I123 In recent years, ASEAN has expanded its scope of cooperative
activities beyond its original economic and political mandate. In so doing,
it has acknowledged that ASEAN's mandate extends to addressing many
concerns that are pertinent to human rights, even though it does not use
the term "human rights." Rather, these matters are classified as "functional
cooperation."
on the case not interference, STRAITs TuMfs INrrERACTIVE, Nov. 5,1998 (visited May 9,1999)
<http: //straitstimes.asial.com/anwar/anwarll 1105.html>.
204. Supra note 142.
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124 The 1992 Singapore Declaration provided that functional
cooperation should promote child development and allow for the "wider
involvement and increased participation by women in the development of
the ASEAN countries in order to meet their needs and aspirations.'2 '5 The
Bangkok Summit Declaration of 1995 stated that "ASEAN shall elevate
functional cooperation to a higher plane to bring shared prosperity to all its
members," guided by the theme of "shared prosperity through human
development, technological competitiveness and social cohesiveness.
' '
Aside from the promotion of the rights of women 7 and children,28 ASEAN
has broadened its reach to human resource development, management of
HIV-related problems,' reduction of rural poverty,20 eradication of
illiteracy, fighting transnational crime1 like drug-trafficking, and to
management of transborder environmental problems such as the haze
problem from Indonesian forest fires. These programs seek to improve
1 205. 31 I.L;M. 498,503-505 (1992). The Singapore Declaration was concluded in Singapore
on January 28,1992 between Brunei-Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Phliipines-Singapore-
Thailand. For a description of the Declaration and its conclusions, see ASEAN's Singapore
Rendezvous: Just Another Summit?, 14 CONTEMP. S.E. AsIA 142 (1992).
206. Fifth ASEAN Summit, Meeting of the ASEAN Heads of Government, Bangkok, Dec.
14-15,1995 (ASEAN Secretariat). This is available at the ASEAN web site, found at
<http://www.aseansec.org>.
207. See, e.g., 1988 Declaration of the Advancement of Women in the ASEAN Region, July
5,1988 (visited May 9,1999) <http: / /www.aseansec.org/function/dsd88.htm> (seeking, in
recognition of women's roles as active agents and beneficiaries of national and regional
development, to integrate the specific concerns of women in national plans of action).
208. See, e.g., 1993 Resolution on the ASEAN Plan of Action for Children, Dec. 2,1993
(visited May 9,1999) <http://www.aseansec.org/function/resd93.htm>. This resolution
deals with issues pertaining to child survival (poverty, basic needs), protection against
exploitation, abuse, child prostitution and trafficking, and alternative family care
arrangements for victims of abuse. An institutional framework is provided in the form of
designating a Desk Officer for Children to serve as a focal point for ASEAN countries. These
Officers assist in recommending regional policy, facilitating information exchanges, reviewing
each country's implementation of ASEAN programs of cooperation on children, and
submitting proposals and reports on children to the ASEAN Committee on Social
Development.
209. ASEAN Regional Program on HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control (1995-2000)
<www.aseansec.org/function /pahivl.htm>.
210. See the Framework for the ASEAN Plan of Action on Rural Development and
Poverty Eradication (visited May 9,1999)
<http://www.aseansec.org/function/rdev frm.htm> (seeking to enhance ASEAN capacity to
monitor and assess the incidence of poverty through, for example, the development of socio-
economic indicators).
211. See 1997 ASEAN Declaration on transnational crime (visited May 9,1999)
<http://www.asean.or.id/politics/adtc97.htm> (pursuing regional modalities to combat
crime through information exchanges and policy coordination and contemplating the
establishment of an ASEAN Centre on Transnational Crimes to co-ordinate regional efforts);
see also 1998 Joint Declaration for a Drug-Free ASEAN (visited May 9,1999)
<http://www.aseansec.org/amm/prdrug8.htm>.
212. See, e.g., Jakarta Declaration on Environment and Development, Sept. 18,1997
(visited May 9,1997) <http: / /wwv.aseansec.org/function/env97.htm> (identifying flagship
projects in the area of ASEAN environmental cooperation); Regional Haze Action Plan
(visited May 9,1999) <http://www.aseansec.org/function/pa haze.htm> (setting out
cooperative measures to monitor fires and promote better land and forest management
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the welfare of ASEAN peoples, which contributes to the vindication of
human dignity.
' 1125 At the 1997 Informal Summit held in Kuala Lumpur, the ASEAN
heads of government adopted a road map for the twenty-first century,
entitled ASEAN Vision 2020.213 Once again, the term "human rights" is
absent from this document, although some Vision goals, such as
eradicating poverty, disease, and illiteracy, correspond with goals in the
field of socio-economic rights. The Vision conceives of ASEAN as a concert
of Southeast Asian nations operating as "an effective force for peace, justice
and moderation in the Asia-Pacific." It foresees:.
vibrant and open ASEAN societies consistent with their respective
national identities, where all people enjoy equitable access to
opportunities for total human development regardless of gender,
race, religion, language, or social and cultural background... a
socially cohesive and caring ASEAN where hunger, malnutrition,
deprivation and poverty are no longer basic problems, where
strong families as the basic units of society tend to their members,
particularly the children, youth, women and elderly; and where
the civil society is empowered and gives special attention to the
disadvantaged, disabled, marginalized and where social justice
and the rule of law reign.
The idea of a "community of caring societies" is fully consistent with the
humane values of human rights law.
126 This ASEAN manifesto of sorts is promising insofar as it lays
before the domestic constituencies of ASEAN states and the international
community a declaration of intent to achieve certain goals. These
programmatic aspirations allow for some degree of political accountability,
as the public will expect ASEAN states to make good on them, and
opposition groups can derive political capital from a failure to fulfill the
goals. Programs do not, however, confer rights; they do not provide
individuals and groups with a legal means for compelling government
action. The highly worthwhile goals of Vision 2020 are couched in the most
general and abstract manner, making monitoring and enforcement
difficult. Governments should formulate and widely disseminate a detailed
national program, setting out principles and establishing guideposts for the
monitoring and measurement of goal fulfillment. If not, implementation of
these goals will remain largely a matter of government largesse. Explicit
linkages should, moreover, be drawn between ASEAN 2020 and human
rights to demonstrate their compatibility and to build bridges between
constituencies. This would not merely be educational in terms of
213. Adopted on December 15,1997 in Kuala Lumpur by the ASEAN Heads of
Government, ASEAN Vision 2020 envisions ASEAN as a concert of nations "bonded together
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demonstrating to ASEAN peoples the relevance of human rights to the
region; it would also bolster ASEAN legitimacy insofar as ASEAN states
are seen as fulfilling their human rights commitments in good faith,
particularly with respect to women's and children's rights. Focusing on the
particular interests of these vulnerable sectors of society is a way of
gradually incorporating the promotion of human rights into government
policy, which will be less threatening than a full immersion into a
comprehensive human rights program. A gradual, but firm, approach in
promoting certain human rights will hopefully encourage ASEAN
governments to incorporate broader human rights goals into their domestic
policies.
1127 In this way, the promotion of human rights could become a facet
of ASEAN policy. For example, Vision 2020's commitment to promoting
the role of women in national development and improving their welfare
could work hand in hand with the commitments that ASEAN states have
made, by acceding to CEDAW, to promoting women's rights and equal
treatment. The reporting obligations under CEDAW will provide for some
measure of international scrutiny. Maximum protection would be afforded
to women if ASEAN states can be persuaded to accede to the proposed
optional protocol to CEDAW, thereby giving individuals a channel for
sending "communications" to an international body. Although this will
open up ASEAN states to more intensive scrutiny, their commitment to
increasing the level of human rights protection could translate into
domestic approval and support, upon which a government's legitimacy
ultimately rests.
IV. A QUESTION OF STRUCTURE: DEVELOPMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS
ARCHITECTURE
'f128 Government initiatives in developing infrastructure for human
rights protection in the ASEAN context have focused on the development
of national institutions. The Commonwealth has been supportive of this
and has held meetings to develop such national institutions. In July 1996,
delegates from various Human Rights Commissions, including those from
India, Indonesia, and New Zealand, met in Australia and decided to
establish an informal Asia-Pacific Forum of National Human Rights
Institutions.214 This'was seen as a tangible and constructive step toward the
establishment of longer-term regional human rights arrangements. The
Australian government funded support services for three years. The
Larrakia Declaration sets out the functions of this Forum.215 The United
214. The Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions currently consists of
representatives from the national human rights commissions of Indonesia, Australia, India,
New Zealand, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. The web page of the Forum is at
<http: //wwiV.apf.hreoc.gov.au>.
215. See The Larrakia Declaration: Conclusions, Recommendations and Decisions of the First
Asia-Pacific Regional Workshop of National Human Rights Institutions, 1996 AUsTRALIAN J. HUM.
RTS. 117. Its functions include facilitating mutual support through information exchanges,
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Nations is involved in establishing networks among national institutions,
as it recognized that national institutions are positioned to ensure human
rights protection at the national level. 6 Furthermore, bilateral exchanges
and coordination could aid the development of subregional human rights
arrangements. The United Nations also holds regular workshops on the
possibility of developing a regional human rights system in the Asia-
Pacific region.
A. The Move Towards National Human Rights Commission: Domestic
Initiatives
[129 The Geneva Centre for Human Rights has arranged consultations
on national human rights institutions. It released a statement of "Principles
relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for the
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (Paris Principles).21 7 The 1992
Commission on Human Rights endorsed this statement, 8 as did the 1993
Vienna Conference. Paragraph 36 of the Vienna Declaration affirms the
constructive and important role played by national institutions as part of
the human rights architecture, recognizing each state's right "to choose the
framework that is best suited to its particular needs at the national level."
' [130 ASEAN states have displayed a general distrust of supranational
institutions. Paragraph 24 of the Bangkok Declaration states:
We welcome the important role played by national institutions in
the genuine and constructive promotion of human rights, and
believe that the conceptualisation and eventual establishment of
such institutions are best left for the States to decide.
[131 Promoting human rights by creating genuinely independent
national bodies to document human rights violations would be less
threatening to territorial sovereignty. Further, it would constitute a "good
practice,21 ' reflecting a willingness to translate human rights rhetoric into
developing joint positions on issues of common interests, sharing expertise and training
development, holding periodical regional meetings, and engendering quick responses to
requests from national institutions to investigate violations of the human rights of their
nationals present in a country which has a national institution.
216. See Report of the Secretary-General, National Institutions for the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, 54P Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/47 (1998). Resolution
1998/55 welcomes the decision of national institutions to set up a coordinating committee to
meet under the auspices of the Centre for Human Rights. United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 54
Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1998/23 (1998).
217. Geneva Centre for Human Rights, Principles relating to the status and functioning of
National Institutions, Annex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/54 (1992).
218. Report of the International Workshop on National Institutions for the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 48' Sess., U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1992/43 (1992).
219. See Interim Report of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, supra
note 12, para. 16. The report identifies several good practices in relation to human rights
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action. Naturally, these institutions must be structured and empowered in
a manner that protects them from political pressures. To prevent them
from being limp puppets in the hands of their creators, they should be
constitutionally entrenched, rather than subject to legislative will. This will
help commission members to discharge their duties freely without fear of
offending the government of the day.
132 Six primary elements have been identified as necessary for the
effective functioning of national institutions:m
Independence in terms of legal, operational and financial
autonomy and with respect to procedures governing the
composition, appointment and dismissal of members. Although
national institutions are state-funded entities, they must be able to
rise above party politics to be real watchdogs.
A defined jurisdiction and adequate powers. These institutions are
charged with promoting human rights-for example, through
legislative review, receiving complaints from aggrieved
individuals, serving as roving investigators into alleged gross
human rights violations. They need sufficient powers to enable
them to discharge their legislative mandate e.g. to call witnesses, to
compel public officials to answer requests for information.
Accessibility in the sense of being physically accessible, also in
terms of public awareness of the institution and whether its
members represent all relevant social forces.
Developing avenues of co-operation with IGOs, NGOs and other
national institutions. This broadens the institution's support base
and enhances its visibility, besides opening up new sources of
information about human rights abuses, expertise and technical
support.
Operational efficiency in terms of working methods, having
adequate resources.
Accountability both to the government, for example, through
reporting obligations, as well as to its clients, for example, through
conducting mandatory public evaluation of institutional activities
development, culled from reports submitted to help the Review Process. These are (a) human
rights-oriented changes in national legislation; (b) enlargement of national human rights
capacities including the establishment or strengthening of national human rights institutions
(national commissions and ombudspersons); (c) special protection extended to women,
children and vulnerable groups; (d) development of human rights education programmes; (e)
adoption of national plan of actions.
220. Centre for Human Rights, Geneva, National Human Rights Institutions: A Handbook
on the Establishment and Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, Professional Training Series No. 4 (1995).
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and reporting the findings.
[133 At present, only the Philippines and Indonesia have established
national human rights institutions, while Thailand, in accordance with the
requirements of the 1997 Thai Constitution, 2' is currently drafting a law to
create one. These national institutions are distinct from and complement
existing constitutional mechanisms for human rights protection, such as
the office of the ombudsman and judicial review.="
134 The Philippines Commission on Human Rights (CHR) finds its
constitutional basis in Section 17, Article XIII of the 1987 Philippines
Constitution. This was drafted in the wake of the triumph of "people
power" over the authoritarian Marcos regime. Neither the executive nor
Congress can summon or sack individual commissioners. Legal training is
considered important insofar as Article 17(2) requires that the majority of
the compact five-member Philippines Commission be members of the Bar.
1135 In June 1993, the twenty-five member Indonesian National
Human Commission on Human Rights was established by Presidential
Decree No. 50.223 This was done to facilitate the development of a national
atmosphere conducive to the exercise of human rights. It was meant to
reflect Indonesia's commitment to the decisions and agreements reached
during the 1993 Vienna world conference on human rights.224
[136 Despite doubts that this Commission could not function
independently, particularly since it owes its existence to an executive order
that can be rescinded at will, it has since taken on an active life of its own.
Commission members who were initially appointed by the President are
considered prominent national figures and include academics and former
military officers. The commission's budget comes solely from the State
Secretariat, which manages public funds.
221. See supra note 6, pt. 8. Section 199 provides that in composing the 11-member
national human rights commission, regard should be had to the participation of
representatives from private human rights organizations. Section 200 provides that it's powers
and duties include the investigation of human rights violations, proposing recommendations
to the legislature with regard to revising laws for the purpose of promoting human rights
protection, to promote co-ordination between government agencies and private human rights
organizations and to prepare an annual report appraising human rights situations in the
country. The commission is to be empowered to demand relevant documents or evidence
from any person for the purpose of performing its duties.
222. Both the ombudsman and human rights commissions serve accountability-holding
functions in regard to government action. While the commission focuses on direct human
rights abuse, ombudsmen may deal with instances of government maladministration that do
not directly implicate individual human rights violations. At the same time, national human
rights commissions compliment judicial review as a means of protecting human rights. While
judicial review is essentially a reactive instrument, responding to specific cases where someone
has locus standi to bring a case through judicial channels, the commission can conduct
investigations into ongoing human rights situations that may be systemic in nature.
223. See Juliane Kokott, Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights: Two Years of
Activities, 16 HuM. RTs. L.J. 420 (1995). The Commission has its web page at
<http: / /www.komnas.go.id/endex.html>.
224. See paragraph 4, Indonesian National Plan of Action on Human Rights, 1998-2003,
available through the Indonesian Foreign Ministry's web page <http: / /www.deplu.go.id>.
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i. The Indonesian Human Rights Commission (Kornas HAM)
[137 The Indonesian Human Rights Commission is divided into three
subcommissions and its tasks are established by presidential decree.
[138 There are four main functions of the Indonesian Commission,
which are to be discharged pursuant to the state Pancasila philosophy.
2 2
5
The first mandate is to inform national and international communities
about the national and international concept of human rights. The Sub-
Commission for Education and Public Awareness on Human Rights
handles this, contributing thereby to the promotion of dialogue on human
rights issues and filling informational gaps. Second, the Sub-Commission
for Monitoring the International Conventions on Human Rights is required
to monitor international human rights treaties and make ratification
recommendations. Thus far, this Sub-Commission has recommended that
Indonesia adopt the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Indonesia is a party to
neither treaty, although it has signed the latter. This promotes Indonesian
involvement and participation in the global United Nations human rights
regime, laying to rest any arguments that human rights are a matter of
national concern only. Third, the Sub-Commission for Monitoring the
Implementation of Human Rights does what its name suggests and makes
recommendations to government agencies on how to strengthen human
rights protection. Lastly, the commission is mandated to cooperate with
regional and international agencies for the continuous protection of human
rights. It thus holds coordinating meetings and workshops and serves as an
information center on human rights conditions in Indonesia.
139 Significantly, the Monitoring Sub-Commission has received many
complaints by letter and in person. It provides individuals or groups with a
forum to ventilate their grievances. The Commission is not purely reactive
as it seeks out human rights violations on its own initiative as a roving
body. It raises public awareness of human rights abuses through the
release of position papers on alleged human rights violations. It has
displayed independence in this practice by addressing politically delicate
matters. When the government banned the popular Tempo publication in
1994, the Commission released a critical statement even before Tempo
lodged a formal complaint contesting the constitutionality of the ban. The
Commission also conducts fact-finding missions and investigations,
although when it looked into the abduction and murder of a young labor
activist in March 1994, the State Secretary reproved the Commission for
225. This is a Hindu term meaning Five (Panca) Sila (principles). These are that every
Indonesian citizen should (a) believe in the existence of God the Almighty; (b) strive to
achieve a just and civilized humanity; (c) maintain Indonesian unity (d) adhere to democracy
which is guided by Inspirational Wisdom in Consultation and Representation and (e) strive to
achieve social justice for all the people of Indonesia. See generally EKA DARMAP'umRA,
PANCASILA AND THE SEARCH FOR IDWTMrrY AND MODERNMrY IN INDONESIAN SOCIETY (1988).
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exceeding its mandate.2 6
[140 The Commission's annual reports are made available not only to
the President and to the Indonesian people, but also to the international
community at large.227 The reports indicate that most of the cases handled
are not politically contentious, pertaining mainly to land ownership and
labor issues. The Commission has adopted an approach to conflict
resolution consonant with indigenous values, favoring nonconfrontational
methods of mediation and arbitration. It has achieved significant success in
eliciting responses to complaints from the relevant government authorities.
In several cases where the government acquired land for state purposes
without paying compensation, the aggrieved owners wrote to the
Commission for help.2 In turn, the Commission wrote to the relevant
authorities requesting their assistance, provoking them into action and
payment of compensation. Similarly, Commission-authored letters
highlighting worker complaints of denial of overtime wages, addressed to
the Ministry of Labor, elicited the direct intervention of the Ministry and
the consequent settlement of grievances.29 Other grievances range from
torture and beatings inflicted by the military, to the unlawful.seizure of
goods, to housing issues, and even to environmental problems.
141 On this small-scale basis, the Commission has been shown to get
results through its methods of persuasive mediation. The Commission
serves as intermediary between state and citizen, getting practical results
that make a difference to the aggrieved individual or group. The increasing
number of cases coming before it shows that it has earned a substantial
degree of public trust.2 ' In 1996, for example, 1,927 cases were handled by
the Commission, out of which 1,406 were settled. This indicates that the
common citizen recognizes that the Commission is sufficiently
independent from the government and sufficiently successful to be worth
appealing to without fear of repercussions; it is not perceived as toothless.
Indeed, whole villages have been known to converge on the Commission's
226. See Monika Talwar, Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission: A Step in the Right
Direction?, HUM. RTS. BRIEF (1997) (visited May 9,1999)
<http: //www.wcl.american.edu./PUB/humright/brief/v4i2/indo42.htm>.
227. The 1994-96 Annual Reports in English are available through the Indonesian
Commission's website at <http://www.komnas.go.id/english/report>.
228. See, for example, Comoro Village Land Case and Compensation for the Land of An.
Koddang, both reported in the 1996 Annual Report. Id.
229. See the Problem of Overtime Pay for the Workers of PT Artika Optima Int Djayanti
Group, reported in the 1996 Annual Report. Id.
230. See, for example, The Burning of Waste from the Wood Industry and from the manufacture
of Mosquito Repellent case, complaint made on April 9,1996, reported in the 1996 Annual
Report. A company openly burned industrial waste in the province of Tangerang causing
health-related problems to the nearby residents. They wrote to the Commission who in turned
wrote to the Mayor. Firm action was taken to control this air pollution by requiring the
relevant companies to dispose of their waste in a manner which did not involve burning and
by continuously monitoring the actions of the companies to ensure their compliance with the
mayoral order. See id.
231. The 1996 Annual Report of the Indonesian Human Rights Commission states that,
from 1995 to 1996, the number of land cases have increased by ninety-four percent-from 168
to 327-while labor cases have increased by forty-two percent-from 112 to 160.
1999]
65
Thio: Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries: "Promises to keep and miles to go before I sleep"
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
office to lodge their complaints. National commissions have the advantage
of being closer to the ground than international or regional human rights
bodies. Aside from the obvious advantage of geographical proximity,
which saves time and costs, national commissions such as the Indonesian
institution are staffed by people who speak the native language, are
conversant with local customs, and know how best to engage government
officials to procure results.
142 On the larger scale, the role of the Commission is more that of a.
watchdog than a mediator of disputes. The Commission's statements draw
attention to systemic human rights violations, which require far-reaching
changes to existing government practices for effective redress. Publicizing
such abuses serves to call the government to account and informs the
citizenry about how their government is performing. On April 30, 1998, the
Commission issued a statement of censure concerning reports it had
received from the families of victims and various social groups about
disappearances.' The Commission did nof discount the possibility that
security forces were involved in this practice, although it quoted the
Minister of Defense as saying that there was no official policy to cause the
disappearances of people. This approach was perhaps the wisest one to
take, given the limitations of operating in the context of an authoritarian
state with a dominant military presence. The Commission referred to the
violation of both constitutional liberties and international legal norms,
citing the Indonesian Criminal Code, as well as Articles 7, 9, 10 and 16 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which Indonesia
has not ratified), and the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances. It recommended that a National Investigative
Commission be formed to address these serious complaints, that immunity
be guaranteed to "survivors" and witnesses, that compensation be afforded,
and that the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (which Indonesia has signed) be
ratified immediately.
[143 Indonesia is currently in a state of flux, given the resignation of
President Suharto after a thirty-two year rule, and following the May 1998
riots. The country's economic problems are presently driving demands for
democratic reform. The Indonesian Human Rights Commission is taking
an active role amid post-Suharto enthusiasm for bringing to light alleged
human rights violations by conducting investigations and issuing
statements on matters related to tumultuous events in both the long and
recent past. Numerous complaints of human rights violations are
surfacing, particularly with respect to military atrocities in the separatist
Acheh province in Sumatra and violations of the right to freedom from
fear, life, property, and dignity during the May riots. In particular, there
were claims that the ethnic Chinese minority had been targeted as victims
232. Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights, Statement of the National
Commission on Human Rights regarding Enforced Disappearance of Persons, April 30,1998 (visited
May 9,1999) <http://www.komnas.go.id/english/cases/cs text.html>.
233. See Dealing with Aceh, the thorn in Jakarta's side, STRAITS TIMFs, Sept. 10, 1998, at 36.
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of mass rapes and sexual assaults by mobs whose orchestrators may have
had state links. Human Rights activists, including the Volunteers for
Humanity group led by Catholic priest Sandyawan Sumardi, have claimed
that 168 women and children were raped and sexually assaulted during the
riots, twenty of whom died or committed suicide.24
I144 The Commission's reports in this respect differ markedly from the
government's official denials. Citizens are apparently more willing to make
complaints to the Commission than to government agencies like the armed
forces and police who are suspected of complicity in human rights
violations. The Commission has made increasingly critical statements
about the police, recommending that it be distinct from ABRI (the armed
forces), and that it serve the people rather than remain "a mere security tool
of the power-holder."2
145 The Commission's finding that 1188 people had died in the riots
was more than double the estimate given by the military.23 It identified the
main causes of the riots as corrupt government practice, resentment
directed against the wealthy ethnic Chinese minority, and the lack of
genuine military effort to contain the spread of the riots, which resulted in
deaths, injuries and extensive damage to property, the brunt of it suffered
by ethnic Chinese Indonesians. 23 7 As the Commission expressed in a public
statement:
The security vacuum during the riots points the blame at the state,
on the neglect by civilian and military leaders in providing
effective protection, which, in turn, allowed these sexual assaults to
become widespread. m
[146 In the face of government statements that the police and armed
forces had not found conclusive proof of mass rapes of Chinese minority
women, the Commission, which undertook an inquiry into reports of rape
and sexual abuse of women, found that gang rapes did in fact occur. 9 The
234. See Abri Denies Confirming May Rapes, STRArrs TmEs INITERACnVE, Sept. 25,1998
(visited May 27,1999) <http: //straitstimes.asial.com.sg/pages/sea8 0925.html>.
235. See Separate Police from Abri, Says Commission, STRAITs TIMEs, June 11, 1998, at 23.
236. See Official Human Rights Commission Report: More Than 1,000 Died in Jakarta Rioting,
STRAnrs TIES, June 4,1998, at 21.
237. Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights, Statement of the National
Commission on Human Rights Concerning the Unrest in Jakarta and Surrounding Areas, June 2,
1998 (visited May 9,1999) <http://www.komnas.go.id>.
238. See Jakarta Blamed for Riot Rapes, STRArrs TIMES, July 11, 1998, at 27.
239. The military has reported that not a single victim has come forward to lodge a
complaint The state Minister of Women's Affairs had also adopted a similar stand but under
public pressure, initiated the formation of an all-woman's group to help those sexually abused
during the riots. Most of the data about the rapes had been compiled by voluntary women's
NGOs. The Commission issued a critical statement regretting "the lack of moral response from
the public to the report of sadistic rapes, and notes with deep concern the government's
skepticism, which influenced public opinion to doubt these reports in the absence of any
evidence." Id.; see also Indonesian National Human Rights Commission, Statement of the
National Commission on Human Rights Concerning the Sexual Assault Including Rape of Ethnic
Chinese and Other Indonesian Citizens, July 8,1998 (visited May 9,1999)
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scale and intensity of the attacks "amounted to terrorism'24 although it
could not be established whether they were organized. That the
Commission did not encounter any real difficulty in accessing witnesses
and victims is testament to the public trust it has earned. The Commission
has called upon the government to declare that the rapes did in fact occur,
to apologize, and to convene a national commission to investigate the riots
and prosecute the culprits.241 It has, in effect, emerged as an independent
and respected voice in the field of human rights protection.
J[147 The Commission's 1998 Annual Evaluation of the Implementation
of Human Rights in Indonesia was particularly candid.2 2 It criticized the
security apparatus and judiciary for failing to investigate even one case of
gross human rights violations, in a year in which widespread incidents of
public violence, especially sexual assault against women, threatened to
divide the nation and erode confidence in the government. It warned that
all cases not swiftly and fairly resolved posed latent threats to Indonesian
stability, which was particularly fragile in this transitional period. Among
its recommendations, it called upon the government to periodically and
promptly make publicly known progress in resolving all cases of gross
human rights violations. This would allay public suspicion of "cover-ups"
of the armed forces and security apparatus's involvement in these matters.
The armed forces needs to win back public confidence as well as to
discharge their function of maintaining order. To that end, the Commission
advised, steps should be taken to depoliticize the army and to diffuse the
concentration of power within it. This might include a functional division
between the office of the Minister of Defense and Security and the
Commander of the Armed Forces, and the granting of extensive autonomy
to all regions in Indonesia. Clearly, the Commission does not feel, restricted
to making only minor suggestions for reform.
[148 In its five years of existence, the Indonesian Commission has
played a vital role in promoting a human rights culture within Indonesia.
Indonesian citizens know that the Commission is an accessible body from
which they can seek assistance in remedying injustices. Through its role in
providing human rights education and information dissemination, the
Commission raises public consciousness about human rights and the
duties owed by the state to individuals. As a vehicle for focusing attention
and publicity on human rights violations on a larger scale through its
public statements and investigations, the Commission may be able to check
government abuses. This can contribute to garnering support for the
<http://www.komnas.go.id/englhsh/cases/cs text03.html>.
240. See Scale of Gang Rapes 'Amounted to Terrorism,' STRArs TIME, July 16,1998, at 17.
241. A national fact-finding commission was setup on July 23 to investigate the May
unrest, composing of representatives from Abri, government agencies, the rights body and
non-governmental organisations. It is expected to deliver its final report in October 1998. Abri
Denies Confirming May Rapes, SRAuns TIMEs INTERACnVE, Sept. 25,1998 (visited May 9,1999)
<http://straitstimes.asial.com.sg/pages/sea8 0925.html>. [URL NOT GET YOU THERE]
242. The Report was issued on Jan. 4,1999 and is available in English through Komnas
Ham's web page at <http://www.komnas.go.id/endex.html>.
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system of government. This is particularly important, concerning the
present unsettled state of affairs in Indonesia, where domestic stability is
needed not only to maintain public order, but also to build investor and
donor confidence, which is necessary for economic recovery.
ii. The Philippine Human Rights Commission (CHR)
[149 The Philippines has ratified more human rights treaties than any
other ASEAN country; the list includes the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its first Optional Protocol. Significantly,
the latter allows individuals to make direct communications to the U.N.
Human Rights Committee, which goes beyond the usual reporting
obligations that attend most human rights treaties. The Philippines has also
declared that it recognizes the Committee's competence to receive
interstate complaints. The Philippines Human Rights Commission (CHR) is
empowered to monitor the Filipino Government's compliance with
international treaty obligations on human rights. Overall, this exhibits an
open willingness to actively engage with, and be held accountable to, the
international human rights regime.
I150 Naturally, a commitment to human rights at the international
level does not mean that serious human rights violations are absent in the
domestic context. In the Philippines particularly, the police and armed
forces commit many serious human rights abuses. In its role as an
independent public watchdog, the CHR has published a report pointing
the finger at state agents as the top perpetrators of human rights violations
such as killings, tortures, kidnapping, and illegal detentions.243 The CHR
role in drawing embarrassing attention to these practices, while important,
is insufficient. Effective redress for these violations depends on the
government taking active steps to reform the police and military, and to
build an effective and accessible court system.
151 The CHR has a high degree of operational autonomy. It appoints
its own employees, adopts its own procedural guidelines and can cite for
contempt those who breach them. The powers of the CHR are established
by Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution. These include investigatory powers
exercised either on its own initiative, or in response to a complaint made
by any party. To facilitate this process, it may grant witness immunity and
also request the assistance of any government department. The CHR's
mandate seems chiefly limited to human rights violations involving civil
and political rights. Clearly, the CHR was designed to be creative and
proactive, engaged in fact-finding in the field rather than bureaucratic
paper shuffling.2" To this end, the CHR has established a system of local
human rights officers ("barangay") who monitor local authorities and
243. See Luz Baguioro, Philippine Police and Army 'Top Violators ofHuman Rights,' SUNDAY
TMES, Aug. 17,1997, at 19.
244. See e.g., Rene V. Sarmiento, The Real Intent and Role of the Commission on Human Rights,
1 HUM. Ris. LJ. 18 (1995) (semi-annual publication of the Philippines Human Rights
Commission).
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report complaints to regional CHR offices. In 1998, there were over 8,000
such officers. 2a The CHR actively investigates extra-judicial killings and, in
1998, looked into 201 cases. Where there are suspicious circumstances
concerning the clashes of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (APP) with
alleged insurgents in areas where the AFP is engaged in a
counterinsurgency campaign, the CHR points these out. For example, it
investigated a reported June 9 summary execution of four people,
including two teenage girls in Dingalan. The military report stated that
soldiers had sought to engage the suspected insurgents in an exchange of
fire. The Commission took note of eyewitness reports that the soldiers
removed the pants of the girls who were allegedly raped before they were
killed, and found it suspicious that the soldiers burned the personal effects
of the girls, shot them in the pelvic area and had the victims' bodies
immediately embalmed without consulting their next of kin.
24
152 The CHR also promotes human rights in other ways. Aside from
disseminating information to enhance respect for human rights, the CHR
holds human rights seminars for public officials including the police,
although this training is not mandatory. These include primers on the
rights of the criminally accused. The CHR has oversight power over jails,
prisons or detention facilities, and has conducted research on the subject. In
a 1990-1996 report based on an examination of 6,939 jail facilities, the CHR
pointed out that detention facilities inadequately segregated women and
children from male inmates. Female prisoners were at particular risk of
sexual assault, sometimes by prison guards. The culture of corruption and
the preferential treatment given to certain famous prisoners were
highlighted. For example, a provincial governor being held on suspicion of
murder was allowed to carry out a successful re-election campaign from
his jail cell, through the privileged use of communications equipment.
153 The CHR is also empowered to provide legal aid services for the
underprivileged. It can intervene on behalf of individuals and offer them
concrete aid. For example, it was reported that through the efforts of the
CHR between 1988 and 1996, 627 prisoners and detainees were released.
The CHR had helped in obtaining their parole or pardons and brought to
official attention those detained beyond the term of their sentences. In a
report, it found that a primary reason for prison congestion was that large
numbers of prisoners were held in pretrial detention, unable to post bail.47
154 In 1997, the CHR reported that only eighteen percent of the cases
it had referred to government agencies or the courts had been resolved,
and that the court dismissed seventy-six percent of the few cases that went
to trial.2 8 While the CHR succeeds in bringing cases of human rights abuses
245. See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of
State, Philippines Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, Feb. 26,1999 (visited May
9,1999)
<http://wv.state.gov/www/global/human rights/1998 hrp report/philippi.html>.
246. See id. ("Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings").
247. See id. ("Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment").
248. See id. ("Denial of Fair Public Trial").
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to light and providing data, in itself, this does not go far enough towards
redressing and reforming abusive government practices. This would
necessitate a broader process of inculcating respect for human rights in
public officials and providing a disciplinary, punitive process for those in
dereliction of duty so that they know that they cannot misuse the powers
of public office with impunity. Furthermore, aggrieved individuals must
have effective remedies for human rights violations, including financial
compensation, such that justice may be translated into real terms. The
present economic crisis and shortage of funds are not promising in this
respect. For example, the CHR is unable to expand its staff due to lack of
funds, and had to suspend an agreement made with the Justice
Department in 1997 to add Justice Department prosecutors to the CHR
staff.
[155 In conclusion, encouraging ASEAN countries to set up their own
national human rights commissions is a worthwhile strategy, particularly
since a local commission composed of independent experts cannot be
accused of being a mouthpiece for foreign political interests. In addition to
building an autonomous human rights culture that can be measured
against international standards, such institutions could play a vital role in
educating the people of their human rights as well as their responsibilities.
They could provide a less threatening informal setting where grievances
could be lodged and receive attention through nonadversarial means of
dispute resolution. The establishment of national human rights institutions
in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand will hopefully inspire other
ASEAN countries to adopt a similar approach. Malaysia seems to have
been influenced by these developments. Indeed, Malaysian Foreign
Minister Datuk Syed Hamid Albar noted them in his March 1999
announcement that a bill would be tabled in July to set up a National
Commission on Human Rights.249 Whatever motives a detractor might
allege for the establishment of these institutions, such as public relations, it
must be remembered that institutions like Komnas Ham have a way of
assuming a life of their own quite apart from the intention of their creators.
B. Towards a Regional Human Rights Mechanism?
156 The United Nations General Assembly has been promoting
efforts to establish a regional human rights mechanism in regions lacking
one since the late seventies.2 The United Nations Economic and Social
249. See KL to Set Up Human-Rights Commission, STRArIS TIMES, Mar. 26,1999, at 41. The
Malaysian Foreign Minister said that this body would compose some twenty individuals from
various interest groups to be appointed by the King and selected on the basis of their
individual expertise. He said that the commission would be charged with investigating
alleged infringements in human rights, visiting places of detention, issuing public statements
on human rights, and promoting human rights awareness through education.
250. See G.A. Res. 32/127, 32" S ess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/127 (1978); G.A. Res. 34/171,
34 Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/171 (1979); G.A. Res. 34/171, 34 Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/34/171 (1980); and G.A. Res. 36/154, 36' Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/154 (1981).
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Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) is a depository for human
rights materials. The Human Rights Commission has also issued numerous
resolutions calling upon states to consider agreements to establish suitable
regional human rights machinery.2"
157 Since the 1982 Colombo seminar organized by the Secretary
General,25 the United Nations has sponsored six intergovernmental
workshops on regional arrangements for human rights protection in the
Asia-Pacific Region with the participation of ASEAN countries, various
NGOs, and representatives of the various national human rights
commissions.m It has offered its advisory services and has conducted
training courses. The concluding remarks of the 1992 Jakarta Workshop
underscore that the primary responsibility for implementing human rights
norms rests at the state level. As far as the international system of
monitoring human rights is concerned, this should be done in a spirit of
international cooperation, creatively, and constructively, and taking into
account the diversity of the region. This evolutionary, step by step, or
"building blocks," approach was affirmed at the 1993 Seoul Workshop. The
first step would be coordinating human rights information dissemination,
followed by an Asia Forum for a regional exchange of ideas and
experiences. Only then should attention be shifted to using the Forum to
design some form of regional or subregional human rights machinery.
158 A central principle for any regional arrangement was reiterated at
the March 1998 Tehran workshop, namely that it must emerge from within
the region after extensive consultation among the governments concerned.
Fufther, any such arrangement must be determined by consensus and be
based on the priorities and needs established by the Governments of the
region, bearing in mind the region's diverse particularities. The workshop
adopted a framework of regional technical cooperation in certain specified
areas, but did not include any concrete proposals for developing regional
human rights machinery.'m Rather, strengthening national human rights
251. See United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Question of the Violation of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World, with Particular
Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and Territories, 42' Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1986/57 (1986); United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Regional
Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 49" Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1993/122 (1993).
252. United Nations Division of Human Rights, Seminar on National, Local and Regional
Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Asian Region, U.N.
Doc. ST/HR/SER.A/12 (1982). See Virginia A. Leary, Human Rights in the Asian Context:
Prospectsfor Regional Human Rights Instruments, 2 CONN. J. INr'L L. 319,323-25 (1987).
253. These workshops were held in Manila (7-11 May 1990); Jakarta (26-28 January 1993);
Seoul (18-20 July 1994); Kathmandu (26-28 February 1996); Amman (5-7 January 1997) and
Tehran (28 February-2 March 1998). See Report of the Secretary General, Regional
Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Asian and Pacific
region, 54" Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/50 (1998).
254. The framework focused on (a) development national plans of action for promoting
human rights and strengthening national capacities (b) human rights education; (c)
developing national human rights institutions and (d) strategies for realization of the right to
development and economic, social and cultural rights. This document is attached Annex II to
the Report of the Secretary General on the Regional Arrangements for the promotion and
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capacities was viewed as a necessary step toward further consideration of
regional cooperation and even regional human rights arrangements. While
an effective regional human rights mechanism was the long-term goal of
the workshop, it was considered premature to discuss any formal
arrangements. Instead, the immediate shift has been towards localized
theme-specific domestic programs. Clearly, the governments involved are
not in a rush to establish a regional arrangement.
f159 Nevertheless, by referring to the possibility of establishing an
appropriate regional human rights mechanism in the Foreign Ministers
Joint Communiqu6, recalled at the 1988 ministers' meeting, ASEAN
seemed to open a door of opportunity. Several NGOs seized upon this
opportunity to conduct consultative meetings and to issue concrete, if
ambitious, proposals and charters.' In the ASEAN context, NGOs have
been primarily responsible for lobbying for an ASEAN human rights
mechanism, as part of the push for political liberalization and respect for
human rights.2 As members of a transnational civil society, these nonstate
actors have played a central role in focusing attention on the gap in human
rights protection. 7
[160 Establishing an independent, effective regional human rights
mechanism that is readily accessible to the public, including NGOs, was a
protection of human rights in the Asian and Pacific region, id.
255. The Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, in association with the European Commission of
Human Rights, for example, conducted two seminars in Strasbourg on the Regional System
for the Protection of Human Rights in Asia, in Africa, in the Americas and in Europe in 1993
and 1994. It invited a select group of Asian participants to attend, among whom were
government representatives, human rights commission members, academics, and NGO
members; the author participated in the 1994 meeting. Members of the European Court and
Commission on Human Rights, the African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights and
the U.N. Centre for Human Rights also attended. Discussions centered on comparative
reviews of the various regional systems and prospects for one in the Asia region.
Recommendations from the 1993 Meeting called for the establishment of an Asian
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, funded by ASEAN as well as
calling for a group of jurists to prepare a draft instrument for presentation before ASEAN. A
more realistic approach was contained in the Second Strasbourg Resolution from the 1994
meeting. This called on ASEAN member states to convene an experts' group to study the
possibility of an appropriate regional mechanism, as well as the establishment of a
consultative human rights forum composed of representatives from ASEAN national
governments, practitioners, academics, and NGOs. The set-up of an ASEAN Center for
Human Rights to deliver advisory and technical services within the region was also
advocated.
256. ASEAN-ISIS, a regional think tank made several proposals concerning an ASEAN
Commission on Human Rights, discussed in Jusuf Wanandi, Human Rights and Democracy in
the ASEAN Nations: The Next 25 Years, 21 INDONEsIAN Q. 14 (1993). On NGO activism in the
Asia-Pacific region, see AsIAN COALITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS
ACrIIVsM IN AsIA: SOME PERSPECTIVES, PROBLE Ms AND APPROACHES (1984); Daniel S. Lev,
Human Rights NGOs in Indonesia and Malaysia, in AsIAN PERSPECrIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 142
(Claude E. Welch & Virginia A. Leary Leary eds., 1990).
257. See generally Panel Discussion, The Growing Role of Nongovernmental Organizations,
AM. SOcIErY Nrr'L L. PROC. 413 (1995); Dianne Otto, Nongovernmental Organizations in the
United Nations System: The Emerging Role of International Civil Society, 18 HuM. RTs. Q. 107
(1996); Michael Posner & Candy Whittoms, The Status of Human Rights NGOs, 25 CoLUM.
HuM. RTs. L. REV. 269 (1994).
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key specific recommendation of the Bangkok NGO Declaration:2
If a regional commission is set up, it should be mandated to apply
without reservations the International Bill of Human rights,
CEDAW, the Convention against Torture, the Declaration of the
Right to Development and other relevant human rights
instruments;
member states.., must ratify or accede to the above instruments
prior to their membership;
the right of individuals* and NGOs to petition the regional
Commission should be guaranteed;
such petitions or appeals should not preclude concurrent appeals
to the various U.N. mechanisms for the protection of human rights;
no member of this regional Commission should hold an official
position in government concurrently, and members should be
appointed in consultation with NGOs;
there should be a regular reporting system by states on their
implementation of human rights standards domestically, with
NGO participation in the drafting of the reports;
meetings of this regional Commission and its deliberations should
be generally open to the public;
no aspect of government operation and no official should be
immune from scrutiny or investigation, including the military and
security forces;
the regional commission should have full investigative powers; a
separate body should be set up to adjudicate complaints;
member governments must be required to disseminate information
on the regional commission and how it operates.
161 The nongovernmental Working Group for an ASEAN Human
Rights Mechanism (WG) was established after a series of workshops and
meetings.259  Participants came from both the governmental and
258. Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights, reproduced in 1 ASIA-PACIFIC HUMAN
RIGHTs DOCUMENTS AND RESOURCES 147 (Fernand de Varennes ed., 1998).
259. LAWASIA convened two preparatory meetings in 1995 in Manila with
representatives from government institutions and NGOs to plan for a conference in Jakarta in
1996 to discuss ASEAN values and the forms an ASEAN subregional mechanism might take.
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nongovernmental sectors. To work toward a regional human rights
institution, the workshop participants resolved to consolidate links
between ASEAN and civil society, to organize regional conferences, to
promote programs and research to raise the status of women and children,
and to consider drafting an ASEAN Convention of Human Rights. The
group held dialogues with ASEAN officials during 1997 and 1998 and
presented a concept paper to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the Thirty-
First Annual Ministerial Meetings in Manila, July 24-25, 1998.2 The
Ministers acknowledged the importance of these dialogues in their Joint
Communique. The paper urged ASEAN to examine the possible forms a
regional mechanism might take, in particular urging the development of an
intergovernmental regional human rights commission to promote human
rights and suggesting several progressive steps.26' It also contained seven
options concerning the steps ASEAN could adopt towards a regional
human rights mechanismm drawing inspiration from the experience of the
Inter-American, European, and African systems.m
It was envisaged that National Working Groups would be formed within each ASEAN State
to encourage governments and peoples to support the initiative. After these three meetings, a
workshop was held in Kuala Lumpur in November-December 1996 out of which the Working
Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism was born. It consists of members of the
National Working Groups that have currently been established in Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Thailand, with government and nongovernmental links. See Initiative for an
ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, 6 LAWASIA HUM. RTS. NEWSLETTER (LAWASIA Human
Rights Committee, Philippines), Jan-June 1996, at 3.
260. Vitit Muntarbohon, Towards an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (1998)
(unpublished paper, on file with author). Available upon request from the Working Group for
an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism Secretariat at 3/F Human Rights Center, School of
Law, Ateneo de Manila University, 130 HV de la Costa SJ Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City,
Metro Manila 3116 Philippines (email: ahrc@acc.aiti.admu.edu.ph)
261. These included (i) evolving a dialogue between ASEAN and civil society with respect
to human rights protection and the possible creation of a regional human rights commission;
(ii) forming a task force to investigate the formal and substantive issues attendant upon the
possible emergence of such a mechanism; (iii) encouraging an exchange of views on this
proposal via regional conferences; (iv) promoting programs to protect the rights of women
and children and (v) calling upon ASEAN Foreign Ministers to propel the establishment of a
regional human rights commission. See id.
262. These steps, in various combinations, included establishing an ASEAN Human
Rights Commission with recommendatory powers and possibly the power to hear complaints
from individuals or states; an ASEAN Human Rights Court with the ability to make binding
decisions and with the mandate to afford compensation to victims of human rights abuses; an
ASEAN Human Rights Committee of Ministers or Assembly of Heads of Government which
would serve as a political forum of accountability; establishing national human rights
commissions where they are currently non-existent, consolidating their networks, and
promoting regional human rights activities through training schemes and education. See id.
263. See generally Bums H. Weston et al., Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and
Appraisal, 20 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAr'L L. 585 (1987); FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN C.A. WHTE,
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTs (1996); U. OJI UMOZURIKE, THE AFRICAN
CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS (1997); Tom Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American
Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, 19 HUM. RIS. Q. 510 (1997); Gabriel
M. Wilner, Reflections on Regional Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 407 (1995/96).
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Evaluating Prospects for Promoting and Protecting Human Rights
162 Both the European and American human rights systems are
grounded in regional treaties that establish both adjudicatory and
investigatory institutions, with fact-finding powers and the competence to
receive individual and interstate complaints. The African system is far
more modest and revolves around information-dissemination, fact-finding
and the issuing of reports after receiving communications from states and
others.
163 Human rights related activities in the ASEAN region are at the
stage of infancy, to apply Donnelly's categorization of the stages in the
evolution of human rights regimes.26 Such activities are mainly at the
declaratory or promotional stage, which requires a relatively low level of
commitment. The former involves an affirmation of international norms
but does not extend to international decisionmaking. Even at this level
there are fears that a regional charter will undermine international
standards. If the AIPO Declaration on Human Rights is any indication of
what such a charter might look like, prospects look grim since its
subjection of fundamental rights to national laws could seriously
undermine universal human right standards. Further, this Declaration
reads more like one on individual duties rather than individual rights.
Promotional efforts may involve efforts to promote or render assistance to
national implementation of international norms. This is underway to some
extent in the form of ASEAN programs to promote the interests of women
and children both nationally and through a coordinated regional approach.
Promotional efforts also involve international exchanges of information,
such as those that take place within the Asia-Pacific Forum of National
Human Rights Institutions. This can facilitate the development of a
regional human rights consensus through highlighting common views and
identifying divergent ones. Such institutions, being closer to the ground
and conversant with local conditions, are well positioned to suggest
strategies for human rights protection. Interaction with NGOs at this level
would be valuable, particularly in relation to data collection and
dissemination.
164 Promotional activities are less threatening to the status quo and
could support the establishment of an ASEAN consultative forum to
discuss and promote awareness of human rights, building cross-cultural
dialogue and consensus. To be inclusive, NGOs must take part in
consultations and research. Such a forum could make recommendations to
governments on how to improve human rights practices and increase
awareness of the human rights consequences of their policies. Furthermore,
it could identify specific treaties that ASEAN governments should ratify,
particularly those containing values ASEAN governments have already
264. See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACrIcE 206 (1989)
(providing a scheme for classifying regimes as declaratory, promotional, implementation and
enforcement, in order of their muscularity).
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endorsed in policy statements or practice. For example Singapore, which
has made a public commitment to multi-racialism and meritocracy, should
be encouraged to accede to the Convention for the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).
f165 ASEAN states might be persuaded to accept an implementation-
oriented regime that entails some monitoring procedures such as reporting
obligations. A limited degree of external scrutiny would seem acceptable,
given that ASEAN states have, by becoming party to human rights treaties,
accepted periodic reporting obligations to United Nations human rights
organs. In this scenario, states could make use of an international forum to
formulate policies that ultimately remain under national control. This gels
with the sentiment expressed in the 1993 Bangkok Declaration at
paragraph 9, recognizing that "States have the primary responsibility for
the promotion and protection of human rights through appropriate
infrastructure and mechanisms, and also recognize that remedies must be
sought and provided primarily through such mechanisms and
procedures." It is unlikely, though, that ASEAN states will look with favor
upon a monitoring body that can receive communications from states or
nonstate actors. At present, only the Philippines is party to the ICCPR's
first optional protocol, which grants the Human Rights Committee
jurisdiction to hear individual communications concerning human rights
violations. The Committee examines the communications in camera and
forwards its views to both the state party and the concerned individual.
ASEAN parties to the Torture Convention (Philippines) and Race
Convention (Laos, Philippines, Vietnam) have not recognized the
competence of the relevant treaty committees to receive and process
individual communications. In their cautious shift toward human rights,
ASEAN states have generally kept their legal obligations to a minimum,
avoiding international channels of accountability. Instead, ASEAN states
tend to declare programmatic objectives that are not easily monitorable nor
judiciable. In national human rights institutions, individuals have a forum
to articulate complaints but this has evolved as a matter of practice, rather
than legal right. There seems to be a strong preference for keeping things at
an informal, conciliatory level and a desire to avoid formal legal
engagement.
[166 To make monitoring schemes with reporting obligations more
palatable to ASEAN governments, attention should be focused on the
possibility of creating theme-specific committees at the national and
regional level with limited mandates. Particular focus should be given to
forming committees with monitoring powers designed to promote and
protect the interests of children and women, given ASEAN's formal
commitment to the related U.N. treaties and its own ongoing programs in
this regard. Explicit linkages between the human rights of women and
children and ASEAN's "functional cooperation" in women and children's
issues should be encouraged so improvement can be sought in an
integrated fashion. Since ASEAN countries stress the right to development,
a reviewing committee could be formed to undertake research into both
1999]
77
Thio: Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries: "Promises to keep and miles to go before I sleep"
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
human and economic indicators of development. From there, momentum
could be built to extend monitoring to the entire gamut of human rights-
civil and political as well as economic, social, and cultural-on a basis of
genuine indivisibility. In the short term, however, it is unlikely that any
such committees will be able to assiduously oversee national compliance
with international norms. This is because ASEAN states jealously guard
their state prerogatives to implement human rights concerns at their own
pace, within their territorial borders, without external interference.
Nevertheless, once institutions are created they can stretch their own
limited mandates.
I167 For several reasons, it is unlikely that ASEAN states will
incorporate a judicial organ into any proposed regional mechanism in the
foreseeable future. Such adjudicatory institutions, which feature in strong
enforcement regimes such as the European Court of Human Rights, are
able to issue authoritative judgments and binding awards.
[168 First, the structure of ASEAN itself militates against commitment
to formal processes. While hailed as an exemplar of regional cooperation,
ASEAN is not based on the principle of supra-nationality or political union
like the European Union. ASEAN has a minimal organizational structure.
Its Jakarta-based Secretariat was established only in 1976. Foreign Ministers
meet annually while the supreme decisionmaking authority, the assembled
Heads of Government, meet once every three years with informal summits
in between. ASEAN is more a forum or arena wherein member states
interact, consult, and coordinate policy, rather than an actor in its own
right. Its activities are largely consistent with the national sovereignty of
ASEAN member states and no considerable powers have been delegated to
ASEAN. A functioning regional court, while representing a strong form of
human rights protection, requires preconditions that simply do not
currently exist. Most importantly, it presupposes a regional human rights
culture. This will take time to develop. A better strategy would be to
encourage the development of independent national human rights
institutions in every ASEAN country and to encourage consultations
between these institutions. These institutions will provide a body of
experts whose knowledge could be tapped in drafting a regional human
rights charter or who could be a pool for supplying the personnel of an
ASEAN human rights commission charged with oversight functions and
empowered to receive individual petitions. Within ASEAN, the pressing
need is to create a human rights culture at the domestic grassroots level,
which permeates both the citizenry and officialdom. The priority must be
to create participatory, civil societies with a high level of civic
consciousness. A concern for human rights has to be born from within
before it can be enforced from without.
[169 Second, ASEAN's modus operandi is that of pragmatism, mutual
accommodation and consensus-seeking. Informal consultation, dialogue,
and mediation rather than the adversarial "winner takes all" nature of
adjudication is the preferred mode for managing conflict in ASEAN. The
collectivist culture with its premium on harmony means that
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decisionmaking and problem solving tend to be based on personal
relations rather than on structures or institutional frameworks. The Treaty
of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia provides for a conflict
resolution process and mechanism in the form of a ministerial High
Council comprising representatives from each state. To date, it has never
been used, indicating an antipathy for formal mechanisms of dispute
settlement. ASEAN states will not want to point accusatory fingers at each
other in an adversarial judicial forum; they are generally reluctant to do so
even in informal contexts. The Philippines is the sole ASEAN country to
become a party to the Optional Clause of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), which confers advance compulsory jurisdiction on the Court,
although Cambodia has also accepted ICJ jurisdiction. The other ASEAN
countries are unlikely to accept a Regional Human Rights Court
transcending the jurisdiction of national courts. The ASEAN preference for
preventive diplomacy and dislike for judicial mechanisms is further
evident in the fact that ASEAN state parties to CEDAW have not, per
Article 29(1), accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in relation to
disputes over the interpretation and application of CEDAW.2 The
proverbial flying pig must make its debut before individuals are given a
right of access to international courts, let alone a regional one! Because of
the importance of giving individuals a channel for making complaints, the
model of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, with its first optional
protocol, is the best option to aspire to for an ASEAN human rights
commission. The success of such a body will largely depend on the degree
to which governments are willing to implement its recommendations.
[170 In conclusion, human rights activism within ASEAN remains at
the early stage of promotion, where publicity and persuasion are the
strongest tools. Stamina is needed to cultivate the "heartware" that sustains
a human rights regime's "hardware" in the form of institutions and
processes. The primary task ahead is educating both the public and private
sectors about human rights norms and the alternate methods for
implementing them. A transnational human rights body with definite
oversight powers should become a collective goal. Work has already been
done to this end, through the cooperation of the ASEAN Secretariat and the
private Working Group. NGOs have already begun supporting the
Working Group with funding and expert technical assistance; this should
continue. It is important that this initiative be perceived as a regional one,
rather than one motivated by the agenda of some distant foreign power.
The activities of this group should be publicized to domestic ASEAN
constituencies, to foster public debate and, hopefully, to stimulate positive
government responses.
265. Indonesia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam in their reservations to
CEDAW have declared that they were not bound by article 29(1). Text of reservations is
available at United Nations Treaty Series, Treaties in Force (visited May 9,1999)
<http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/fin...newfiles/part boo/iv boo/iv 8.html>.
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V. PROMISES TO KEEP AND MILES TO GO BEFORE I SLEEP
171 As ASEAN approaches the new millennium, cooperation in
regional economic, socio-cultural, and technical programs is likely to
intensify. ASEAN is seeking to forge more of a regional identity as it
evolves from a mere forum to coordinate economic policy into a
community of nations bound together by a shared vision. Plagued by
economic and financial crises and the continuing political unrest in
Burma,2 Indonesia7 and Malaysia,m ASEAN states are unlikely to make
human rights protection a top priority. At least three potential obstacles to
promoting human rights in the region have already been identified: the
antipathy of some ASEAN states towards civil and political rights, which
leads to an emphasis on the economic aspects of the right to development;
the paramount importance accorded to collective interests, which has been
used to justify broad derogation from human rights in the interest of public
order; and ASEAN's general treatment of human rights as matters of
national competence.
172 Nevertheless, in their 1998 Joint Communiqu6, the ASEAN
foreign ministers did not ignore human rights entirely. They did
acknowledge the importance of international treaties and declarations that
promote human rights. They drew a clear link between international
human rights law and the ASEAN 2020 vision of creating a "community of
caring societies,"' 9 which gives particular emphasis to vulnerable groups
like children, youth, women, and the elderly. This link needs to be
strengthened in order to integrate the effective protection of human rights
into recognized ASEAN policy. Since there is continuing dialogue with
private groups about a regional mechanism, ASEAN has not rejected the
idea outright.
266. See Yangon Students protest against junta, STRAITS TIMaS, Sept. 3,1998, at 20.
267. Ethnic and inter-religious dashes are increasingly becoming a serious problem, as
witnessed by the recent dashes between Muslims and Christians in the Ambon province. See
Amy Chew, Ambon Unrest Ethnic Cleansing, Moslem Cleric Says, STRAITS TIvfs INTERACrIvE,
Mar. 12,1999 (visited May 27,1999)
<http://straitstimes.asial.com.sg/reuters/as9903124.html>.
268. Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim,
for example, was recently dismissed from his government positions after evidence of alleged
inappropriate behavior emerged. See Anwar Sacked, STRAITS TmEs, Sept. 3,1998, at 1; The Final
Rupture, STRArTS TiMES, Sept. 3,1998, at 6.
269. This explicit reference to a "community of caring societies" may be a useful
foundation upon which to develop human right norms for the ASEAN region in at least two
respects. First, "care' relates to a moral ordering of state-society relations, which could open
up discussions about what is necessary to vindicate human dignity in all its permutations.
Second, caring societies cannot remain indifferent to the sufferings and injustice in the larger
community of states. This could open the door towards the cultivation of a transnational civil
society whereby NGOs take an active interest in human rights conditions in the ASEAN
states, both in terms of advocacy and relief efforts. At the interstate level, in taking an interest
in their counterparts' human rights performances, ASEAN governments could present
themselves as good, caring neighbors rather than officious busybodies, not just through
urging changes to abusive government practices, but by providing technical aid and moral
support in the joint enterprise of promoting human rights to benefit all ASEAN peoples.
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[173 Human rights and democratic reform are likely to fall within
ASEAN's purview as the grouping matures for several reasons. First,
pressures for societal change are likely to come from within. More
educated, economically advanced societies, increasingly integrated into the
various global systems, will have higher expectations for "good
governance"-including an end to cronyism, nepotism, and corruption,
charges presently levied against Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's
government and which contributed to the downfall of President Suharto's
administration. Political legitimacy and accountable, transparent
governments that display a greater respect for human rights and dignity
will be considered facets of what is considered "good governance."
Attempts to suppress popular democratic reforms implicate regional
security. Burma is the major refugee-producing country in the region. As
individual ASEAN countries go through transitions with social and
political unrest, such as those recently experienced by Cambodia,
Indonesia, and Burma, ASEAN leaders may come to realize that states
must be stabilized by means other than economic development. Political
pluralism cannot be ignored as an agent of stabilization and national
reconciliation, whereby citizens accept the legitimacy of the political order
and ethnic and religious minorities no longer fear persecution and
discrimination.
[174 ASEAN may well have to focus its attention on ensuring that its
member states' governments are perceived as legitimate and civilized, both
by the domestic population and the international community. This will
require a tempering of its nonintervention policy. The consciousness
displayed by some ASEAN states of the interdependent nature of the
region and the need for increased cooperation and a more activist form of
engagement in each other's affairs may already point to a more
interventionist future ASEAN policy. Indeed, ASEAN states have already
demonstrated a limited willingness to curtail sovereignty in matters of
common concern such as reducing barriers to trade and economic
development and undertaking environmental obligations. ASEAN,
moreover, is increasingly adopting coordinated approaches for
interdependencies like unemployment and managing banking and
financial systems. There is widespread sentiment that the Asian currency
crises could have been mitigated had a regional early warning system been
in place, with governments freely sharing information.7 This may translate
into a greater acceptance that a "hands-off' approach is unfeasible in
relation to problems "where the chains of cause and effect stretch across
national and geographical divides.., where the point of origin of the
problems are in one country and the consequences therefore in another."m
270. ASEAN Parliamentarians have recommended that ASEAN develop an early warning
system to monitor and anticipate impending economic crises. See Asean MPs call for crisis
warning system, STRArrs TMES, Aug. 30,1998, at 19.
271. Sukhurnbhand Paribatra, Preparing ASEANfor the 21' Century, Bus. TIMES ONLINE,
Aug. 29,1998 (visited May 27,1999) <http://business-times.asial.com.sg/6/focus5O.html>
This article is extracted from a speech delivered by the Thai Deputy Minister of Foreign
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National borders are becoming as porous as the line that separates
domestic and international affairs.
175 ASEAN has committed itself to the ASEAN 2020 vision of
developing caring communities. This may contribute to inducing internal
changes in modes of government as national governments jettison those
policies that make their societies less open, less caring, and less protective
of individual welfare and dignity. The overlap with human rights here
should be made apparent, linking ASEAN policy towards the goal of
promoting human rights.
176 External influences pushing for human rights and democracy are
also increasing. ASEAN has become a political forum where Asian
countries and world powers can discuss problems of security, political
issues and military concerns as well as trade. This growing engagement of
ASEAN with countries and regional blocs beyond the confines of Southeast
Asia has resulted in the discussion of human rights and political
liberalization issues at the highest ministerial levels, as in the ASEM
context. The international community should continue to exert pressure on
egregious human rights violators like Burma, particularly where Burma's
fellow ASEAN states refuse to do so. Unacceptable government conduct
cannot be glossed over, lest dictators and tyrants be encouraged in their
repression. While it may not be profitable to isolate Burma, Burma should
be taken sternly to task in international and regional fora. ASEAN states
should press their fellow members for change, even if this is done in
private. ASEAN should also be encouraged to take responsibility for its
policy of "constructive engagement" by publicizing concrete improvements
in the human rights situation in Burma. The failure to report any
improvement will itself pose a reason for changing a policy demonstrated
not to work.
177 The post-1997 period marks the demise of the orthodoxy of
optimism in ASEAN, given the region's economic downturn and socio-
political unrest. Much of the national and regional resilience of ASEAN
and its members rested on their economic successes; that bubble has been
punctured, as countries like Indonesia face desperate economic crises and
struggle to meet even the basic needs of their people. The task of elevating
the human dignity of ASEAN peoples is mammoth. It will require staving
off violence, rebellions, instability and insecurity, and the holistic
promotion and protection of human rights.
178 Before ASEAN can speak of having a human rights convention,
commission, or court, its peoples must become aware of human rights and
how they can be of practical use. Educational initiatives in this regard
should be affiliated with and support the United Nations Human Rights
Education decade (1995-2004).m Educating public officials about their
Affairs at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30"' Anniversary Conference on "Southeast
Asia in the 21' Century: Challenges of Globalisation.]
272. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASiAN CULTUREs CoNTunY AND CHANGE: A REGIONAL
REPORT IN SUPPORT OF THE U.N. DECADE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS EDUcATION (Jefferson R. Plantilla
& Sebasti L. Raj eds., 1997).
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responsibilities under human rights law may induce a change in behavior
while educating people about their rights will enable them to participate in
formulating human rights standards at both the domestic and international
level. Exposure to the international human rights regime will feed domestic
initiatives urging governments to ratify human rights treaties or to set up
regional institutions, thereby strengthening civil society.
179 Encouraging trends can be found in the ratification of human
rights treaties by individual ASEAN countries, albeit muted by extensive
reservations, and in their greater acceptance of the United Nations' role in
promoting human rights. Several ASEAN states, for example, have
permitted special rapporteurs from thematic U.N. human rights
committees to conduct on-site investigations.,27 The development of
national human rights commissions can promote a climate for human
rights advocacy and provide useful models for addressing human rights
issues. It is heartening too, that ASEAN is developing specific programs for
promoting the interests of women and children. It will be easier for human
rights activists to engage ASEAN in dialogue over these matters, for which
ASEAN has already demonstrated concern.
[180 On a more localized basis, some positive changes may be
observed. While Indonesia still struggles with a mounting economic crisis
and the daily risk of civil disorder, a slow change in the government's
attitude toward human rights is taking place. This is evident in the
aftermath of the November riots and military crackdoivn. The human
rights commission called for a probe into the violence, followed by the
unprecedented step of the Indonesia military taking out advertisements in
three major newspapers to express condolences for the fourteen dead. 4
Apparently accepting responsibility, the government stated that the
hundreds injured in the attack would receive free medical treatment. 0
Governments should be reminded that commitments to human rights,
which can contribute to a stable political order in the long run (as opposed
to order coercively maintained, which is inherently unstable), can serve
other goals. A government respecting human rights and environmental
concerns may well, for example, be able to attract more aid and investment.
181 NGO activism in the region is crucial to the task of popularizing
human rights consciousness and drawing attention to abuses. Attention
should be focused on establishing the groundwork for an institutionalized
273. For example, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions visited Indonesia in 1994. See STEINER & AESTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
iN CorEXT: LAW, POLIcS, MORALS 437,437-38 (1996). The Working Group on
Disappearances visited the Philippines in 1992 and the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention visited Vietnam in November 1994. Burma, however, continues to deny entry to the
U.N. Special Rapporteur for Burma.
274. See Abri Says 'Sony' in Ads, STRAITS TIMES L\rERACnTvE, Nov. 19,1998 (visited May 9,
1999) 19 http://straitstimes.asial.com/pages/seal 1119.html. See also President Habibie's
apology for military atrocities committed in Aceh in Habibie apologises to Aceh people, STRArrs
TIMES, Mar. 27,1999, at 2.
275. See Those Injured in Unrest to Get Free Treatment, STRArTs TIMES INTERACnvE, Nov. 19,
1998 (visited May 9,1999) <http://straitstimes.asia1.com/pages/sea12 1119.htmnl>.
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human rights culture at the grassroots level, line by line, precept by
precept. Government action must be called to account first through the
internal check of an active civil society, and then through the external
check of the international community.
f182 The international community will need the wisdom to know
when to condemn human rights abuses and when to come alongside
ASEAN states in an attitude of partnership to offer expert help and
technical assistance, and all states should be critical of their own human
rights records. They are all accountable to the same law and all fall short, to
varying degrees. To assume a posture of moral superiority is to promote a
battle of wills that detracts from the real task of promoting the welfare of
human beings. Yet, the human rights deficiencies of a state that criticizes
another state do not in themselves provide an excuse for the criticized state
to ignore its own shortcomings.
[183 The international community can help in building the national
resilience of ASEAN states by supporting the development of civil society,
and government based on the rule of law. These will take time to grow; it
cannot be imposed by decree or will. With sober realism, one must
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Appendix I (EF = Entry into Force)
Treaty ASEAN State Party
Convention against Torture and other Cambodia 14 Nov 1992 EF
Cruel Inhumane or Degrading Treatment Indonesia 23 Oct 1985 (Date Signed)
or Punishmentm6  Philippines 26 Jun 1987 ElF
Convention for the Elimination of All Cambodia 14 Nov 1992 ElF
Forms of Discrimination Against Women27 Indonesia 13 Oct 1984 ElF
Laos 13 Sept 1981 ElF
Malaysia 4 Aug 1991 ElF
Myanmar 21 Aug 1997 ElF
Philippines 4 Sept 1981 ElF
Singapore 5 Nov 1995 ElF
Thailand 8 Sept 1985 EIF
Vietnam 19 March 1982 ElF
Convention on the Rights of the Childm Brunei Darussalam 26 Jan 1996 ElF
Cambodia 14 Nov 1992 ElF
Indonesia 5 Oct 1990 ElF
Laos 7 Jun 1991 ElF
Malaysia 19 Mar 1995 EIF
Myanmar 14 Aug 1991 ElF
Philippines 20 Sept 1990 ElF
Singapore 4 Nov 1995 ElF
Thailand 26 April 1992 ElF
Vietnam 2 Sept 1990 ElF
Convention for the Elimination of All Cambodia 28 Dec 1983 ElF
Forms of Racial Discrimination Laos 24 March 1974 ElF
Philippines 4 Jan 1969 ElF
Vietnam 9 Jul 1982 EIF
International Convention on the Protection Philippines 5 July 1995 Receipt of
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Instrument
Members of their Families
International Covenant of Civil and Cambodia 26 Aug 1992 ElF
Political Rightsm (ICCPR) Philippines 23 Jan 1987 ElF
Thailand 29 Jan 1997 EF
Vietnam 24 Dec 1982 ELF
276. UNTS Vol. 1465 at page 85. At present it has 66 signatories and 106 parties.
277. UNTS Vol. 1249 at page 13. At present, it has 97 signatories and 162 parties.
278. Do. A/RES/44/25. At present, it has 140 signatories and 191 parties, making it the
most widely ratified treaty.
279. UNTS Vol. 660 at page 195. At present, it has 77 signatories and 151 parties.
280. UNTS vol. 999 at page 171. The Covenant has 59 signatories and 140 parties.
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Treaty (continued) ASEAN State Party
International Covenant on Economic, Cambodia 28 Aug 1992 ElF
Social and Cultural Rights Philippines 3 Jan 1976 ElF
Vietnam 23 Dec 1982 ElF
Optional Protocol to the ICCPRO' Philippines 22 Nov 1989 ElF
Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR0 None.
281. UNTS Vol. 999 at page 171. The protocol has 26 signatories and 92 parties.
282. Doc. A/RES/44/128. The protocol has 21 signatories ind 33 parties.
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